The paper forms part of a series of papers outlining the theoretical framework for a new model of uncertainty distress (this paper), treatment implications arising from the model, and empirical tests of the model. We define uncertainty distress asthe subjective negative emotions experienced in response to the as yet unknown aspects of a given situation. In the first paper we draw on a robust body of research on distinct areas including: threat models of anxiety, perceived illness uncertainty and intolerance of uncertainty. We explore how threat and uncertainty are separable in anxiety and how we can understand behaviours in response to uncertainty. Finally, we propose a clinically, theoretically and empirically informed model for uncertainty distress, and outline how this model can be tested. Caveats, clinical applications and practitioner key points are briefly included, although these are more fully outlined in the treatment implications article. While we outline this model in the context of novel coronavirus (COVID-19), the model has broader applications to both mental and physical health care settings.Key learning aims: (1)To define the concept of uncertainty distress. (2)To understand the role of threat, over-estimation of threat, perceived uncertainty, actual uncertainty, and intolerance of uncertainty in distress maintenance. (3)To understand how people may behave in response to uncertainty distress. (4)To describe a model of uncertainty distress.
Background: Beyond the core symptoms of autism spectrum disorder (ASD), associated symptoms of anxiety can cause substantial impairment for individuals affected by ASD and those who care for them. Methods: We utilized a potentiated startle paradigm with a puff of air to the neck as the unconditioned stimulus in order to investigate differences between response to cued fear and contextual anxiety among cognitively able adolescents diagnosed with ASD and an age- and IQ-matched typically developing group. Results: In a threat-modulated startle paradigm, response patterns to neutral, predictable, and unpredictable conditions were comparable across typically developing and ASD youth in terms of startle response magnitude and latency. However, the ASD group showed significantly greater absolute startle responsivity at baseline and throughout the experiment, suggesting possibly enhanced general sensitivity to threatening contexts. The ASD group, but not the control group, demonstrated moderate to strong negative correlations between psychophysiological response to unpredictable threats (uncertainty) and questionnaire measures of generalized anxiety, intolerance of uncertainty, and repetitive behavior. Conclusions: Our data suggest enhanced general reactivity among the ASD group, possibly reflecting greater sensitivity to the threatening context of the startle paradigm. Associations with the response to uncertainty may help explain shared neurobehavioral mechanisms in ASD and anxiety. This task can provide useful targets for future neuroimaging and genetics studies as well as specific avenues for intervention. We emphasize the importance of further basic and clinical research into links among these important constructs.
Intolerance of uncertainty (IU) has gained widespread interest as a construct of broad interest from both transdiagnostic and trans-situational perspectives. We have approached this article inspired by the curiosity, clinical observation, consideration of different theoretical perspectives, speculation, optimism and indeed fun that can be seen in S. J. Rachman's work. We address some of what we know about IU before considering one way of conceptualizing IU from the standpoint of a felt sense or embodied experience. In the first part, we start with Woody and Rachman's (1994) observations of people with GAD. Second, we consider some key findings from the literature. Third, we consider two important perspectives on uncertainty, namely, Brosschot et al.'s (2016, 2018) influential Generalized Unsafety Theory of Stress and uncertainty as an emotion. In the second part, backing our clinical hunch about the importance of the felt sense of uncertainty, we consider IU from the perspective of interoception and the somatic error theory of anxiety (Khalsa & Feinstein, 2018). We propose the somatic error theory of intolerance of uncertainty, which places the experience of uncertainty at the heart of our understanding of intolerance of uncertainty. This is followed by predictions, unresolved questions, and potential clinical implications. Finally, we revisit Woody and Rachman's (1994) suggestions for treatment as internalizing "a sense of safety in a range of circumstances (p. 750)" and update this from the perspective of the felt sense of uncertainty. We finish by suggesting that uncertainty can be tolerated, perhaps accepted, and even embraced.
Introduction. People with delusional beliefs “jump to conclusions” (JTC). This finding is well replicated. However, there is only limited exploration of the factors that might lead a person to JTC. The aim of the present study was to explore the contribution of working memory processes (WM) and IQ to hasty decision making and to investigate the stability of this bias over time. Methods. A single group cross-sectional design was utilised. The study was conducted in 2 phases: (1) an initial screening phase and (2) an experimental phase whereby we explored and tested hypotheses regarding the cognitive origins of the JTC bias. In Study 1, participants completed the beads task as well as measures of mood and symptoms. In Study 2, the same participants repeated the beads task, and completed a battery of neuropsychological tests designed to assess different facets of WM and IQ. Results. In most cases, “jumpers” were indistinguishable from “nonjumpers” in terms of their neuropsychological profiles. The only exception to this pattern was for visual working memory, in which “jumpers” performed better than “nonjumpers”. In terms of the temporal stability of the JTC bias, 8 individuals (out of the 29) effectively switched from being “jumpers” at T1 to “nonjumpers” at T2. Conclusions. This study casts doubt on reduced global WM as an explanation of JTC. Rather it may be that the differences in reasoning are related to the manipulation of visual material and do not extend to other areas of neuropsychological functioning. However, as our sample is small it may be underpowered to detect important differences. Future work is therefore needed to replicate these findings.
26 July 2017 in Clinical Psychology & Psychotherapy