Rosalind M. Eggo

Rosalind M. Eggo

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Rosalind M. Eggo

London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

18Years (2009-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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9 April 2021 in Science
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
NDNicholas G. Davies
Nicholas G. Davies
SASam Abbott
Sam Abbott
RBRosanna C. Barnard
Rosanna C. Barnard
CJChristopher I. Jarvis
Christopher I. Jarvis
AKAdam J. Kucharski
Adam J. Kucharski
WEW. John Edmunds
W. John Edmunds
UK variant transmission: Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) has the capacity to generate variants with major genomic changes. The UK variant B.1.1.7 (also known as VOC 202012/01) has many mutations that alter virus attachment and entry into human cells. Using a variety of statistical and dynamic modeling approaches, Davieset al.characterized the spread of the B.1.1.7 variant in the United Kingdom. The authors found that the variant is 43 to 90% more transmissible than the predecessor lineage but saw no clear evidence for a change in disease severity, although enhanced transmission will lead to higher incidence and more hospital admissions. Large resurgences of the virus are likely to occur after the easing of control measures, and it may be necessary to greatly accelerate vaccine roll-out to control the epidemic.Science, this issue p.eabg3055

1 May 2020 in The Lancet Infectious Diseases
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
AKAdam J Kucharski
Adam J Kucharski
TRTimothy W Russell
Timothy W Russell
CDCharlie Diamond
Charlie Diamond
YLYang Liu
Yang Liu
JEJohn Edmunds
John Edmunds
SFStefan Flasche
Stefan Flasche
An outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) has led to 95 333 confirmed cases as of March 5, 2020. Understanding the early transmission dynamics of the infection and evaluating the effectiveness of control measures is crucial for assessing the potential for sustained transmission to occur in new areas. Combining a mathematical model of severe SARS-CoV-2 transmission with four datasets from within and outside Wuhan, we estimated how transmission in Wuhan varied between December, 2019, and February, 2020. We used these estimates to assess the potential for sustained human-to-human transmission to occur in locations outside Wuhan if cases were introduced. We combined a stochastic transmission model with data on cases of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) in Wuhan and international cases that originated in Wuhan to estimate how transmission had varied over time during January, 2020, and February, 2020. Based on these estimates, we then calculated the probability that newly introduced cases might generate outbreaks in other areas. To estimate the early dynamics of transmission in Wuhan, we fitted a stochastic transmission dynamic model to multiple publicly available datasets on cases in Wuhan and internationally exported cases from Wuhan. The four datasets we fitted to were: daily number of new internationally exported cases (or lack thereof), by date of onset, as of Jan 26, 2020; daily number of new cases in Wuhan with no market exposure, by date of onset, between Dec 1, 2019, and Jan 1, 2020; daily number of new cases in China, by date of onset, between Dec 29, 2019, and Jan 23, 2020; and proportion of infected passengers on evacuation flights between Jan 29, 2020, and Feb 4, 2020. We used an additional two datasets for comparison with model outputs: daily number of new exported cases from Wuhan (or lack thereof) in countries with high connectivity to Wuhan (ie, top 20 most at-risk countries), by date of confirmation, as of Feb 10, 2020; and data on new confirmed cases reported in Wuhan between Jan 16, 2020, and Feb 11, 2020. We estimated that the median daily reproduction number (Rt) in Wuhan declined from 2·35 (95% CI 1·15-4·77) 1 week before travel restrictions were introduced on Jan 23, 2020, to 1·05 (0·41-2·39) 1 week after. Based on our estimates of Rt, assuming SARS-like variation, we calculated that in locations with similar transmission potential to Wuhan in early January, once there are at least four independently introduced cases, there is a more than 50% chance the infection will establish within that population. Our results show that COVID-19 transmission probably declined in Wuhan during late January, 2020, coinciding with the introduction of travel control measures. As more cases arrive in international locations with similar transmission potential to Wuhan before these control measures, it is likely many chains of transmission will fail to establish initially, but might lead to new outbreaks eventually. Wellcome Trust, Health Data Research UK, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, and National Institute for Health Research.

