Parinaz Naghizadeh

Parinaz Naghizadeh

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Parinaz Naghizadeh

University of California, San Diego, USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

14Years (2013-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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5 March 2018 in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
MKMohammad Mahdi Khalili
Mohammad Mahdi Khalili
PNParinaz Naghizadeh
Parinaz Naghizadeh
MLMingyan Liu
Mingyan Liu
Cyber insurance is a viable method for cyber risk transfer. However, it has been shown that depending on the features of the underlying environment, it may or may not improve the state of network security. In this paper, we consider a single profit-maximizing insurer (principal) with voluntarily participating insureds/clients (agents). We are particularly interested in two distinct features of cybersecurity and their impact on the contract design problem. The first is the interdependent nature of cybersecurity, whereby one entity's state of security depends not only on its own investment and effort, but also the efforts of others' in the same eco-system (i.e., externalities). The second is the fact that recent advances in Internet measurement combined with machine learning techniques now allow us to perform accurate quantitative assessments of security posture at a firm level. This can be used as a tool to perform an initial security audit, or pre-screening, of a prospective client to better enable premium discrimination and the design of customized policies. We show that security interdependency leads to a “profit opportunity” for the insurer, created by the inefficient effort levels exerted by interdependent agents who do not account for the risk externalities when insurance is not available; this is in addition to risk transfer that an insurer typically profits from. Security pre-screening then allows the insurer to take advantage of this additional profit opportunity by designing the appropriate contracts which incentivize agents to increase their effort levels, allowing the insurer to “sell commitment” to interdependent agents, in addition to insuring their risks. We identify conditions under which this type of contract leads to not only increased profit for the principal, but also an improved state of network security.

16 April 2020 in IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
MAMustafa Abdallah
Mustafa Abdallah
PNParinaz Naghizadeh
Parinaz Naghizadeh
AHAshish R. Hota
Ashish R. Hota
TCTimothy Cason
Timothy Cason
SBSaurabh Bagchi
Saurabh Bagchi
SSShreyas Sundaram
Shreyas Sundaram
We consider a system consisting of multiple interdependent assets, and a set of defenders, each responsible for securing a subset of the assets against an attacker. The interdependencies between the assets are captured by an attack graph, where an edge from one asset to another indicates that if the former asset is compromised, an attack can be launched on the latter asset. Each edge has an associated probability of successful attack, which can be reduced via security investments by the defenders. In such scenarios, we investigate the security investments that arise under certain features of human decision-making that have been identified in behavioral economics. In particular, humans have been shown to perceive probabilities in a nonlinear manner, typically overweighting low probabilities and underweighting high probabilities. We show that suboptimal investments can arise under such weighting in certain network topologies. We also show that pure strategy Nash equilibria exist in settings with multiple (behavioral) defenders, and study the inefficiency of the equilibrium investments by behavioral defenders compared to a centralized socially optimal solution.

22 December 2016 in Journal of Cybersecurity
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
ASArmin Sarabi
Armin Sarabi
PNParinaz Naghizadeh
Parinaz Naghizadeh
YLYang Liu
Yang Liu
MLMingyan Liu
Mingyan Liu
This article aims to understand if, and to what extent, business details about an organization can help to assess a company’s risk in experiencing data breach incidents, as well its distribution of risk over multiple incident types, in order to provide guidelines to effectively protect, detect, and recover from different forms of security incidents. Existing work on prediction of data breach mainly focuses on network incidents, and studies that analyze the distribution of risk across different incident categories, most notably Verizon’s latest Data Breach Investigations Report, provide recommendations based solely on business sector information. In this article, we leverage a broader set of publicly available business details to provide a more fine-grained analysis on incidents involving any form of data breach and data loss. Specifically, we use reports collected in the VERIS Community Database (VCDB), as well as data from Alexa Web Information Service (AWIS), the Open Directory Project (ODP), and Neustar Inc., to train and test a sequence of classifiers/predictors. Our results show that our feature set can distinguish between victims of data breaches, and nonvictims, with a 90% true positive rate, and 11% false positive rate, making them an effective tool in evaluating an entity’s cyber-risk. Furthermore, we show that compared to using business sector information alone, our method can derive a more accurate risk distribution for specific incident types, and allow organizations to focus on a sparser set of incidents, thus achieving the same level of protection by spending less resources on security through more judicious prioritization. Keywords: data breach; resource allocation; risk assessment.

20 September 2017 in IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PNParinaz Naghizadeh
Parinaz Naghizadeh
MLMingyan Liu
Mingyan Liu
We consider the provision of public goods on networks of strategic agents. We study different effort outcomes of these network games, namely, the Nash equilibria, Pareto efficient effort profiles, and semi-cooperative equilibria (resulting from interactions among coalitions of agents). We identify necessary and sufficient conditions on the structure of the network for the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium by using a connection between these outcomes and linear complementarity problems. We show that our finding unifies, and extends, existing results in the literature. We also identify conditions for the existence of Nash equilibria for two subclasses of games at the two extremes of our model, namely games of strategic complements and games of strategic substitutes. We provide a graph-theoretical interpretation of agents' efforts at the Nash equilibrium, as well as the Pareto efficient outcomes and semi-cooperative equilibria, by linking an agent's decision to her centrality in the interaction network. Using this connection, we separate the effects of incoming and outgoing edges on agents' efforts and uncover an alternating effect over walks of different length in the network.

10 August 2016 in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PNParinaz Naghizadeh
Parinaz Naghizadeh
MLMingyan Liu
Mingyan Liu
In a network of interdependent users, the expenditure in security measures by an entity affects not only herself, but also other users interacting with her. As a result, users' efforts toward security can be viewed as a public good; the optimal provision of which in a system of self-interested entities requires the design of appropriate incentives through an external mechanism. In this paper, we propose the notion of exit equilibrium to study users' voluntary participation in such incentive mechanisms. We show a fundamental result that, due to the non-excludable nature of security, there exists no reliable mechanism, which can incentivize socially optimal investments, while ensuring voluntary participation and maintaining a weakly balanced budget, for all instances of security games. To further illustrate this result, we analyze the performance of two well-known incentive mechanisms, namely the Pivotal (VCG) and Externality mechanisms, in security games. We illustrate how, given a mechanism, stable coalitions of participating users may emerge, leading to an improved, yet sub-optimal security status. We further extend the impossibility result to risk-averse users, and discuss its implications on the viability of using cyber-insurance contracts to improve the state of cyber security.

7 August 2018
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
SASurin Ahn
Surin Ahn
MGMaria Gorlatova
Maria Gorlatova
PNParinaz Naghizadeh
Parinaz Naghizadeh
MCMung Chiang
Mung Chiang
PMPrateek Mittal
Prateek Mittal