Jiaqi Yan

Jiaqi Yan

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Jiaqi Yan

Fudan Univ, Sch Publ Hlth, 130 Dongan Rd, Shanghai 200030, Peoples R China

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

3Years (2024-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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20 November 2024 in International Journal of Health Policy and Management
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
RWRuixin Wang
Ruixin Wang
JYJiaqi Yan
Jiaqi Yan
XZXinyu Zhang
Xinyu Zhang
MQMengcen Qian
Mengcen Qian
XYXiaohua Ying
Xiaohua Ying
Background: China has developed a novel case-based payment method called the DiagnosisIntervention Packet (DIP) to regulate healthcare providers' behavior. G city, a metropolis in southeast China, has shifted its payment policy from fixed rate per admission to DIP under regional global budget since 2018. This study examined the immediate and trend changes in provider behavior after this payment reform. Methods: Discharge data in G city between 2016 and 2019 was used, covering more than 10 million inpatient cases in 320 hospitals. A counterfactual scenario was developed to assign insured and uninsured inpatients across the study period to specific DIP groups under consistent rules. Controlled interrupted time-series (ITS) analyses were performed, with uninsured inpatients as control. Outcomes included inpatient volume, average DIP weight (similar to case-mix index in Diagnosis-Related Groups), and two innovative indicators (average diagnostic weight and average treatment weight) to decompose the changes in DIP weight. Subgroup analyses were conducted for different hospital levels and 21 major disease categories. Results: After the DIP reform, monthly trend of inpatient volume decreased (-1085.34, P=0.052), while monthly growth of average DIP weight increased (2.17, P=0.02). No significant changes in average diagnostic weight were observed. Monthly trend of average treatment weight increased (2.38, P=0.001) after the reform. Secondary and tertiary hospitals experienced insignificantly decreased inpatient volume and elevated average DIP weight, accompanied by negligible change in average diagnostic weight and significant increase in average treatment weight. Primary hospitals experienced reduced inpatient volume and stable average DIP weight, along with increase in average diagnostic weight and decrease in average treatment weight. Conclusion: By differentiated payments for severity, DIP induced hospitals to shift their focus from volume to weight of inpatients. Instead of diagnostic upcoding, hospitals responded to the DIP reform primarily by increasing treatment intensity. Primary hospitals may face financial risks under regional competition.

1 December 2024 in Risk Management and Healthcare Policy
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
XZXinyu Zhang
Xinyu Zhang
MQMengcen Qian
Mengcen Qian
JYJiaqi Yan
Jiaqi Yan
RWRuixin Wang
Ruixin Wang
DLDawei Lyu
Dawei Lyu
STShenglan Tang
Shenglan Tang
Purpose: China has developed and widely piloted a new case-based payment, ie, the "Diagnosis-Intervention Packet" (DIP) payment, which has a granular classification system. We evaluated the impact of DIP payment on the quality of care in a large pilot city in China and explored potential mechanisms of quality change. Methods: The city started to implement DIP payment with a hospital-level cap on July 1, 2019. Using a 5% random sample of discharge records from July 2017 to June 2021, we employed a difference-in-differences approach to compare two mortality measures (in-hospital mortality, mortality of surgical patients), two readmission measures (all-cause readmission within 30 days, readmission with the same principal diagnosis within 30 days) and a patient safety measure (operation associated complications or adverse event) in 13 pilot hospitals and 27 non-pilot hospitals before and after DIP payment reform. Results: Of 122,637 discharge records included, 43,023 (35.1%) were from pilot hospitals. After DIP payment, the readmission rate within 30 days and readmission rate with the same principal diagnosis in pilot hospitals decreased significantly by 3.2 percentage points (P <0.001) and 1.8 percentage points (P <0.001), respectively. The in-hospital mortality rate, the mortality rate of surgical patients, and the rate of operation-associated complications or adverse events did not have significant changes. The decrease in quality measures was primarily driven by tertiary hospitals, was more obvious over time after the policy adoption, and was more pronounced in groups with higher intensity of care. Conclusion: This study indicated that DIP payment with a cap in the study city was associated with improved quality of care among patients in pilot hospitals. The provider's behavior of increasing the intensity of care, especially for more severe patients, may partially contribute to the results.