1 April 2020 in The Lancet Global Health
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
JHJoel Hellewell
Joel Hellewell
SASam Abbott
Sam Abbott
AGAmy Gimma
Amy Gimma
NBNikos I Bosse
Nikos I Bosse
CJChristopher I Jarvis
Christopher I Jarvis
RERosalind M Eggo
Rosalind M Eggo
Isolation of cases and contact tracing is used to control outbreaks of infectious diseases, and has been used for coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). Whether this strategy will achieve control depends on characteristics of both the pathogen and the response. Here we use a mathematical model to assess if isolation and contact tracing are able to control onwards transmission from imported cases of COVID-19. We developed a stochastic transmission model, parameterised to the COVID-19 outbreak. We used the model to quantify the potential effectiveness of contact tracing and isolation of cases at controlling a severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2)-like pathogen. We considered scenarios that varied in the number of initial cases, the basic reproduction number (R0), the delay from symptom onset to isolation, the probability that contacts were traced, the proportion of transmission that occurred before symptom onset, and the proportion of subclinical infections. We assumed isolation prevented all further transmission in the model. Outbreaks were deemed controlled if transmission ended within 12 weeks or before 5000 cases in total. We measured the success of controlling outbreaks using isolation and contact tracing, and quantified the weekly maximum number of cases traced to measure feasibility of public health effort. Simulated outbreaks starting with five initial cases, an R0 of 1·5, and 0% transmission before symptom onset could be controlled even with low contact tracing probability; however, the probability of controlling an outbreak decreased with the number of initial cases, when R0 was 2·5 or 3·5 and with more transmission before symptom onset. Across different initial numbers of cases, the majority of scenarios with an R0 of 1·5 were controllable with less than 50% of contacts successfully traced. To control the majority of outbreaks, for R0 of 2·5 more than 70% of contacts had to be traced, and for an R0 of 3·5 more than 90% of contacts had to be traced. The delay between symptom onset and isolation had the largest role in determining whether an outbreak was controllable when R0 was 1·5. For R0 values of 2·5 or 3·5, if there were 40 initial cases, contact tracing and isolation were only potentially feasible when less than 1% of transmission occurred before symptom onset. In most scenarios, highly effective contact tracing and case isolation is enough to control a new outbreak of COVID-19 within 3 months. The probability of control decreases with long delays from symptom onset to isolation, fewer cases ascertained by contact tracing, and increasing transmission before symptoms. This model can be modified to reflect updated transmission characteristics and more specific definitions of outbreak control to assess the potential success of local response efforts. Wellcome Trust, Global Challenges Research Fund, and Health Data Research UK.

16 June 2020 in Nature Medicine
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
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NDNicholas G. Davies
Nicholas G. Davies
PKPetra Klepac
Petra Klepac
YLYang Liu
Yang Liu
KPKiesha Prem
Kiesha Prem
MJMark Jit
Mark Jit
CJChristopher I. Jarvis
Christopher I. Jarvis

1 March 2020 in The Lancet
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
YLYang Liu
Yang Liu
RERosalind M Eggo
Rosalind M Eggo
AKAdam J Kucharski
Adam J Kucharski

17 May 2016 in PLOS Neglected Tropical Diseases
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
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AKAdam J. Kucharski
Adam J. Kucharski
SFSebastian Funk
Sebastian Funk
RERosalind M. Eggo
Rosalind M. Eggo
HMHenri-Pierre Mallet
Henri-Pierre Mallet
WEW. John Edmunds
W. John Edmunds
Eric James NillesEric James Nilles
Eric James Nilles
Between October 2013 and April 2014, more than 30,000 cases of Zika virus (ZIKV) disease were estimated to have attended healthcare facilities in French Polynesia. ZIKV has also been reported in Africa and Asia, and in 2015 the virus spread to South America and the Caribbean. Infection with ZIKV has been associated with neurological complications including Guillain-Barré Syndrome (GBS) and microcephaly, which led the World Health Organization to declare a Public Health Emergency of International Concern in February 2015. To better understand the transmission dynamics of ZIKV, we used a mathematical model to examine the 2013–14 outbreak on the six major archipelagos of French Polynesia. Our median estimates for the basic reproduction number ranged from 2.6–4.8, with an estimated 11.5% (95% CI: 7.32–17.9%) of total infections reported. As a result, we estimated that 94% (95% CI: 91–97%) of the total population of the six archipelagos were infected during the outbreak. Based on the demography of French Polynesia, our results imply that if ZIKV infection provides complete protection against future infection, it would take 12–20 years before there are a sufficient number of susceptible individuals for ZIKV to re-emerge, which is on the same timescale as the circulation of dengue virus serotypes in the region. Our analysis suggests that ZIKV may exhibit similar dynamics to dengue virus in island populations, with transmission characterized by large, sporadic outbreaks with a high proportion of asymptomatic or unreported cases. Since the first reported major outbreak of Zika virus disease in Micronesia in 2007, the virus has caused outbreaks throughout the Pacific and South America. Transmitted by the Aedes genus of mosquitoes, the virus has been linked to possible neurological complications including Guillain-Barré Syndrome and microcephaly. To improve our understanding of the transmission dynamics of Zika virus in island populations, we analysed the 2013–14 outbreak on the six major archipelagos of French Polynesia. We found evidence that Zika virus infected the majority of the population, but only around 12% of total infections on the archipelagos were reported as cases. If infection with Zika virus generates lifelong immunity, we estimate that it would take at least 12–20 years before there are enough susceptible people for the virus to re-emerge. Our results suggest that Zika virus could exhibit similar dynamics to dengue virus in the Pacific, producing large but sporadic outbreaks in small island populations.