Domhnall Carlin

Domhnall Carlin

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Domhnall Carlin

Centre for Secure Information Technologies (CSIT), Queen's University Belfast, Belfast, UK

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

10Years (2017-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 September 2018 in IET Networks
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
POPhilip O'KAne
Philip O'KAne
SSSakir Sezer
Sakir Sezer
DCDomhnall Carlin
Domhnall Carlin
Cybercrime has long since transformed from a world of Maverick attackers to a criminal business. Ransomware is a malware that renders a victim's computer or data unusable and is increasingly being used by criminals to generate revenue through extortion. This study contributes to the authors’ knowledge by exploring the transition from the early‐day scams, to extortion implemented by current ransomware. They examine the pathway from the first clumsy ransomware attempts to the present day sophisticated ransomware attack campaigns. This Crypto‐warfare now accounts for estimated damages of $1 billion. Considering the fact that many Internet users appear to be unaware of ransomware and do little to protect themselves, they argue that this low‐impact extortion, using highly automated methods, has proven very rewarding for the criminals. As criminals have been early adopters (or abusers) of Internet technology, they expect that ransomware will continue to evolve beyond the capability of present day defence solutions.

1 June 2020 in Computers & Security
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
AAAhmad O. Almashhadani
Ahmad O. Almashhadani
MKMustafa Kaiiali
Mustafa Kaiiali
DCDomhnall Carlin
Domhnall Carlin
SSSakir Sezer
Sakir Sezer

1 August 2018
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
DCDomhnall Carlin
Domhnall Carlin
POPhilip OrKane
Philip OrKane
SSSakir Sezer
Sakir Sezer
JBJonah Burgess
Jonah Burgess
POPhilip O’kane
Philip O’kane
With the rise in worth and popularity of cryptocurrencies, a new opportunity for criminal gain is being exploited and with little currently offered in the way of defence. The cost of mining (i.e., earning cryptocurrency through CPU-intensive calculations that underpin the blockchain technology) can be prohibitively expensive, with hardware costs and electrical overheads previously offering a loss compared to the cryptocurrency gained. Off-loading these costs along a distributed network of machines via malware offers an instantly profitable scenario, though standard Anti-virus (AV) products offer some defences against file-based threats. However, newer fileless malicious attacks, occurring through the browser on seemingly legitimate websites, can easily evade detection and surreptitiously engage the victim machine in computationally-expensive cryptomining (cryptojacking). With no current academic literature on the dynamic opcode analysis of cryptomining, to the best of our knowledge, we present the first such experimental study. Indeed, this is the first such work presenting opcode analysis on non-executable files. Our results show that browser-based cryptomining within our dataset can be detected by dynamic opcode analysis, with accuracies of up to 100%. Further to this, our model can distinguish between cryptomining sites, weaponized benign sites, de-weaponized cryptomining sites and real world benign sites. As it is process-based, our technique offers an opportunity to rapidly detect, prevent and mitigate such attacks, a novel contribution which should encourage further future work.

1 August 2019 in Computers & Security
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
DCDomhnall Carlin
Domhnall Carlin
POPhilip O’kAne
Philip O’kAne
SSSakir Sezer
Sakir Sezer

7 September 2017 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
DCDomhnall Carlin
Domhnall Carlin
ACAlexandra Cowan
Alexandra Cowan
POPhilip O'KAne
Philip O'KAne
SSSakir Sezer
Sakir Sezer
The arms race between the distributors of malware and those seeking to provide defenses has so far favored the former. Signature detection methods have been unable to cope with the onslaught of new binaries aided by rapidly developing obfuscation techniques. Recent research has focused on the analysis of low-level opcodes, both static and dynamic, as a way to detect malware. Although sometimes successful at detecting malware, static analysis still fails to unravel obfuscated code, whereas dynamic analysis can allow researchers to investigate the revealed code at runtime. Research in the field has been limited by the underpinning data sets; old and inadequately sampled malware can lessen the extrapolation potential of such data sets. The main contribution of this paper is the creation of a new parsed runtime trace data set of over 100 000 labeled samples, which will address these shortcomings, and we offer the data set itself for use by the wider research community. This data set underpins the examination of the run traces using classifiers on count-based and sequence-based data. We find that malware detection rates are lessened when samples are labeled with traditional anti-virus (AV) labels. Neither count-based nor sequence-based algorithms can sufficiently distinguish between AV label classes. Detection increases when malware is re-classed with labels yielded from unsupervised learning. With sequenced-based learning, detection exceeds that of labeling as simply “malware” alone. This approach may yield future work, where the triaging of malware can be more effective.

2 July 2019 in IEEE Security & Privacy
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
DCDomhnall Carlin
Domhnall Carlin
JBJonah Burgess
Jonah Burgess
POPhilip O'Kane
Philip O'Kane
SSSakir Sezer
Sakir Sezer