David T. Robinson

David T. Robinson

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David T. Robinson

Duke University Fuqua School of Business and NBER

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

27Years (2000-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 March 2016 in Small Business Economics
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Journal Article
Open access
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ZAZoltan Acs
Zoltan Acs
TÅThomas Åstebro
Thomas Åstebro
DADavid Audretsch
David Audretsch
DRDavid T. Robinson
David T. Robinson
We debate the motivation for and effectiveness of public policies to encourage individuals to become entrepreneurs. Reviewing established evidence we find that most Western world policies do not greatly reduce or solve any market failures but instead waste taxpayers’ money, encourage those already intent on becoming entrepreneurs, and mostly generate one-employee businesses with low-growth intentions and a lack of interest in innovating. Most policy initiatives that would have the effect of promoting valuable entrepreneurship would not be recognizable as such, because they would primarily address other market failures: A central-payer health care would remove healthcare-related distortions affecting employment choices; greater STEM education would produce more engineers of which some start valuable new firms; and labor market reform to encourage hiring immigrants in jobs they have been educated for would reduce inefficient allocation of talent to entrepreneurship.

5 January 2008 in The Review of Financial Studies
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Journal Article
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DRDavid T. Robinson
David T. Robinson
Strategic alliances are long-term contracts between legally distinct organizations that provide for sharing the costs and benefits of a mutually beneficial activity. In this paper, I develop and test a model that helps explain why firms sometimes prefer alliances over internally organized projects. I introduce managerial effort into a model of internal capital markets and show how strategic alliances help overcome incentive problems that arise when headquarters cannot pre-commit to particular capital allocations. The model generates a number of implications, which I test using a large sample of alliance transactions in conjunction with Compustat data.

24 August 2006 in The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
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Journal Article
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DRDavid T. Robinson
David T. Robinson
TSToby E. Stuart
Toby E. Stuart
We argue that the stock of prior alliances between participants in the biotechnology sector forms a network that serves as a governance mechanism in interfirm transactions. To test how this network substitutes for other governance mechanisms, we examine how equity participation and pledged funding in strategic alliances vary with two features of the way alliance participants are positioned in the network of past deals: proximity, or how close two firms are to one another in the network; and centrality, or how deeply a firm is embedded in the network. As centrality and proximity increase, equity participation (measured by size and propensity) diminishes, whereas pledged funding increases.

1 April 2022 in Management Science
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Journal Article
Closed access
RFRobert Fairlie
Robert Fairlie
ARAlicia Robb
Alicia Robb
DRDavid T. Robinson
David T. Robinson
We used confidential and restricted-access data from the Kauffman Firm Survey and matched administrative data on credit scores to explore racial disparities in access to capital for new business ventures. The novel results on racial inequality in start-up financing indicate that Black-owned start-ups start smaller and stay smaller over the entire first eight years of their existence. Black start-ups face more difficulty in raising external capital, especially external debt. We find that disparities in creditworthiness constrain Black entrepreneurs, but perceptions of treatment by banks also hold them back. Black entrepreneurs apply for loans less often than White entrepreneurs largely because they expect to be denied credit, even when they have a good credit history and in settings where strong local banks favor new business development. This paper was accepted by David Simchi-Levi, finance.

1 August 2023 in Management Science
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Journal Article
Closed access
JBJean-Etienne de Bettignies
Jean-Etienne de Bettignies
HLHua Fang Liu
Hua Fang Liu
DRDavid T. Robinson
David T. Robinson
BGBulat Gainullin
Bulat Gainullin
We examine the impact of product market competition on innovation in markets for technology. An innovator makes an investment in quality-improving innovation that can be licensed to one (targeted licensing) or all (market-wide licensing) product market competitors. Our model points to a U-shaped relationship between competition in licensee product markets and innovation in the market for technology: at low levels of competition, market-wide licensing is optimal, and competition reduces innovation, whereas at high levels of competition, targeted licensing is optimal and competition increases innovation. Our empirical analysis using a large panel of U.S. data provides clear support for these predictions linking competition, innovation, and licensing.This paper was accepted by Joshua Gans, business strategy.Funding: J.-E. (de) Bettignies gratefully acknowledges financial support by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada [Grant 435-2013-1863].Supplemental Material: The data files and online appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4574 .

4 April 2013 in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
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Journal Article
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MPManju Puri
Manju Puri
DRDavid T. Robinson
David T. Robinson