David Choffnes

David Choffnes

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

David Choffnes

Northeastern University, Boston, USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

14Years (2013-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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4 March 2015
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
XXXing Xu
Xing Xu
YJYurong Jiang
Yurong Jiang
TFTobias Flach
Tobias Flach
EKEthan Katz-Bassett
Ethan Katz-Bassett
DCDavid Choffnes
David Choffnes
RGRamesh Govindan
Ramesh Govindan

19 April 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
MKMonica Kowalczyk
Monica Kowalczyk
JGJohanna T. Gunawan
Johanna T. Gunawan
DCDavid Choffnes
David Choffnes
DDDaniel J Dubois
Daniel J Dubois
WHWoodrow Hartzog
Woodrow Hartzog
CWChristo Wilson
Christo Wilson
Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices are ubiquitous, but little attention has been paid to how they may incorporate dark patterns despite consumer protections and privacy concerns arising from their unique access to intimate spaces and always-on capabilities. This paper conducts a systematic investigation of dark patterns in 57 popular, diverse smart home devices. We update manual interaction and annotation methods for the IoT context, then analyze dark pattern frequency across device types, manufacturers, and interaction modalities. We find that dark patterns are pervasive in IoT experiences, but manifest in diverse ways across device traits. Speakers, doorbells, and camera devices contain the most dark patterns, with manufacturers of such devices (Amazon and Google) having the most dark patterns compared to other vendors. We investigate how this distribution impacts the potential for consumer exposure to dark patterns, discuss broader implications for key stakeholders like designers and regulators, and identify opportunities for future dark patterns study.

23 July 2021 in Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
AMAnna Maria Mandalari
Anna Maria Mandalari
DDDaniel J. Dubois
Daniel J. Dubois
RKRoman Kolcun
Roman Kolcun
MPMuhammad Talha Paracha
Muhammad Talha Paracha
HHHamed Haddadi
Hamed Haddadi
DCDavid Choffnes
David Choffnes
Despite the prevalence of Internet of Things (IoT) devices, there is little information about the purpose and risks of the Internet traffic these devices generate, and consumers have limited options for controlling those risks. A key open question is whether one can mitigate these risks by automatically blocking some of the Internet connections from IoT devices, without rendering the devices inoperable. In this paper, we address this question by developing a rigorous methodology that relies on automated IoT-device experimentation to reveal which network connections (and the information they expose) are essential, and which are not. We further develop strategies to automatically classify network traffic destinations as either required (i.e., their traffic is essential for devices to work properly) or not, hence allowing firewall rules to block traffic sent to non-required destinations without breaking the functionality of the device. We find that indeed 16 among the 31 devices we tested have at least one blockable non-required destination, with the maximum number of blockable destinations for a device being 11. We further analyze the destination of network traffic and find that all third parties observed in our experiments are blockable, while first and support parties are neither uniformly required or non-required. Finally, we demonstrate the limitations of existing blocklists on IoT traffic, propose a set of guidelines for automatically limiting non-essential IoT traffic, and we develop a prototype system that implements these guidelines.

24 October 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
UIUmar Iqbal
Umar Iqbal
PBPouneh Nikkhah Bahrami
Pouneh Nikkhah Bahrami
RTRahmadi Trimananda
Rahmadi Trimananda
HCHao Cui
Hao Cui
AGAlexander Gamero-Garrido
Alexander Gamero-Garrido
ZSZubair Shafiq
Zubair Shafiq
Smart speakers collect voice commands, which can be used to infer sensitive information about users. Given the potential for privacy harms, there is a need for greater transparency and control over the data collected, used, and shared by smart speaker platforms as well as third party skills supported on them. To bridge this gap, we build a framework to measure data collection, usage, and sharing by the smart speaker platforms. We apply our framework to the Amazon smart speaker ecosystem. Our results show that Amazon and third parties, including advertising and tracking services that are unique to the smart speaker ecosystem, collect smart speaker interaction data. We also find that Amazon processes smart speaker interaction data to infer user interests and uses those inferences to serve targeted ads to users. Smart speaker interaction also leads to ad targeting and as much as 30X higher bids in ad auctions, from third party advertisers. Finally, we find that Amazon's and third party skills' data practices are often not clearly disclosed in their policy documents.

24 October 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
AGAniketh Girish
Aniketh Girish
THTianrui Hu
Tianrui Hu
VPVijay Prakash
Vijay Prakash
DDDaniel J. Dubois
Daniel J. Dubois
SMSrdjan Matic
Srdjan Matic
NVNarseo Vallina-Rodriguez
Narseo Vallina-Rodriguez
The network communication between Internet of Things (IoT) devices on the same local network has significant implications for platform and device interoperability, security, privacy, and correctness. Yet, the analysis of local home Wi-Fi network traffic and its associated security and privacy threats have been largely ignored by prior literature, which typically focuses on studying the communication between IoT devices and cloud end-points, or detecting vulnerable IoT devices exposed to the Internet. In this paper, we present a comprehensive and empirical measurement study to shed light on the local communication within a smart home deployment and its threats. We use a unique combination of passive network traffic captures, protocol honeypots, dynamic mobile app analysis, and crowdsourced IoT data from participants to identify and analyze a wide range of device activities on the local network. We then analyze these datasets to characterize local network protocols, security and privacy threats associated with them. Our analysis reveals vulnerable devices, insecure use of network protocols, and sensitive data exposure by IoT devices. We provide evidence of how this information is exfiltrated to remote servers by mobile apps and third-party SDKs, potentially for household fingerprinting, surveillance and cross-device tracking. We make our datasets and analysis publicly available to support further research in this area.

29 August 2018 in Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
EPElleen Pan
Elleen Pan
JRJingjing Ren
Jingjing Ren
MLMartina Lindorfer
Martina Lindorfer
CWChristo Wilson
Christo Wilson
DCDavid Choffnes
David Choffnes
The high-fidelity sensors and ubiquitous internet connectivity offered by mobile devices have facilitated an explosion in mobile apps that rely on multimedia features. However, these sensors can also be used in ways that may violate user’s expectations and personal privacy. For example, apps have been caught taking pictures without the user’s knowledge and passively listened for inaudible, ultrasonic audio beacons. The developers of mobile device operating systems recognize that sensor data is sensitive, but unfortunately existing permission models only mitigate some of the privacy concerns surrounding multimedia data. In this work, we present the first large-scale empirical study of media permissions and leaks from Android apps, covering 17,260 apps from Google Play, AppChina, Mi.com, and Anzhi. We study the behavior of these apps using a combination of static and dynamic analysis techniques. Our study reveals several alarming privacy risks in the Android app ecosystem, including apps that over-provision their media permissions and apps that share image and video data with other parties in unexpected ways, without user knowledge or consent. We also identify a previously unreported privacy risk that arises from third-party libraries that record and upload screenshots and videos of the screen without informing the user and without requiring any permissions.