1 November 2018 in International Review of Financial Analysis
1 November 2018 in Operations Research
In “Fear of the Market or Fear of the Competitor? Ambiguity in a Real Options Game”, Tobias Hellmann and Jacco Thijssen study the effects of managerial ambiguity aversion on investment decisions in a duopoly. Ambiguity is over the investment project’s expected growth rate (the “trend”). In their continuous-time model they assume that investment commands a first-mover advantage, which, in equilibrium, leads to pre-emption. They show that ambiguity reduces pre-emptive pressure. As a consequence firm value may be increasing in the degree of ambiguity. They also find that the worst-case prior (under which managers compute firm value) is not always given by the lowest trend, but can switch over time between the lowest and the highest trend. Finally, if one of the firms is not ambiguity averse, then its value is increasing in the other firm’s degree of ambiguity.
17 June 2022 in Energy Economics
22 June 2022 in European Journal of Operational Research
In response to the recent outbreak of the SARS-CoV-2 virus governments have aimed to reduce the virus’s spread through, inter alia, non-pharmaceutical intervention. We address the question when such measures should be implemented and, once implemented, when to remove them.
1 April 2022 in European Journal of Operational Research
1 January 2003 in SSRN Electronic Journal
As becomes apparent from the standard text books in industrial organization (cf. Tirole, 1988, The Theory of Industrial Organization), the analysis of the effects of uncertainty within this field is yet underdeveloped. This paper shows that the new theory of strategic real options can be used to fill this empty hole. Based on the work by Smets (1991) standard models are identified, and they are analyzed by applying a method involving symmetric mixed strategies. As an illustration, extensions regarding asymmetry, technology adoption and decreasing uncertainty over time are reviewed. Among others, it is found that the value of a high cost firm can increase in its own cost. Furthermore, it is established to what extent investments are delayed when technologial progress is anticipated, and it is found that competition can be bad for welfare.