16 March 2016 in Proceedings of the IEEE
CKCharalambos Konstantinou
+1
Industrial control systems (ICSs) are transitioning from legacy-electromechanical-based systems to modern information and communication technology (ICT)-based systems creating a close coupling between cyber and physical components. In this paper, we explore the ICS cybersecurity landscape including: 1) the key principles and unique aspects of ICS operation; 2) a brief history of cyberattacks on ICS; 3) an overview of ICS security assessment; 4) a survey of “uniquely-ICS” testbeds that capture the interactions between the various layers of an ICS; and 5) current trends in ICS attacks and defenses.
29 May 2017 in IEEE Design & Test
The following is a survey on surveys and may help the interested reader to find a way through the jungle of literature on the security and CPS topics out there already. In order to ease the search, the authors have provided a classification in CPS Domains, Attacks, Defenses, Research-trends, Network-security, Security level implementation, and Computational Strategies which makes this survey a unique and I believe very helpful article.
20 September 2021 in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Recent work has shown that the introduction of autonomous vehicles (AVs) in traffic could help reduce traffic jams. Deep reinforcement learning methods demonstrate good performance in complex control problems, including autonomous vehicle control, and have been used in state-of-the-art AV controllers. However, deep neural networks (DNNs) render automated driving vulnerable to machine learning-based attacks. In this work, we explore the backdooring/trojanning of DRL-based AV controllers. We develop a trigger design methodology that is based on well-established principles of traffic physics. The malicious actions include vehicle deceleration and acceleration to cause stop-and-go traffic waves to emerge (congestion attacks) or AV acceleration resulting in the AV crashing into the vehicle in front (insurance attack). We test our attack on single-lane and two-lane circuits. Our experimental results show that the backdoored model does not compromise normal operation performance, with the maximum decrease in cumulative rewards being 1%. Still, it can be maliciously activated to cause a crash or congestion when the corresponding triggers appear.
30 September 2008 in IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems
Software-based self-test (SBST) has recently emerged as an effective methodology for the manufacturing test of processors and other components in systems-on-chip (SoCs). By moving test related functions from external resources to the SoC's interior, in the form of test programs that the on-chip processor executes, SBST significantly reduces the need for high-cost, big-iron testers, and enables high-quality at-speed testing and performance binning. Thus far, SBST approaches have focused almost exclusively on the functional (programmer visible) components of the processor. In this paper, we analyze the challenges involved in testing an important component of modern processors, namely, the pipelining logic, and propose a systematic SBST methodology to address them. We first demonstrate that SBST programs that only target the functional components of the processor are not sufficient to test the pipeline logic, resulting in a significant loss of overall processor fault coverage. We further identify the testability hotspots in the pipeline logic using two fully pipelined reduced instruction set computer (RISC) processor benchmarks. Finally, we develop a systematic SBST methodology that enhances existing SBST programs so that they comprehensively test the pipeline logic. The proposed methodology is complementary to previous SBST techniques that target functional components (their results can form the input to our methodology, and thus we can reuse the test development effort behind preexisting SBST programs). We automate our methodology and incorporate it in an integrated software environment (developed using Java, XML, and archC) for the automatic generation of SBST routines for microprocessors. We apply the methodology to the two complex benchmark RISC processors with respect to two fault models: stuck-at fault model and transition delay fault model. Simulation results show that our methodology provides significant improvements for the two fault models, both for the entire processor (12% fault coverage improvement on average) and for the pipeline logic itself (19% fault coverage improvement on average), compared to a conventional SBST approach.