Proxy re-encryption cryptosystem enables proxy to re-encrypt the ciphertext and protects the privacy of the corresponding plaintext. Hence, this type of cryptosystem has found tremendous applications in data sharing in cloud computing, email forwarding, securing file systems, and so on. In practice, proxy re-encryption has to support verification of ciphertext to reduce the users’ computational burden. The ciphertext verification can be achieved through a public, private, or delegatable manner. Delegatable verification is more generic in that it can be easily converted into the other two verification methods. However, almost all existing schemes with delegatable verifiability only achieve replayable chosen ciphertext security. Hence, in this paper we propose a more secure proxy re-encryption scheme with delegatable verifiability. Specifically, we utilize a short signature scheme to prevent an attacker from forging a valid ciphertext, and prevent an attacker from forging a signature. As a result, our scheme is secure against chosen ciphertext attacks under the standard model.
Confronted with severe challenges from quantum computers on public-key cryptography based on traditional number theory, post-quantum cryptography (PQC) has received a substantial amount of attentions. However, suffering from time-consuming polynomial operations, most post-quantum schemes cannot be really applied in practice, especially in high-concurrency scenarios. In this paper, we focus on the post-quantum signature algorithm, DILITHIUM, and present an optimized and highly parallel implementation on Graphics Processing Units (GPU). We give two optimized versions, named single mode and batch mode. In the scheme of single mode, we show efficient implementations of number theoretic transformations (NTT) and other polynomial operations adapted to the scheme. In the batch mode, we improve the reject sampling algorithm for the simultaneous processing of multiple sets of data. Finally, we implement our schemes on GPUs with different architectures, such as Pascal, Volta, and Turing, which shows that the speedup ratio of our schemes increases with the increasing of processed data number. The speedup is up to 11.18× for 15360 groups of data in our experimental environment. In the single mode, We can achieve a speedup of more than 4× for complex operations, such as NTT and its inverse. Other simpler operations such as reduce, caddq and decompose can also achieve an acceleration of 2× ~ 4×. In comparison with the original DILITHIUM scheme testing in the high-performance CPU 6133, our scheme finally has a 1.22× speedup even after taking the communication overhead between CPU and GPU into consideration.
2 June 2019 in Security and Communication Networks
Homomorphic encryption is widely used in the scenarios of big data and cloud computing for supporting calculations on ciphertexts without leaking plaintexts. Recently, Li et al. designed a symmetric homomorphic encryption scheme for outsourced databases. Wang et al. proposed a successful key-recovery attack on the homomorphic encryption scheme but required the adversary to know some plaintext/ciphertext pairs. In this paper, we propose a new ciphertext-only attack on the symmetric fully homomorphic encryption scheme. Our attack improves the previous Wang et al.’s attack by eliminating the assumption of known plaintext/ciphertext pairs. We show that the secret key of the user can be recovered by running lattice reduction algorithms twice. Experiments show that the attack successfully and efficiently recovers the secret key of the randomly generated instances with an overwhelming probability.
28 April 2021 in Security and Communication Networks
Private information retrieval (PIR) protocol is a powerful cryptographic tool and has received considerable attention in recent years as it can not only help users to retrieve the needed data from database servers but also protect them from being known by the servers. Although many PIR protocols have been proposed, it remains an open problem to design an efficient PIR protocol whose communication overhead is irrelevant to the database size . In this paper, to answer this open problem, we present a new communication-efficient PIR protocol based on our proposed single-ciphertext fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme, which supports unlimited computations with single variable over a single ciphertext even without access to the secret key. Specifically, our proposed PIR protocol is characterized by combining our single-ciphertext FHE with Lagrange interpolating polynomial technique to achieve better communication efficiency. Security analyses show that the proposed PIR protocol can efficiently protect the privacy of the user and the data in the database. In addition, both theoretical analyses and experimental evaluations are conducted, and the results indicate that our proposed PIR protocol is also more efficient and practical than previously reported ones. To the best of our knowledge, our proposed protocol is the first PIR protocol achieving communication efficiency on the user side, irrelevant to the database size .