Thomas J. Peters

Thomas J. Peters

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Thomas J. Peters

University of Connecticut

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

34Years (1993-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 December 1995 in Computer Aided Geometric Design
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
LAL.-E. Andersson
L.-E. Andersson
SDS.M. Dorney
S.M. Dorney
TPT.J. Peters
T.J. Peters
NSN.F. Stewart
N.F. Stewart

23 June 2011 in IEEE Transactions on Visualization and Computer Graphics
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
TETiago Etiene
Tiago Etiene
LNLuis Gustavo Nonato
Luis Gustavo Nonato
CSCarlos Scheidegger
Carlos Scheidegger
VPValerio Pascucci
Valerio Pascucci
RKRobert M. Kirby
Robert M. Kirby
TPThomas J. Peters
Thomas J. Peters
The broad goals of verifiable visualization rely on correct algorithmic implementations. We extend a framework for verification of isosurfacing implementations to check topological properties. Specifically, we use stratified Morse theory and digital topology to design algorithms which verify topological invariants. Our extended framework reveals unexpected behavior and coding mistakes in popular publicly available isosurface codes.

7 May 2020 in IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
CGChun Guo
Chun Guo
OPOlivier Pereira
Olivier Pereira
TPThomas Peters
Thomas Peters
FSFrançois-Xavier Standaert
François-Xavier Standaert
The ongoing NIST lightweight cryptography standardization process highlights the importance of resistance to side-channel attacks, which has renewed the interest for Authenticated Encryption schemes (AEs) with light(er)-weight sidechannel secure implementations. To address this challenge, our first contribution is to investigate the leakage-resistance of a generic duplex-based stream cipher. When the capacity of the duplex is of c bits, we prove the classical bound, i.e., ≈ 2c/2, under an assumption of non-invertible leakage. Based on this, we propose a new 1-pass AE mode TETSponge, which carefully combines a tweakable block cipher that must have strong protections against side-channel attacks and is scarcely used, and a duplex-style permutation that only needs weak side-channel protections and is used to frugally process the message and associated data. It offers: (i) provable integrity (resp. confidentiality) guarantees in the presence of leakage during both encryption and decryption (resp. encryption only), (ii) some level of nonce misuse robustness. We conclude that TETSponge is an appealing option for the implementation of low-energy AE in settings where side-channel attacks are a concern. We also provides the first rigorous methodology for the leakage-resistance of sponge/duplex-based AEs based on a minimal non-invertibility assumption on leakages, which leads to various insights on designs and implementations.

1 December 1994 in Research in Engineering Design
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
TPThomas J. Peters
Thomas J. Peters
DRDavid W. Rosen
David W. Rosen
VSVadim Shapiro
Vadim Shapiro

7 March 2007 in Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
EME. L. F. Moore
E. L. F. Moore
TPT. J. Peters
T. J. Peters
JRJ. A. Roulier
J. A. Roulier