Felix Günther

Felix Günther

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Felix Günther

IBM Research Europe - Zurich, Rüschlikon, Switzerland

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

7Years (2020-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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16 August 2024
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
MBMatilda Backendal
Matilda Backendal
HDHannah Davis
Hannah Davis
FGFelix Günther
Felix Günther
MHMiro Haller
Miro Haller
KPKenneth G. Paterson
Kenneth G. Paterson

9 August 2023
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
MBMatilda Backendal
Matilda Backendal
MBMihir Bellare
Mihir Bellare
FGFelix Günther
Felix Günther
MSMatteo Scarlata
Matteo Scarlata

17 August 2025
Verified
Book Chapter
Open access
PDF file
FGFelix Günther
Felix Günther
MRMichael Rosenberg
Michael Rosenberg
DSDouglas Stebila
Douglas Stebila
SVShannon Veitch
Shannon Veitch
Hiding the metadata in Internet protocols serves to protect user privacy, dissuade traffic analysis, and prevent network ossification. Fully encrypted protocols require even the initial key exchange to be obfuscated: a passive observer should be unable to distinguish a protocol execution from an exchange of random bitstrings. Deployed obfuscated key exchanges such as Tor’s pluggable transport protocol \(\texttt{obfs4}\) are Diffie–Hellman-based, and rely on the Elligator encoding for obfuscation. Recently, Günther, Stebila, and Veitch (CCS ’24) proposed a post-quantum variant \(\texttt{pq} {\text {-}}\texttt{obfs} \), using a novel building block called obfuscated key encapsulation mechanisms (OKEMs): KEMs whose public keys and ciphertexts look like random bitstrings. For transitioning real-world protocols, pure post-quantum security is not enough. Many are taking a hybrid approach, combining traditional and post-quantum schemes to hedge against security failures in either component. While hybrid KEMs are already widely deployed (e.g., in TLS 1.3), existing hybridization techniques fail to provide hybrid obfuscation guarantees for OKEMs. Further, even if a hybrid OKEM existed, the \(\texttt{pq} {\text {-}}\texttt{obfs} \) protocol would still not achieve hybrid obfuscation. In this work, we address these challenges by presenting the first OKEM combiner that achieves hybrid \(\textsf{IND} {{\text {-}}}\textsf{CCA} \) security with hybrid ciphertext obfuscation guarantees, and using this to build \(\texttt{Drivel}\), a modification of \(\texttt{pq} {\text {-}}\texttt{obfs} \) that is compatible with hybrid OKEMs. Our OKEM combiner allows for a variety of practical instantiations, e.g., combining obfuscated versions of \(\textsf{DHKEM}\) and \(\textsf{ML} {\text {-}}\textsf{KEM} \). We additionally provide techniques to achieve unconditional public key obfuscation for LWE-based OKEMs, and explore broader applications of hybrid OKEMs, including a construction of the first hybrid password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocol secure against adaptive corruptions in the UC model.

1 January 2022
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
MBMatilda Backendal
Matilda Backendal
FGFelix Günther
Felix Günther
KPKenneth G. Paterson
Kenneth G. Paterson

2 December 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
FGFelix Günther
Felix Günther
DSDouglas Stebila
Douglas Stebila
SVShannon Veitch
Shannon Veitch
Censorship circumvention tools enable clients to access endpoints in a network despite the presence of a censor. Censors use a variety of techniques to identify content they wish to block, including filtering traffic patterns that are characteristic of proxy or circumvention protocols and actively probing potential proxy servers. Circumvention practitioners have developed fully encrypted protocols (FEPs), intended to have traffic that appears indistinguishable from random. A FEP is typically composed of a key exchange protocol to establish shared secret keys, and then a secure channel protocol to encrypt application data; both must avoid revealing to observers that an obfuscated protocol is in use. We formalize the notion of obfuscated key exchange, capturing the requirement that a key exchange protocol's traffic "looks random" and that it resists active probing attacks, in addition to ensuring secure session keys and authentication. We show that the Tor network's obfs4 protocol satisfies this definition. We then show how to extend the obfs4 design to defend against stronger censorship attacks and present a quantum-safe obfuscated key exchange protocol. To instantiate our quantum-safe protocol using the ML-KEM (Kyber) standard, we present Kemeleon, a new mapping between ML-KEM public keys/ciphertexts and uniform byte strings.

15 November 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
MFMarc Fischlin
Marc Fischlin
FGFelix Günther
Felix Günther
Common verification steps in cryptographic protocols, such as signature or message authentication code checks or the validation of elliptic curve points, are crucial for the overall security of the protocol. Yet implementation errors omitting these steps easily remain unnoticed, as often the protocol will function perfectly anyways. One of the most prominent examples is Apple's goto fail bug where the erroneous certificate verification skipped over several of the required steps, marking invalid certificates as correctly verified. This vulnerability went undetected for at least 17 months. We propose here a mechanism which supports the detection of such errors on a cryptographic level. Instead of merely returning the binary acceptance decision, we let the verification return more fine-grained information in form of what we call a confirmation code. The reader may think of the confirmation code as disposable information produced as part of the relevant verification steps. In case of an implementation error like the goto fail bug, the confirmation code would then miss essential elements. The question arises now how to verify the confirmation code itself. We show how to use confirmation codes to tie security to basic functionality at the overall protocol level, making erroneous implementations be detected through the protocol not functioning properly. More concretely, we discuss the usage of confirmation codes in secure connections, established via a key exchange protocol and secured through the derived keys. If some verification steps in a key exchange protocol execution are faulty, then so will be the confirmation codes, and because we can let the confirmation codes enter key derivation, the connection of the two parties will eventually fail. In consequence, an implementation error like goto fail would now be detectable through a simple connection test. We propose here a mechanism which supports the detection of such errors on a cryptographic level. Instead of merely returning the binary acceptance decision, we let the verification return more fine-grained information in form of what we call a confirmation code. The reader may think of the confirmation code as disposable information produced as part of the relevant verification steps. In case of an implementation error like the goto fail bug, the confirmation code would then miss essential elements. The question arises now how to verify the confirmation code itself. We show how to use confirmation codes to tie security to basic functionality at the overall protocol level, making erroneous implementations be detected through the protocol not functioning properly. More concretely, we discuss the usage of confirmation codes in secure connections, established via a key exchange protocol and secured through the derived keys. If some verification steps in a key exchange protocol execution are faulty, then so will be the confirmation codes, and because we can let the confirmation codes enter key derivation, the connection of the two parties will eventually fail. In consequence, an implementation error like goto fail would now be detectable through a simple connection test.