5 April 2021 in Journal of Population Research
29 March 2021 in Population Studies
Extensive literature has documented the contribution of rising women’s education to decreases in completed cohort fertility (CCF). A key question related to the education–fertility relationship is to what extent the decrease in fertility is the result of changes in educational composition vs changes in fertility behaviours within educational categories. This study quantified the effect of educational expansion on fertility levels by decomposing the overall change in CCF into educational composition and education-specific fertility, and explored the changes in parity-specific components of CCF by education for cohorts born between 1940 and 1970. The results show that, despite the decline in CCF being caused mostly by changes in fertility behaviours, educational composition had a considerable impact for some cohorts. The decline in third and higher-order births played a central role in the fall in CCF across educational groups, while the effects of transitions to first and second births varied substantially.
18 January 2021 in Demography
Increases in the average age at first birth and in the proportion of women remaining childless have extended the total number of years that women spend childless during their reproductive lifetime in several countries. To quantify the number of years that reproductive-age women live without children, we introduce the cross-sectional average length of life childless (CALC). This measure includes all the age-specific first-birth information available for the cohorts present at time t; it is a period measure based on cohort data. Using the Human Fertility Database, CALC is calculated for the year 2015 for all countries with long enough histories of fertility available. Results show that women in the majority of the studied countries spend, on average, more than half of their reproductive lives childless. Furthermore, the difference between CALCs in two countries can be decomposed to give a clear visualization of how each cohort contributes to the difference in the duration of the length of childless life in those populations. Our illustration of the decomposition shows that (1) in recent years, female cohorts in Japan and Spain at increasingly younger ages have been contributing to more years of childless life compared with those in Sweden, (2) the United States continues to represent an exception among the high-income countries with a low expectation for childless life of women, and (3) Hungary experienced a strong period effect of the recent Great Recession. These examples show that CALC and its decomposition can provide insights into first-birth patterns.
1 September 2023 in Demographic Research
Volume 49 - Article 16 | Pages 423–464
10 September 2024 in Demographic Research
Volume 51 - Article 19 | Pages 625–636
17 May 2024 in Statistics, Politics and Policy
Social scientists have long been interested in how attitudes and values influence fertility intentions and behaviors. The role of political ideology has, on the contrary, been overlooked. Right-wing people tend to be more religious, to hold more traditional views on gender roles and on the importance of the family. Therefore, right-wing people may be more likely to hold positive fertility intentions that individuals with other political orientations. In addition, political ideology may have an effect on fertility intention independent of other attitudes. Using two rounds of the European Social Survey, we show that people that position at the extreme right of the political ideology scale are more likely to intend to have a child during the three years following the interview. This association holds even after accounting for several socio-demographic and economic factors, values and attitudes. Heterogeneity tests show that the association is restricted to younger individuals (aged 20–34), with higher levels of education (at least upper secondary), and individuals in Eastern Europe. In Southern Europe right-wing individuals show significantly higher predicted probabilities of a positive fertility intention compared people that locate themselves in the political center. The statistically significant associations are also sizeable (differences in terms of predicted probabilities vary between 4 and 9 percentage points). These results point to the importance of considering a neglected factor in fertility research and contribute to the growing field of Political Demography.