John H. Kagel

John H. Kagel

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John H. Kagel

Ohio State University, Columbus, USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

26Years (2001-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 June 2004 in Experimental Economics
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GCGary Charness
Gary Charness
GFGuillaume R. Frechette
Guillaume R. Frechette
JKJohn H. Kagel
John H. Kagel
The gift-exchange game is a form of sequential prisoner's dilemma, developed by Fehr et al. (1993), and popularized in a series of papers by Ernst Fehr and co-authors. While the European studies typically feature a high degree of gift exchange, the few U.S. studies provide some conflicting results. We find that the degree of gift exchange is surprisingly sensitive to an apparently innocuous change—whether or not a comprehensive payoff table is provided in the instructions. We also find significant and substantial time trends in responder behavior.

1 November 2005 in Econometrica
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GFGuillaume Frechette
Guillaume Frechette
JKJohn H. Kagel
John H. Kagel
MMMassimo Morelli
Massimo Morelli

1 May 2003 in American Political Science Review
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GFGuillaume R. Fréechette
Guillaume R. Fréechette
JKJohn H. Kagel
John H. Kagel
SLSteven F. Lehrer
Steven F. Lehrer
We investigate the differential effects of open versus closed amendment rules within the framework of a distributive model of legislative bargaining. The data show that there are longer delays in distributing benefits and a more egalitarian distribution of benefits under the open amendment rule, the proposer gets a larger share of the benefits than coalition members under both rules, and play converges toward minimal winning coalitions under the closed amendment rule. However, there are important quantitative differences between the theoretical model underlying the experiment (Baron and Ferejohn 1989) and data, as the frequency of minimal winning coalitions is much greater under the closed rule (the theory predicts minimal winning coalitions under both rules for our parameter values) and the distribution of benefits between coalition members is much more egalitarian than predicted. The latter are consistent with findings from shrinking pie bilateral bargaining game experiments in economics, to which we relate our results.Research support from the Economics Division and the DRMS Divisions of NSF and the University of Pittsburgh is gratefully acknowledged. We have benefited from comments by David Cooper, Massimo Morelli, Jack Ochs, and seminar participants at Carnegie Mellon University, École des Hautes Études Commerciales, Harvard University, Indiana University, ITAM, Université de Montreal, Universite du Québec a Montréal, University of Pittsburgh, Joseph L. Rotman School, University of Toronto, Ohio State University, Texas \widehat{{\rm A}{\&}{\rm M}} University, Tilburg University CENTER, Western Michigan University, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, the 2000 Public Choice Meetings, the 2000 Summer Institute in Behavioral Economics, the 2000 Econometric Society World Congress meetings, and the CEA 35th Annual Meetings. We are responsible for all remaining errors.

1 June 2010 in Experimental Economics
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JKJohn H. Kagel
John H. Kagel
HSHankyoung Sung
Hankyoung Sung
EWEyal Winter
Eyal Winter
Veto power consists of the right of one or more players to unilaterally block decisions but without the ability to unilaterally secure their preferred outcome. Our experiment shows that (i) committees with a veto player take longer to reach decisions (are less efficient) and generate less consensus than without a veto player, (ii) veto power substantially enhances proposer's power, and (iii) non-veto players are substantially more willing to compromise than veto players. We relate our results to the theoretical literature on the impact of veto power as well as to concerns about the impact of veto power in real-life committees.

1 July 2015 in Journal of the Economic Science Association
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ABAndrzej Baranski
Andrzej Baranski
JKJohn H. Kagel
John H. Kagel
We investigate the Baron-Ferejohn (The American Political Science Review 83(4): 1181–1206, 1989) model of legislative bargaining with cheap talk between the designated proposer and potential coalition partners. Communication results in substantially increased proposer power close to the stationary subgame perfect equilibrium prediction. This is achieved primarily through voters competing with each other to get the proposer to include them in the winning coalition, while arguing for a zero allocation for redundant voters. Voters typically follow through on their stated reservation shares, but proposers often fail to partner with voters making excessively low offers, as these are more likely to be reneged on.

1 September 2009 in Journal of the European Economic Association
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DCDavid J. Cooper
David J. Cooper
JKJohn H. Kagel
John H. Kagel
We study the impact of meaningful versus abstract context on cross-game learning in a signaling game experiment. With individual decision makers (referred to as 1x1 games) meaningful context promotes positive cross-game learning in moving from a game with a pooling equilibrium to one where the only pure strategy equilibrium is separating. Abstract context (commonly employed in economic experiments) yields negative cross-game learning in this case. In 1x1 games a change in the (meaningful) context which accompanies "superficial" changes in the game stalls the learning process compared to an abstract context that does not change. This stall does not occur in games with two-person teams as decision makers. These also show substantially higher levels of strategic play throughout. We relate the effect of meaningful context on cross-game learning to the psychology literature on deductive reasoning processes.