Mathieu Lefebvre

Mathieu Lefebvre

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Mathieu Lefebvre

Aix Marseille University, CNRS, AMSE, Marseille, France

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

21Years (2006-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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7 August 2014 in Journal of the European Economic Association
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
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FVFerdinand M. Vieider
Ferdinand M. Vieider
MLMathieu Lefebvre
Mathieu Lefebvre
RBRanoua Bouchouicha
Ranoua Bouchouicha
TCThorsten Chmura
Thorsten Chmura
RHRustamdjan Hakimov
Rustamdjan Hakimov
PMPeter Martinsson
Peter Martinsson

17 April 2014 in International Tax and Public Finance
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Journal Article
Closed access
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MLMathieu Lefebvre
Mathieu Lefebvre
PPPierre Pestieau
Pierre Pestieau
Arno RiedlArno Riedl
Arno Riedl
MVMarie Claire Villeval
Marie Claire Villeval

24 November 2012 in Social Choice and Welfare
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Journal Article
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MLMathieu Lefebvre
Mathieu Lefebvre
PPPierre Pestieau
Pierre Pestieau
GPGregory Ponthiere
Gregory Ponthiere

19 October 2012 in Theory and Decision
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Journal Article
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MLMathieu Lefebvre
Mathieu Lefebvre
FVFerdinand M. Vieider
Ferdinand M. Vieider

17 January 2020 in PLOS ONE
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Journal Article
Open access
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MLMathieu Lefebvre
Mathieu Lefebvre
ASAnne Stenger
Anne Stenger
Using a common experimental framework, this paper addresses both the question of the short-term and the long-lasting effects of temporary monetary and non-monetary incentive mechanisms on increasing individual contributions to the public good. The results show that both punishments and rewards significantly increase contributions compared to the baseline, but that monetary sanctions lead to the highest contributions, whereas non-monetary sanctions lead to the lowest contributions. The four types of incentives display long-lasting effects, i.e., contributions do not go back to baseline levels directly after the withdrawal of the incentives. However, rewards appear to have much stronger persistent effects than sanctions, revealing some sort of delayed reciprocity.

1 January 2014 in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
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Journal Article
Closed access
MLMathieu Lefebvre
Mathieu Lefebvre
FVFerdinand M. Vieider
Ferdinand M. Vieider