Paul A. Klaczynski

Paul A. Klaczynski

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Paul A. Klaczynski

Department of Psychology, Pennsylvania State University, University Park 16802, USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

27Years (2000-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

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1 August 2004 in Journal of Youth and Adolescence
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Journal Article
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PKPaul A. Klaczynski
Paul A. Klaczynski
KGKristen W. Goold
Kristen W. Goold
JMJeffrey J. Mudry
Jeffrey J. Mudry

1 September 2005 in Journal of Experimental Child Psychology
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Journal Article
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PKPaul A. Klaczynski
Paul A. Klaczynski
KLKristen L. Lavallee
Kristen L. Lavallee

1 January 2004 in Developmental Psychology
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Journal Article
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PKPaul A. Klaczynski
Paul A. Klaczynski
MSMary J. Schuneman
Mary J. Schuneman
DDDavid B. Daniel
David B. Daniel
Children and adolescents were presented with problems that contained deontic (i.e., if action p is taken, then precondition q must be met) or causal (i.e., if event p occurs, then event q will transpire) conditionals and that varied in the ease with which alternative antecedents could be activated. Results showed that inferences were linked to the availability of alternative antecedents and the generation of "disabling" conditions (claims that the conditionals were false under specific circumstances). Age-related developments were found only on problems involving indeterminate inferences. Correlations among inferences differed for children and adolescents. The findings provide stronger support for domain-general theories than for domain-specific theories of reasoning and suggest, under some conditions, age-related changes in the roles of implicit and explicit processing.

1 September 2005 in Thinking & Reasoning
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Journal Article
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PKPaul A. Klaczynski
Paul A. Klaczynski
DDDavid B. Daniel
David B. Daniel
Dual-process theories of conditional reasoning predict that relationships among four basic logical forms, and to intellectual ability and thinking predictions, are most evident when conflict arises between experiential and analytic processing (e.g., Stanovich & West, 2000 Stanovich, KE and West, RF . 2000. Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate?. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 23: 645–665. ). To test these predictions, 210 undergraduates were presented with conditionals for which the consequents were either weakly or strongly associated with alternative antecedents (i.e., WA and SA problems, respectively). Consistent with predictions, modus ponens inferences were not related to inferences on the uncertain forms (affirmation of the consequent, denial of the antecedent). On WA problems, modus tollens, affirmation of the consequent, and denial of the antecedent were related to each other and to verbal ability. Modus ponens was linked to verbal ability only when disabling conditions were activated. In accord with the predictions of Stanovich and West ( 2000 Stanovich, KE and West, RF . 2000. Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate?. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 23: 645–665. ), on most problems, thinking dispositions predicted variance in inferences independently from verbal ability. We argue that a largely automatic experiential processing system governs performance on modus ponens, unless disablers are activated. Consciously controlled analytic processing predominates on the uncertain forms and, under some conditions, on modus tollens.