The German federal system is conventionally understood as highly co-ordinated between federal and regional governments and aimed at producing a ‘uniformity’ of living conditions. This view has increasingly been challenged as new work focuses on innovation and diversity at the regional level, and also as a consequence of reforms to the federal system that took place in 2006. This contribution attempts to establish a more systematic basis for assessing and explaining the scope and significance of regional policy variation in Germany. Our findings suggest that – despite institutional structures that foster intense co-ordination between central and regional governments and apparent popular preferences for uniformity of policy outcomes – the extent of policy variation in Germany is much greater than conventionally understood and driven both by structural factors and partisan choices at the regional level.
This article considers recent attempts to reform German federalism, the failed 2004 reform, and the reforms agreed in 2006 and 2009. It compares partisan, ideological and territorial factors which contribute to an understanding of reform, finding that all three have a role in explaining actors’ views of reform proposals. Two other claims are developed: that in some aspects of the reforms, a division between ‘generalist’ and ‘subject specialist’ politicians became apparent; and that a decisive change between 2004 and 2006 was the formation of a grand coalition at a federal level, which paved the way for agreement upon reform proposals.
In recent years, Germany's federal system has been subject to a number of pressures for change. A constitutional debate on ‘disentangling’ the legislative roles of federal and Länder institutions which stuttered through the 1990s and into the 2000s finally led to a re-allocation of competences in 2006. These reforms shifted some areas of legislative responsibility from the federal to the Länder level and relaxed rules which had earlier justified a federal override when both levels held legislative responsibilities concurrently. At the very least, these constitutional adjustments increased the potential for policy outputs to diverge from one Land to another and give expression to territorial differences in priority and preference.
There are long-standing debates amongst scholars of European Union politics over the relative importance of member states and supranational institutions in determining what happens in the EU. This paper treats the case of ‘Brexit’ as a case study, considering the positions of the EU institutions, France, Germany and the V4, focusing particularly on dissociation issues, questions of migration, the customs union and trade, and the UK’s relationship to the single market during the first year of exit negotiations. It finds that while there are distinct national priorities, EU institutions have been able to synthesise these rather effectively into a common position which meets member states’ priorities as well as their own, confirming the claims of those who emphasise the ability of EU institutions to drive European integration and act on behalf of member states.