Cheng Wan

Cheng Wan

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Cheng Wan

Optimization, SImulation, Risk and Statistics (OSIRIS) Department, Electricit de France, Palaiseau, France

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

15Years (2012-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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18 September 2019 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
XSXin Shi
Xin Shi
DWDan Wu
Dan Wu
CWCheng Wan
Cheng Wan
MWMeng Wang
Meng Wang
YZYu Zhang
Yu Zhang
In this paper, we investigate the secure content delivery issue for device-to-device networks based on the trust evaluation mechanism and covert communication model. Specifically, in order to stimulate the lasting and rational cooperation among mobile devices, we propose a trust evaluation mechanism, where the trust degree between two mobile devices can be obtained through historical assessed values. Simultaneously, a covert communication model is introduced to guarantee the undetectability of content delivery, which helps to stop malicious wardens adopting some coming external attacks. In this way, the availability and dependability of content sharing, as well the confidentiality and integrity of transmitted contents cam be guaranteed. Then, combining security-aware metrics, in terms of trust degree and covert rate, with physical layer transmission performances, in terms of achievable rate and successful delivery probability, we propose the definition of secrecy-aware effective rate to serve as a guidance on the joint optimization issue of content delivery mode selection and resource management, which is formulated as a social welfare maximization problem. To solve the complex problem tactfully, it is decoupled into two subproblems, i.e., mode selection which is a many-to-one matching problem, and resource management which is a one-to-one matching problem. By analyzing the interaction between two issues, a novel hierarchical stable matching algorithm is proposed to obtain three-dimension stable matching results. Its properties, such as stability, convergence, optimality, and complexity, are theoretically analyzed and proved. Finally, extensive numerical results are provided to demonstrate the advantages of our proposed algorithms.

1 August 2023 in Mathematics of Operations Research
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
KLKang Liu
Kang Liu
NONadia Oudjane
Nadia Oudjane
CWCheng Wan
Cheng Wan
This paper shows the existence of [ ]-Nash equilibria in n-player noncooperative sum-aggregative games in which the players’ cost functions, depending only on their own action and the average of all players’ actions, are lower semicontinuous in the former, whereas γ-Hölder continuous in the latter. Neither the action sets nor the cost functions need to be convex. For an important class of sum-aggregative games, which includes congestion games with γ equal to one, a gradient-proximal algorithm is used to construct [ ]-Nash equilibria with at most [ ] iterations. These results are applied to a numerical example concerning the demand-side management of an electricity system. The asymptotic performance of the algorithm when n tends to infinity is illustrated.

13 July 2020 in IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PJPaulin Jacquot
Paulin Jacquot
CWCheng Wan
Cheng Wan
OBOlivier Beaude
Olivier Beaude
NONadia Oudjane
Nadia Oudjane
Aggregative games have many industrial applications, and computing an equilibrium in those games is challenging when the number of players is large. In the framework of atomic aggregative games with coupling constraints, we show that variational Nash equilibria of a large aggregative game can be approximated by a Wardrop equilibrium of an auxiliary population game of smaller dimension. Each population of this auxiliary game corresponds to a group of atomic players of the initial large game. This approach enables an efficient computation of an approximated equilibrium, as the variational inequality characterizing the Wardrop equilibrium is of smaller dimension than the initial one. This is illustrated on an example in the smart grid context.

1 January 2013 in RAIRO - Operations Research
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
SSSylvain Sorin
Sylvain Sorin
CWCheng Wan
Cheng Wan
This work studies a new strategic game called delegation game. A delegation game is associated to a basic game with a finite number of players where each player has a finite integer weight and her strategy consists in dividing it into several integer parts and assigning each part to one subset of finitely many facilities. In the associated delegation game, a player divides her weight into several integer parts, commits each part to an independent delegate and collects the sum of their payoffs in the basic game played by these delegates. Delegation equilibrium payoffs, consistent delegation equilibrium payoffs and consistent chains inducing these ones in a delegation game are defined. Several examples are provided.

21 October 2015 in arXiv
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SSSylvain Sorin
Sylvain Sorin
CWCheng Wan
Cheng Wan
We study games with finitely many participants, each having finitely many choices. We consider the following categories of participants: (I) populations: sets of nonatomic agents, (II) atomic splittable players, (III) atomic non splittable players. We recall and compare the basic properties, expressed through variational inequalities, concerning equilibria, potential games and dissipative games, as well as evolutionary dynamics. Then we consider composite games where the three categories of participants are present, a typical example being congestion games, and extend the previous properties of equilibria and dynamics. Finally we describe an instance of composite potential game.

25 October 2018 in HAL
Verified
Preprint
Open access
PDF file
CWCheng Wan
Cheng Wan
PJPaulin Jacquot
Paulin Jacquot
OBOlivier Beaude
Olivier Beaude
NONadia Oudjane
Nadia Oudjane
Computing an equilibrium in congestion games can be challenging when the number of players is large. Yet, it is a problem to be addressed in practice, for instance to forecast the state of the system and be able to control it. In this work, we analyze the case of generalized atomic congestion games, with coupling constraints, and with players that are heterogeneous through their action sets and their utility functions. We obtain an approximation of the variational Nash equilibria-a notion generalizing Nash equilibria in the presence of coupling constraints-of a large atomic congestion game by an equilibrium of an auxiliary population game, where each population corresponds to a group of atomic players of the initial game. Because the variational inequalities characterizing the equilibrium of the auxiliary game have smaller dimension than the original problem, this approach enables the fast computation of an estimation of equilibria in a large congestion game with thousands of heterogeneous players.