5 April 2007 in Journal of Business Finance & Accounting
1 July 2023 in Management Science
Using terrorist attacks as an exogenous shock to uncertainty, we provide evidence that firms located near terrorism-stricken areas are less likely takeover targets for two years after the attack and receive lower acquisition premiums. The latter finding is reflected in lower target firm abnormal returns and synergy gains. Additionally, in terrorism-stricken areas, target firms are associated with a lower share of synergies, withdrawn deals rise, and acquirers are more likely to get involved in acquisitions of target firms located in different metropolitan statistical areas than their own or acquire faraway target firms. We attribute our results to the real options theory, which predicts that high uncertainty increases the value of the option to delay investments. Additionally, we show that the impact on target firm human capital and acquirer CEO uncertainty and fear are potential sources of terrorism-induced uncertainty with the former source prevailing over the latter. This paper was accepted by Gustavo Manso, finance. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4506 .
8 February 2025 in Review of Accounting Studies
We examine the association between CEO birthplace proximity and financial misconduct. We find that CEOs managing firms near their birthplaces (home CEOs) are associated with less financial misconduct compared to other CEOs. This association is not attributable to differences in corporate governance. The relationship strengthens in areas with a strong local investment presence and greater religious commitment as well as among CEOs with longer tenures in their home state. Our findings are robust to addressing potential selection and omitted variable biases as well as to conducting multiple robustness tests, including analyses of involuntary CEO changes and headquarters relocations. We also find a similar association for CFOs, with firms employing home CFOs exhibiting less financial misconduct.
18 October 2022 in Research Policy
29 April 2021 in Review of Corporate Finance
Firms provide compensation incentives to executives, primarily in the form of bonus payments, to alleviate slack in the deployment of corporate resources to working capital. Financially constrained firms are heavy users of working capital incentives. So are firms that are less exposed to external takeover threats. Among the different components of working capital, inventories and payables are the main drivers of executive bonuses. Overall, our evidence supports the optimal contracting view of bonus payments in executive compensation.
16 June 2019 in SSRN Electronic Journal
We examine the causal effect of uncertainty on corporate innovation by exploiting terrorist attacks. Counting victims to measure an attack’s strength, we find that as terrorism intensity increases, firms near the strikes exhibit declines in R&D spending, patenting, citations, patent originality, and innovation value. Nearby firms do not hire new inventors and some of their inventors move to distant companies. These effects continue for up to three years after the attacks. Our findings suggest that terrorism curtails innovation by aggravating the economic uncertainty affecting firms near the attacks and by worsening the uncertainty about personal security faced by their employees.