1 August 2009 in Accounting, Organizations and Society
1 March 2012 in Management Accounting Research
1 March 2012 in The International Journal of Human Resource Management
The fairness of managerial pay can be judged in terms of its distributive justice properties (‘is my pay fair when compared to others’) and its procedural justice properties (‘is my pay fairly determined’). While both types of justice have been studied extensively in the organizational literature, their relative importance in predicting work-related outcomes is still open to debate. In this paper, we provide field evidence that the relationship between pay justice and managers' intrinsic motivation is moderated by pay transparency, which is the extent to which managers know each other's pay levels. In a homogeneous sample of 139 Slovenian bank managers, we find that procedural justice is a better predictor of intrinsic motivation when pay transparency is low, and that distributive justice is a better predictor of intrinsic motivation when pay transparency is high. These findings that are congruent with fairness heuristic theory (Van den Bos, Lind, Vermunt and Wilke 1997a) suggest the importance of considering pay transparency for understanding and designing fair managerial pay systems.
7 August 2023 in International Journal of Accounting Information Systems
17 February 2020 in European Accounting Review
We examine external auditors’ decisions to use the evidence or direct assistance of internal auditors when those auditors engage in consulting on enterprise risk management. Although such consulting provides value to an organization, it can also put the objectivity and independence of internal auditors at risk. We hypothesize that external auditors’ reliance on the internal audit function depends on the effectiveness of the audit committee monitoring the internal auditors’ activities. We also hypothesize that external auditors’ perception of the objectivity and independence of internal auditors mediates the reliance decision. We analyze these hypotheses using a 2 × 2 between-subjects design with 92 certified external auditors. Confirming the hypotheses, we find that external auditors’ reliance on the internal audit function is highest when the latter provides risk management consulting under the supervision of a strong audit committee. It is lower if the internal audit function provides only assurance (under either a weak or strong audit committee) and lowest if it provides consulting under a weak audit committee. The mediation analysis shows that the effect of audit committee effectiveness on the reliance decision is mediated by external auditors’ perception of internal auditors’ objectivity.
9 February 2016 in Frontiers in Psychology
In this study, we compare the effects of two prominent organizational control mechanisms—monetary incentive and social pressure—on cognitive control. Cognitive control underlies the human ability to regulate thoughts and actions in the pursuit of behavioral goals. Previous studies show that monetary incentives can contribute to goal-oriented behavior via the activation of proactive control. There is, however, much less evidence on the effect of social pressure on cognitive control and task performance. In a within-subject experimental design, we tested 47 subjects performing the AX-CPT task to compare the activation of cognitive control modes under monetary incentive and social pressure beyond mere instructions to perform better. We find that social pressure and monetary incentive have similar effects as mere instructions on cognitive control. All three lead to a significant shift from a reactive to a proactive control mode and a similar improvement in task performance. Our findings suggest that social control mechanisms and monetary incentives provide similar behavioral effects in stimulating a proactive cognitive control mode and performance.