Yingjin Xu

Yingjin Xu

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Yingjin Xu

School of Philosophy, Fudan University, Shanghai, China

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

17Years (2010-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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9 May 2012 in Synthese
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YXYingjin Xu
Yingjin Xu
PWPei Wang
Pei Wang

1 August 2023 in Fudan Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences
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YXYingjin Xu
Yingjin Xu

29 September 2021 in Asian Philosophy
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YXYingjin Xu
Yingjin Xu
To have a coherent picture of Wang Chong’s Lunheng is difficult. Some of Lunheng’s chapters obviously show Wang’s hostility to a large part of the folklore (including the social institutions based on it) and traditional philosophical texts. In some other chapters, however, Wang appears to be more sympathetic to the social institutions related to folk religious beliefs. Esther Sunkyung Klein & Colin Klein attempt to explain this prima facie inconsistency in terms of ‘piecemeal non-reductionism’, which roughly means that Wang would take any testimonial belief for granted until he can find a defeater of such a belief. But this explanation merely depicts Wang as a defeater-seeker rather than a thinker looking for philosophical grounds of his claims in a more positive manner. In contrast, in this paper, I intend to attribute the following epistemological thesis to Wang: A testimonial belief taken from classics or folklore will be judged as unjustified if the knowledge attributor finds a non-negligible defeater of it, and such an attributor would feel more sympathetic to the target belief if it can be at least prima facie justified in the light of analogical reasoning.

30 March 2020 in Episteme
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YXYingjin Xu
Yingjin Xu
“Epistemic safety” refers to an epistemic status in which the subject acquires true beliefs without involving epistemic luck. There is a tradition of cashing out safety-defining modality in terms of possible world semantics (as put forward by Duncan Pritchard), and even Julian Dutant's and Martin Smith's normalcy-based notions of safety also take this semantics as a significant component of them. However, such an approach has to largely depend on epistemologists’ ad hoc intuitions on how to individuate possible worlds and how to pick out “close” worlds. In contrast, I propose a probabilistic approach to safety to maximally preclude the preceding type of ad hoc-ness. The main idea is as follows: Each epistemic vignette wherein a subject S holds a true belief p has to be evaluated by a safety-ascriber, hence, S holds a true belief p safely iff according to the safety-ascriber's evaluation (which is based on her background knowledge), the probability of the occurrence of the truth-maker of p is above a pre-fixed “safety threshold”. My theory will be applied to Lottery Cases, Gettierized Cases and Skeptical Cases to test the scope of its applicability.

1 March 2024 in Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness
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BFBojie Feng
Bojie Feng
NSNady Slam
Nady Slam
YXYingjin Xu
Yingjin Xu

13 January 2010 in International Journal for Philosophy of Religion
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YXYingjin Xu
Yingjin Xu