Adrianna C. Jenkins

Adrianna C. Jenkins

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Adrianna C. Jenkins

University of Pennsylvania

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

19Years (2008-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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18 March 2008 in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
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Journal Article
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AJAdrianna C. Jenkins
Adrianna C. Jenkins
CMC. Neil Macrae
C. Neil Macrae
JMJason P. Mitchell
Jason P. Mitchell
One useful strategy for inferring others' mental states (i.e., mentalizing) may be to use one's own thoughts, feelings, and desires as a proxy for those of other people. Such self-referential accounts of social cognition are supported by recent neuroimaging observations that a single brain region, ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vMPFC), is engaged both by tasks that require introspections about self and by tasks that require inferences about the minds of others perceived to be similar to self. To test whether people automatically refer to their own mental states when considering those of a similar other, we examined repetition-related suppression of vMPFC response during self-reflections that followed either an initial reflection about self or a judgment of another person. Consistent with the hypothesis that perceivers spontaneously engage in self-referential processing when mentalizing about particular individuals, vMPFC response was suppressed when self-reflections followed either an initial reflection about self or a judgment of a similar, but not a dissimilar, other. These results suggest that thinking about the mind of another person may rely importantly on reference to one's own mental characteristics.

1 June 2011 in Social Neuroscience
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Journal Article
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AJAdrianna C. Jenkins
Adrianna C. Jenkins
JMJason P. Mitchell
Jason P. Mitchell
The ability to think about oneself—to self-reflect—is one of the defining features of the human mind. Recent research has suggested that this ability may be subserved by a particular brain region: the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC). However, although humans can contemplate a variety of different aspects of themselves, including their stable personality traits, current feelings, and physical attributes, no research has directly examined the extent to which these different forms of self-reflection are subserved by common mechanisms. To address this question, participants were scanned using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) while making judgments about their own personality traits, current mental states, and physical attributes as well as those of another person. Whereas some brain regions responded preferentially during only one form of self-reflection, a robust region of MPFC was engaged preferentially during self-reflection across all three types of judgment. These results suggest that—although dissociable—diverse forms of self-referential thought draw on a shared cognitive process subserved by MPFC.

28 May 2009 in Cerebral Cortex
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AJAdrianna C. Jenkins
Adrianna C. Jenkins
JMJason P. Mitchell
Jason P. Mitchell
The ability to read the minds of others (i.e., to mentalize) requires that perceivers understand a wide range of different kinds of mental states, including not only others’ beliefs and knowledge but also their feelings, desires, and preferences. Moreover, although such inferences may occasionally rely on observable features of a situation, perceivers more typically mentalize under conditions of “uncertainty,” in which they must generate plausible hypotheses about a target's mental state from ambiguous or otherwise underspecified information. Here, we use functional neuroimaging to dissociate the neural bases of these 2 distinct social–cognitive challenges: 1) mentalizing about different types of mental states (beliefs vs. preferences) and 2) mentalizing under conditions of varying ambiguity. Although these 2 aspects of mentalizing have typically been confounded in earlier research, we observed a double dissociation between the brain regions sensitive to type of mental state and ambiguity. Whereas ventral and dorsal aspects of medial prefrontal cortex responded more during ambiguous than unambiguous inferences regardless of the type of mental state, the right temporoparietal junction was sensitive to the distinction between beliefs and preferences irrespective of certainty. These results underscore the emerging consensus that, rather than comprising a single mental operation, social cognition makes flexible use of different processes as a function of the particular demands of the social context.

27 December 2010 in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
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KGKurt Gray
Kurt Gray
AJAdrianna C. Jenkins
Adrianna C. Jenkins
AHAndrea S. Heberlein
Andrea S. Heberlein
DWDaniel M. Wegner
Daniel M. Wegner
It has long been known that psychopathology can influence social perception, but a 2D framework of mind perception provides the opportunity for an integrative understanding of some disorders. We examined the covariation of mind perception with three subclinical syndromes—autism-spectrum disorder, schizotypy, and psychopathy—and found that each presents a unique mind-perception profile. Autism-spectrum disorder involves reduced perception of agency in adult humans. Schizotypy involves increased perception of both agency and experience in entities generally thought to lack minds. Psychopathy involves reduced perception of experience in adult humans, children, and animals. Disorders are differentially linked with the over- or underperception of agency and experience in a way that helps explain their real-world consequences.

1 July 2008 in Psychological Science
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Journal Article
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DADaniel L. Ames
Daniel L. Ames
AJAdrianna C. Jenkins
Adrianna C. Jenkins
MBMahzarin R. Banaji
Mahzarin R. Banaji
JMJason P. Mitchell
Jason P. Mitchell

31 August 2014 in Nature Neuroscience
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Journal Article
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LZLusha Zhu
Lusha Zhu
AJAdrianna C Jenkins
Adrianna C Jenkins
ESEric Set
Eric Set
DSDonatella Scabini
Donatella Scabini
RKRobert T Knight
Robert T Knight
MHMing Hsu
Ming Hsu
This study uses data from patients with damage to specific parts of the frontal cortex to provide causal evidence for the role of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in enabling honest behavior. Damage to this area was associated with decisions that prioritized the decision-maker's own self-interest, at the cost of honesty. Substantial correlational evidence suggests that prefrontal regions are critical to honest and dishonest behavior, but causal evidence specifying the nature of this involvement remains absent. We found that lesions of the human dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) decreased the effect of honesty concerns on behavior in economic games that pit honesty motives against self-interest, but did not affect decisions when honesty concerns were absent. These results point to a causal role for DLPFC in honest behavior.