Brooks Davis

Brooks Davis

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Brooks Davis

SRI International, Menlo Park, California, United States of America

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

3Years (2024-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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27 April 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
NFNathaniel Wesley Filardo
Nathaniel Wesley Filardo
BGBrett F. Gutstein
Brett F. Gutstein
JWJonathan Woodruff
Jonathan Woodruff
JCJessica Clarke
Jessica Clarke
PRPeter Rugg
Peter Rugg
RWRobert N. M. Watson
Robert N. M. Watson
Violations of temporal memory safety ("use after free", "UAF") continue to pose a significant threat to software security. The CHERI capability architecture has shown promise as a technology for C and C++ language reference integrity and spatial memory safety. Building atop CHERI, prior works - CHERIvoke and Cornucopia - have explored adding heap temporal safety. The most pressing limitation of Cornucopia was its impractical "stop-the-world" pause times. We present Cornucopia Reloaded, a re-designed drop-in replacement implementation of CHERI temporal safety, using a novel architectural feature - a per-page capability load barrier, added in Arm's Morello prototype CPU and CHERI-RISC-V - to nearly eliminate application pauses. We analyze the performance of Reloaded as well as Cornucopia and CHERIvoke on Morello, using the CHERI-compatible SPEC CPU2006 INT workloads to assess its impact on batch workloads and using pgbench and gRPC QPS as surrogate interactive workloads. Under Reloaded, applications no longer experience significant revocation-induced stop-the-world periods, without additional wall- or CPU-time cost over Cornucopia and with median 87% of Cornucopia's DRAM traffic overheads across SPEC CPU2006 and < 50% for pgbench.

21 June 2024 in IEEE Security & Privacy
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
RWRobert N. M. Watson
Robert N. M. Watson
DCDavid Chisnall
David Chisnall
JCJessica Clarke
Jessica Clarke
BDBrooks Davis
Brooks Davis
NFNathaniel Wesley Filardo
Nathaniel Wesley Filardo
JWJonathan Woodruff
Jonathan Woodruff
The memory-safe Capability Hardware Enhanced RISC Instructions (CHERI) C and C++ languages build on architectural capabilities in the CHERI protection model. With the development of two industrial CHERI-enabled processors, Arm’s Morello and Microsoft’s CHERIoT, CHERI may offer the fastest path to widely deployed memory safety.

17 April 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
VZVadim Zaliva
Vadim Zaliva
KMKayvan Memarian
Kayvan Memarian
RARicardo Almeida
Ricardo Almeida
JCJessica Clarke
Jessica Clarke
BDBrooks Davis
Brooks Davis
PSPeter Sewell
Peter Sewell
Memory safety issues are a persistent source of security vulnerabilities, with conventional architectures and the C codebase chronically prone to exploitable errors. The CHERI research project has shown how one can provide radically improved security for that existing codebase with minimal modification, using unforgeable hardware capabilities in place of machine-word pointers in CHERI dialects of C, implemented as adaptions of Clang/LLVM and GCC. CHERI was first prototyped as extensions of MIPS and RISC-V; it is currently being evaluated by Arm and others with the Arm Morello experimental architecture, processor, and platform, to explore its potential for mass-market adoption, and by Microsoft in their CHERIoT design for embedded cores. There is thus considerable practical experience with CHERI C implementation and use, but exactly what CHERI C's semantics is (or should be) remains an open question. In this paper, we present the first attempt to rigorously and comprehensively define CHERI C semantics, discuss key semantics design questions relating to capabilities, provenance, and undefined behaviour, and clarify them with semantics in multiple complementary forms: in prose, as an executable semantics adapting the Cerberus C semantics, and mechanised in Coq. This establishes a solid foundation for CHERI C, for those porting code to it, for compiler implementers, and for future semantics and verification.

14 November 2026
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
DGDapeng Gao
Dapeng Gao
JBJohn Baldwin
John Baldwin
JCJessica Clarke
Jessica Clarke
NCNicholas C. Connolly
Nicholas C. Connolly
BDBrooks Davis
Brooks Davis
RWRobert N. M. Watson
Robert N. M. Watson