Frances M. Tice

Frances M. Tice

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Frances M. Tice

University of Colorado Boulder, Boulder, Colorado 80309

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

7Years (2020-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
1 August 2020 in Management Science
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
TOThomas Omer
Thomas Omer
MSMarjorie K. Shelley
Marjorie K. Shelley
FTFrances M. Tice
Frances M. Tice
This study examines the effect of audit committee connectedness through director networks on financial reporting quality, specifically the misstatement of annual financial statements. Using network analysis, we examine multiple dimensions of connectedness and find that after controlling for operating performance and corporate governance characteristics, firms with well-connected audit committees are less likely to misstate annual financial statements. In addition, our study demonstrates that audit committee connectedness through director networks moderates the negative effect of board interlocks to misstating firms on financial reporting quality. We conduct several tests to address identification concerns and find similar results. Our findings suggest that firms with better-connected audit committees are less likely to adopt reporting practices that reduce financial reporting quality. This paper was accepted by Suraj Srinivasan, accounting.

1 March 2024 in Management Science
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
FTFrances M. Tice
Frances M. Tice
I examine the effect of relative performance evaluation (RPE) on firm performance and risk-taking behavior. Agency theory suggests that, for firms that experience common shocks, RPE in executive compensation plans improves risk sharing and strengthens incentive alignment by providing more information about managerial effort than firm performance alone. In practice (i.e., in the presence of a finite number of peers), RPE effectiveness depends on the extent of firms’ common risk exposure and the amount of common risk captured by RPE peers. I develop a simple model that predicts that the benefit of using RPE exceeds the cost of adding noise from peers when the amount of common risk removed is large. Consistent with predictions, I find empirically that RPE firms perform better than similar non-RPE firms when there is high common risk exposure and the common risk removed by the selected peers is high. I also find that, in these circumstances, the use of RPE is associated with greater firm risk and a lower likelihood of underinvesting. Overall, my study provides evidence that RPE is associated with better risk sharing and stronger incentive alignment when (1) RPE firms are exposed to high common risk and (2) RPE peers are effective in removing common risk for performance evaluation. This paper was accepted by Brian Bushee, accounting. Funding: F. M. Tice gratefully acknowledges financial support from Texas A&M University and the University of Colorado Boulder. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4764 .