Praveen Kujal

Praveen Kujal

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Praveen Kujal

Middlesex University

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

13Years (2014-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 August 2016 in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
EBEleonora Bottino
Eleonora Bottino
TGTeresa Maria García-Muñoz
Teresa Maria García-Muñoz
CGCintia Goddio
Cintia Goddio
PKPraveen Kujal
Praveen Kujal

21 July 2016 in PLOS ONE
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
JFJosé Luis Ferreira
José Luis Ferreira
PKPraveen Kujal
Praveen Kujal
SRStephen Rassenti
Stephen Rassenti
We test the competition enhancing effect of selling forward in experimental Cournot duopoly and quadropoly with multiple forward markets. We find that two forward periods yields competitive outcomes and that the results are very close to the predicted theoretical results for quantity setting duopolies and quadropolies. Our experiments lend strong support to the hypothesis that forward markets are competition enhancing. We then test a new market that allows for endogenously determined indefinitely many forward periods that only close when sellers coordinate on selling a zero amount in a forward market. We find that the outcomes under an endogenous close rule are also very competitive. These results hold for both duopolies and quadropolies.

2 November 2023 in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
LELara Ezquerra
Lara Ezquerra
JGJoaquin Gomez-Minambres
Joaquin Gomez-Minambres
NJNatalia Jimenez
Natalia Jimenez
PKPraveen Kujal
Praveen Kujal

1 January 2014 in SSRN Electronic Journal
Verified
Preprint
Open access
PDF file
JJJoseph E. Harrington Jr
Joseph E. Harrington Jr
RGRoberto Hernan Gonzalez
Roberto Hernan Gonzalez
PKPraveen Kujal
Praveen Kujal
Collusion is when firms coordinate on suppressing competition, and coordination typically requires that firms communicate in some manner. This study conducts ex

1 January 2020 in SSRN Electronic Journal
Verified
Preprint
Open access
PDF file
ACAntonio Cabrales
Antonio Cabrales
ICIrma Clots-Figueras
Irma Clots-Figueras
RHRoberto Hernã¡N-Gonzã¡Lez
Roberto Hernã¡N-Gonzã¡Lez
PKPraveen Kujal
Praveen Kujal
Formal or informal institutions have long been adopted by societies to protect against opportunistic behavior. However, we know very little about how these institutions are chosen and their impact on behavior. We experimentally investigate the demand for different levels of institutions that provide low to high levels of insurance and its subsequent impact on prosocial behavior. We conduct a large-scale online experiment where we add the possibility of purchasing insurance to safeguard against low reciprocity to the standard trust game. We compare two different mechanisms, the private (purchase) and the social (voting) choice of institutions. Whether voted or purchased, we find that there is demand for institutions in low trustworthiness groups, while high trustworthiness groups always demand lower levels of institutions. Lower levels of institutions are demanded when those who can benefit from opportunistic behavior, i.e. low trustworthiness individuals, can also vote for them. Importantly, the presence of insurance crowds out civic spirit even when subjects can choose the no insurance option: trustworthiness when formal institutions are available is lower than in their absence.

1 January 2020 in SSRN Electronic Journal
Verified
Preprint
Open access
PDF file
ACAntonio Cabrales
Antonio Cabrales
ICIrma Clots-Figueras
Irma Clots-Figueras
RHRoberto Hernán-González
Roberto Hernán-González
PKPraveen Kujal
Praveen Kujal
Formal or informal institutions have long been adopted by societies to protect against opportunistic behavior. However, we know very little about how these institutions are chosen and their impact on behavior. We experimentally investigate the demand for different levels of institutions that provide low to high levels of insurance and its subsequent impact on prosocial behavior. We conduct a large-scale online experiment where we add the possibility of purchasing insurance to safeguard against low reciprocity to the standard trust game. We compare two different mechanisms, the private (purchase) and the social (voting) choice of institutions.Whether voted or purchased, we find that there is demand for institutions in low trustworthiness groups, while high trustworthiness groups always demand lower levels of institutions. Lower levels of institutions are demanded when those who can benefit from opportunistic behavior, i.e. low trustworthiness individuals, can also vote for them. Importantly, the presence of insurance crowds out civic spirit even when subjects can choose the no insurance option: trustworthiness when formal institutions are available is lower than in their absence.