European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI), 1000 Brussels, Belgium; and Swiss Finance Institute, 8006 Zurich, Switzerland; and Department of Finance, University of Zurich, 8032 Zurich, Switzerland; and Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), London EC1V 0DX, United Kingdom; and Center for Crisis Competence, University of Zurich, 8032 Zurich, Switzerland
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Alexander F. Wagner
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI), 1000 Brussels, Belgium; and Swiss Finance Institute, 8006 Zurich, Switzerland; and Department of Finance, University of Zurich, 8032 Zurich, Switzerland; and Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), London EC1V 0DX, United Kingdom; and Center for Crisis Competence, University of Zurich, 8032 Zurich, Switzerland
Market reactions to the 2019 novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) provide new insights into how real shocks and financial policies drive firm value. Initially, internationally oriented firms, especially those more exposed to trade with China, underperformed. As the virus spread to Europe and the United States, corporate debt and cash holdings emerged as important value drivers, relevant even after the Fed intervened in the bond market. The content and tone of conference calls mirror this development over time. Overall, the results illustrate how anticipated real effects from the health crisis, a rare disaster, were amplified through financial channels. (JEL G01, G12, G14, G32, F14) Received: May 27, 2020; editorial decision June 16, 2020 by Editor Andrew Ellul. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.
7 March 2017 in Journal of the European Economic Association
Does the presence of immigrants in one’s neighborhood affect voting for far right-wing parties? We study the case of the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) that, under the leadership of Jörg Haider, increased its vote share from less than 5% in the early 1980s to 27% by the end of the 1990s and continued to attract more than 20% of voters in the 2013 national election. We find that the inflow of immigrants into a community has a significant impact on the increase in the community’s voting share for the FPÖ, explaining roughly a tenth of the regional variation in vote changes. Our results suggest that voters worry about adverse labor market effects of immigration, as well as about the quality of their neighborhood. In fact, we find evidence of a negative impact of immigration on “compositional amenities”. In communities with larger immigration influx, Austrian children commute longer distances to school, and fewer daycare resources are provided. We do not find evidence that Austrians move out of communities with increasing immigrant presence. (JEL: P16, J61)
We conduct an experiment assessing the extent to which people trade off the economic costs of truthfulness against the intrinsic costs of lying. The results allow us to reject a type-based model. People's preferences for truthfulness do not identify them as only either “economic types” (who care only about consequences) or “ethical types” (who care only about process). Instead, we find that preferences for truthfulness are heterogeneous among individuals. Moreover, when examining possible sources of intrinsic costs of lying and their interplay with economic costs of truthfulness, we find that preferences for truthfulness are also heterogeneous within individuals.
1 March 2009 in European Journal of Political Economy