David Eyers

David Eyers

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

David Eyers

University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

25Years (2002-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
23 July 2015 in IEEE Internet of Things Journal
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
JSJatinder Singh
Jatinder Singh
TPThomas Pasquier
Thomas Pasquier
JBJean Bacon
Jean Bacon
HKHajoon Ko
Hajoon Ko
DEDavid Eyers
David Eyers
To realize the broad vision of pervasive computing, underpinned by the “Internet of Things” (IoT), it is essential to break down application and technology-based silos and support broad connectivity and data sharing; the cloud being a natural enabler. Work in IoT tends toward the subsystem, often focusing on particular technical concerns or application domains, before offloading data to the cloud. As such, there has been little regard given to the security, privacy, and personal safety risks that arise beyond these subsystems; i.e., from the wide-scale, cross-platform openness that cloud services bring to IoT. In this paper, we focus on security considerations for IoT from the perspectives of cloud tenants, end-users, and cloud providers, in the context of wide-scale IoT proliferation, working across the range of IoT technologies (be they things or entire IoT subsystems). Our contribution is to analyze the current state of cloud-supported IoT to make explicit the security considerations that require further work.

24 September 2017
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
PDF file
TPThomas Pasquier
Thomas Pasquier
XHXueyuan Han
Xueyuan Han
MGMark Goldstein
Mark Goldstein
TMThomas Moyer
Thomas Moyer
DEDavid Eyers
David Eyers
JBJean Bacon
Jean Bacon
Data provenance describes how data came to be in its present form. It includes data sources and the transformations that have been applied to them. Data provenance has many uses, from forensics and security to aiding the reproducibility of scientific experiments. We present CamFlow, a whole-system provenance capture mechanism that integrates easily into a PaaS offering. While there have been several prior whole-system provenance systems that captured a comprehensive, systemic and ubiquitous record of a system's behavior, none have been widely adopted. They either A) impose too much overhead, B) are designed for long-outdated kernel releases and are hard to port to current systems, C) generate too much data, or D) are designed for a single system. CamFlow addresses these shortcoming by: 1) leveraging the latest kernel design advances to achieve efficiency; 2) using a self-contained, easily maintainable implementation relying on a Linux Security Module, NetFilter, and other existing kernel facilities; 3) providing a mechanism to tailor the captured provenance data to the needs of the application; and 4) making it easy to integrate provenance across distributed systems. The provenance we capture is streamed and consumed by tenant-built auditor applications. We illustrate the usability of our implementation by describing three such applications: demonstrating compliance with data regulations; performing fault/intrusion detection; and implementing data loss prevention. We also show how CamFlow can be leveraged to capture meaningful provenance without modifying existing applications.Comment: 15 pages, 7 figure

6 January 2014 in IEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
JBJean Bacon
Jean Bacon
DEDavid Eyers
David Eyers
TPThomas Pasquier
Thomas Pasquier
JSJatinder Singh
Jatinder Singh
IPIoannis Papagiannis
Ioannis Papagiannis
PPPeter Pietzuch
Peter Pietzuch
Security concerns are widely seen as an obstacle to the adoption of cloud computing solutions. Information Flow Control (IFC) is a well understood Mandatory Access Control methodology. The earliest IFC models targeted security in a centralised environment, but decentralised forms of IFC have been designed and implemented, often within academic research projects. As a result, there is potential for decentralised IFC to achieve better cloud security than is available today. In this paper we describe the properties of cloud computing-Platform-as-a-Service clouds in particular-and review a range of IFC models and implementations to identify opportunities for using IFC within a cloud computing context. Since IFC security is linked to the data that it protects, both tenants and providers of cloud services can agree on security policy, in a manner that does not require them to understand and rely on the particulars of the cloud software stack in order to effect enforcement.

15 October 2018
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
PDF file
TPThomas Pasquier
Thomas Pasquier
XHXueyuan Han
Xueyuan Han
TMThomas Moyer
Thomas Moyer
ABAdam Bates
Adam Bates
OHOlivier Hermant
Olivier Hermant
MSMargo Seltzer
Margo Seltzer

9 October 2015 in IEEE Transactions on Cloud Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
TPThomas Pasquier
Thomas Pasquier
JSJatinder Singh
Jatinder Singh
DEDavid Eyers
David Eyers
JBJean Bacon
Jean Bacon
A model of cloud services is emerging whereby a few trusted providers manage the underlying hardware and communications whereas many companies build on this infrastructure to offer higher level, cloud-hosted PaaS services and/or SaaS applications. From the start, strong isolation between cloud tenants was seen to be of paramount importance, provided first by virtual machines (VM) and later by containers, which share the operating system (OS) kernel. Increasingly it is the case that applications also require facilities to effect isolation and protection of data managed bythose applications. They also require flexible data sharingwith other applications, often across the traditional cloud-isolation boundaries; for example, when government, consisting of different departments, provides services to its citizens through a common platform. These concerns relate to the management of data. Traditional access control is application and principal/role specific, applied at policy enforcement points, after which there is no subsequent control over where data flows;a crucial issue once data has left its owner's control by cloud-hosted applications andwithin cloud-services. Information Flow Control (IFC), in addition, offers system-wide, end-to-end, flow control based on the properties of the data. We discuss the potential of clouddeployed IFC for enforcingowners' data flow policy with regard to protection and sharing, aswell as safeguarding against malicious or buggy software. In addition, the audit log associated with IFC provides transparency and offers system-wide visibility over data flows. This helps those responsible to meet their data management obligations, providing evidence of compliance, and aids in the identification ofpolicy errors and misconfigurations. We present our IFC model and describe and evaluate our IFC architecture and implementation (CamFlow). This comprises an OS level implementation of IFC with support for application management, together with an IFC-enabled middleware.

15 August 2017 in Personal and Ubiquitous Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
TPThomas Pasquier
Thomas Pasquier
JSJatinder Singh
Jatinder Singh
JPJulia Powles
Julia Powles
DEDavid Eyers
David Eyers
MSMargo Seltzer
Margo Seltzer
JBJean Bacon
Jean Bacon