28 November 2022 in Nature Methods
MKMohammad Reza Keshtkaran
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1 November 2010 in Clinical Neurophysiology
1 October 2021 in Current Opinion in Neurobiology
Bayesian inference has emerged as a general framework that captures how organisms make decisions under uncertainty. Recent experimental findings reveal disparate mechanisms for how the brain generates behaviors predicted by normative Bayesian theories. Here, we identify two broad classes of neural implementations for Bayesian inference: a modular class, where each probabilistic component of Bayesian computation is independently encoded and a transform class, where uncertain measurements are converted to Bayesian estimates through latent processes. Many recent experimental neuroscience findings studying probabilistic inference broadly fall into these classes. We identify potential avenues for synthesis across these two classes and the disparities that, at present, cannot be reconciled. We conclude that to distinguish among implementation hypotheses for Bayesian inference, we require greater engagement among theoretical and experimental neuroscientists in an effort that spans different scales of analysis, circuits, tasks, and species.
22 April 2013 in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
When corresponding areas of the two eyes view dissimilar images, stable perception gives way to visual competition wherein perceptual awareness alternates between those images. Moreover, a given image can remain visually dominant for several seconds at a time even when the competing images are swapped between the eyes multiple times each second. This perceptual stability across eye swaps has led to the widespread belief that this unique form of visual competition, dubbed stimulus rivalry, is governed by eye-independent neural processes at a purely binocular stage of cortical processing. We tested this idea by investigating the influence of stimulus rivalry on the buildup of the threshold elevation aftereffect, a form of contrast adaptation thought to transpire at early cortical stages that include eye-specific neural activity. Weaker threshold elevation aftereffects were observed when the adapting image was engaged in stimulus rivalry than when it was not, indicating diminished buildup of adaptation during stimulus-rivalry suppression. We then confirmed that this reduction occurred, in part, at eye-specific neural stages by showing that suppression of an image at a given moment specifically diminished adaptation associated with the eye viewing the image at that moment. Considered together, these results imply that eye-specific neural events at early cortical processing stages contribute to stimulus rivalry. We have developed a computational model of stimulus rivalry that successfully implements this idea.
1 December 2011 in Psychiatry Research
14 June 2021 in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
Significance: Over the last decade, Bayesian modeling has emerged as a unified approach for capturing a wide range of behaviors such as perceptual illusions, cognitive decision making, and motor control. Despite its remarkable success, the Bayesian approach has been challenged by the issue of model identifiability; that is, the components of a Bayesian model (e.g., prior and cost function) are not uniquely determined by the behavior. Here, we create an experimental paradigm that provides a way to adjudicate whether and when humans build and use the internal models of priors and cost functions. Our work provides a path toward resolving the controversies surrounding the notion of the Bayesian brain.