This book focuses on the potential for conflict between overlapping constitutional and EU fundamental rights. When constitutional and EU rights overlap and the respective interpretations diverge, state courts are asked to follow the standard of protection defined by the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The ECJ's claim to normative authority needs to be justified. This book advocates a theory of supranational judicial authority grounded in the ideal of dialogue. At the outset, it is argued that traditional approaches to constitutional conflicts based upon supremacy should be overcome. A pluralist framework for structuring the interaction between legal systems in the EU not only offers a better account of reality, but it should be welcomed normatively as well. In this context, the ideal of dialogue will contribute to a better understanding and theorizing of the interaction between national and supranational courts interpreting fundamental rights. Despite multiple and varied references to dialogue in the literature, mostly from a descriptive standpoint, there has been no thorough and rigorous account establishing its legitimating potential regarding ECJ adjudication of fundamental rights norms. This book offers a theoretical account of how the legitimacy of ECJ's authority in adjudicating fundamental rights might be grounded in the ideal of dialogue. The arguments underpinning the legitimating potential of dialogue and the prerequisites for judicial dialogue are explored. Thereafter, the implications of dialogue for the mode of judicial reasoning in interpreting fundamental rights are analyzed. Such a theory of supranational judicial authority would serve as a normative model to assess the activity of the ECJ and to improve current institutional practices.
14 August 2014 in European Constitutional Law Review
On 13 February 2014, the Spanish Constitutional Court came to a final decision regarding the fate of Mr Stefano Melloni. The story of the case is worthy of attention not only from the perspective of the interaction between the Spanish Constitutional Court and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), but also from the standpoint of the conflicting levels of rights' protection in Europe. The story of Melloni can be described in three acts: setup, confrontation, and resolution.First, the setup: in 2011, the Spanish Constitutional Court made its first and (so far) only preliminary reference to the CJEU. The Constitutional Court was faced with a collision between the constitutional right to fair trial of persons convicted in absentia and the obligation under EU law to execute a European arrest warrant (heretofore EAW). This setup generated great anticipation, both because of the protagonists and the type of conflict, since in this case what obstructed one member state from complying with EU law was its higher level of constitutional protection for the right in question.
1 October 2017 in International Journal of Constitutional Law
In the EU, fundamental rights are inextricably intertwined with the federal structure of such a uniquely divided power composite. This article examines the structure of fundamental rights’ protection and the continuous bargaining over the allocation of judicial tasks between domestic and EU courts regarding the interpretation and enforcement of fundamental rights. First, I will analyze the latest Court of Justice case law to show how, since the Charter of Fundamental Rights entered into force, it has had a centralizing effect. Next, I will reflect upon how the “nationalist school of federalism” developed in the US literature might provide valuable insights for an argument grounding supranational authority while acknowledging the contribution of state constitutions and state courts to the supranational system of rights’ protection. In the end, it will be argued that the growing self-empowerment of the Court of Justice in the field of fundamental rights needs to be tempered by an understanding of how state courts and rights could actually promote supranational ends in this context.
1 February 2012 in European Constitutional Law Review
In Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, the CJEU seized the occasion to uphold the principle of judicial independence as a primary obligation for the Member States under the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU. This newly crafted interpretation of Article 19(1) has crystallized in Commission v. Poland, in which the CJEU declared that the reform of the Polish law on the Supreme Court lowering the retirement age of judges breached the obligation to respect judicial independence. The goal of this piece is to assess the bold interpretation given to the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) as a building block of the EU’s constitutional order. First, the expansion of the substantive content of Article 19(1) TEU will be analysed. How did the CJEU justify the shift from an obligation to establish a system of remedies ensuring effective judicial review to an obligation of respect for judicial independence? Second, the scope of this obligation and its potential reach will be critically examined. I will argue that Article 19(1) TEU may actually trigger the application of the Charter. Eventually, Article 19(1) TEU has the potential to become an open door for enforcing the Charter against the States regardless of its limited scope of application.
19 September 2018 in Journal of European Integration
National courts all over Europe have faced the challenge of how to protect rights in times of crisis. In the context of the Spanish housing crisis, judges adopted an activist role by mobilizing the Court of Justice of the EU in multiple cases to challenge national legislation. This forced the Spanish government to adopt reforms to strengthen the position of mortgage debtors to fulfil the obligations under EU consumer law. This article discerns the factors that lead Spanish judges to cooperate with the CJEU. We show that, although political and legal opportunities and resources play a role for the judicial mobilization of EU law, the degree to which they matter vary when we consider: the role of ‘judicial entrepreneurs’ who introduce EU law as a novel legal strategy, and the impact of this tactic on how judicial actors frame EU law, with important consequences for the politics within the judiciary.