10 October 2019 in IEEE Internet of Things Journal
21 October 2021 in IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) can be leveragedin mobile crowdsensing (MCS) to conduct sensing tasks at remote or rural areas through computation offloading and data sensing. Nonetheless, both computation offloading and data sensing have been separately investigated in most existing studies. In this paper, we propose a novel cooperative data sensing and computation offloading scheme for the UAV-assisted MCS system with an aim to maximize the overall system utility. First, a multi-objective function is formulated to evaluate the system utility by jointly considering flight direction, flight distance, task offloading proportion, and server offload selection for each UAV. Then, the problem is modeled as a partially observable Markov decision process and a multi-agent actor-critic algorithm framework is proposed to train the strategy network for UAVs. Due to high delay and energy costs caused by communications among multiple agents, we train a centralized critic network to model other agents and to seek equilibrium among all UAVs rather than adopting the explicit channel for information exchange. Furthermore, we introduce attention mechanism to enhance the convergence performance in model training phases. Finally, experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness and applicability of our scheme. Compared with baselines, our algorithm shows significant advantages in convergence performance, system utility, task costs, and task completion rate.
18 September 2020 in IEEE Transactions on Services Computing
To support the increasing computation-intensive applications in the Internet of Things (IoT), edge computing is introduced to provide mobile devices computing resources for performing low-latency tasks. Therefore, how to design an effective and secure computing resource allocation mechanism is attracting increasing attention. A lot of works have been done to design an effective computational resource market for IoT, but the problems of vulnerability and inefficiency still exist. In this paper, we propose a two-level Stackelberg game-based computing resource trading mechanism for mobile IoT devices with a credit-based payment approach, which is implemented by smart contracts on blockchain. In our model, the Stackelberg game consists of two levels, i.e., leader-level and user-level. In the leader-level, the computing service provider (CSP) and its agent constitute a composite leader. The agent purchases computing resource from CSP on credit and acts as a broker among leader-level and user-level reselling these computing resources to users. In the user-level, every user experiences social externality, which means users are interdependent. The leader-level subgame makes credit payment easier by making loaning and trading become a joint credit payment. The user-level subgame makes the market more active and closer to reality by introducing social externality. Besides, smart contracts can prevent malicious behaviors such as delay payment. We also conduct equilibrium analysis and prove the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium in our Stackelberg game-based model. Finally, we conduct numerical experiments to evaluate the cost of smart contracts and the performance of each entity with the proposed pricing mechanism.