Extant literature has not fully accounted for the changes underway in China’s perspectives on the ethical risks of artificial intelligence (AI). This article develops a community-of-practice (CoP) approach to the study of Chinese policymaking in the field of AI. It shows that the Chinese approach to ethical AI emerges from the communication of practices of a relatively stable group of actors from three domains—the government, academia, and the private sector. This Chinese CoP is actively cultivated and led by government actors. The paper draws attention to CoP configurations during collective situated-learning and problem-solving among its members that inform the evolution of Chinese ethical concerns of AI. In so doing, it demonstrates how a practice-oriented approach can contribute to interpreting Chinese politics on AI governance.
This research probes the boundary-work of Communities of Practice (CoP) by examining China’s active efforts in advancing a state-centric approach in managing cyberspace in the international arena. Boundaries separating the Global North and South are reproduced in the expansion of what I call the “community of cyber sovereignty.” This phenomenon points to the CoP literature’s omission of the proactive aspects of boundary-work undertaken by core members and its surrounding and confounding historical contexts. I argue that boundary reproduction arises from both deliberate and unreflective moves in cultivating CoP. First, emerging from reflexivity in interacting with the external environment, practitioners in CoPs that are vigorously contested will likely replicate historically successful boundary drawing to acquire or maintain credibility. Second, CoP members engage in the habitual selection of strategies, anchoring the community toward sustaining relationships with actors that its members traditionally associate with. These proactive boundary-work dynamics are enabled by inclusive and exclusive mechanisms such as “brokering” varied practices to include potential members and “gatekeeping” others. My analysis suggests that scholarship must attend to actors’ proactive efforts to establish communities preferentially as well as their linkages with prevailing social structures.
The concept of “ASEAN centrality” emerged in the aftermath of the Cold War but renewed power rivalries in the Indo-Pacific have put its relevance under scrutiny. This study contributes to the debate on the continuity of ASEAN centrality by examining major powers’ willingness to adhere to and engage with ASEAN-led mechanisms, which we argue will have a decisive impact on the dominant form of the organisation of regional order. Our analysis shows that the major powers – China, the European Union, India, Japan, and the United States – subscribe to an enhanced role for ASEAN in the economic realm but do not see the mechanism as the first resort in political and security cooperation. ASEAN centrality is hard to continue, although a possible way out for ASEAN is to leverage its in-between position to help diffuse tensions so major powers have a stake in maintaining its centrality.