David Kohlbrenner

David Kohlbrenner

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

David Kohlbrenner

University of Washington, Seattle, Washington, USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

8Years (2019-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 March 2019
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
ILIlya S Lebedev
Ilya S Lebedev
KHKyle Hogan
Kyle Hogan
JDJules Drean
Jules Drean
DKDavid Kohlbrenner
David Kohlbrenner
DLDayeol Lee
Dayeol Lee
SDSrinivas Devadas
Srinivas Devadas

19 November 2025
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
AWAlan Wang
Alan Wang
PGPranav Gopalkrishnan
Pranav Gopalkrishnan
YWYingchen Wang
Yingchen Wang
CFChristopher W. Fletcher
Christopher W. Fletcher
HSHovav Shacham
Hovav Shacham
RPRiccardo Paccagnella
Riccardo Paccagnella

27 April 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
MFMichael Flanders
Michael Flanders
RSReshabh K Sharma
Reshabh K Sharma
AMAlexandra E. Michael
Alexandra E. Michael
DGDan Grossman
Dan Grossman
DKDavid Kohlbrenner
David Kohlbrenner
With the end of Moore's Law-based scaling, novel microarchitectural optimizations are being patented, researched, and implemented at an increasing rate. Previous research has examined recently published patents and papers and demonstrated ways these upcoming optimizations present new security risks via novel side channels. As these side channels are introduced by microarchitectural optimization, they are not generically solvable in source code. In this paper, we build program analysis and transformation tools for automatically mitigating the security risks introduced by future instruction-centric microarchitectural optimizations. We focus on two classes of optimizations that are not yet deployed: silent stores and computation simplification. Silent stores are known to leak secret data being written to memory by dropping in-flight stores that will have no effect. Computation simplification is known to leak operands to arithmetic instructions by shortcutting trivial computations at execution time. This presents problems that classical constant-time techniques cannot handle: register spills, address calculations, and the micro-ops of complex instructions are all potentially leaky. To address these problems, we design, implement, and evaluate a process and tool, cio, for detecting and mitigating these types of side channels in cryptographic code. cio is a backstop, providing verified mitigation for novel microarchitectural side-channels when more specialized and efficient hardware or software tools, such as microcode patches, are not yet available.

27 April 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
CDColin Drewes
Colin Drewes
OWOlivia Weng
Olivia Weng
AMAndres Meza
Andres Meza
AAAlric Althoff
Alric Althoff
DKDavid Kohlbrenner
David Kohlbrenner
DRDustin Richmond
Dustin Richmond
Remote attackers can recover "FPGA pentimento" - long-removed data belonging to a prior user or proprietary design image on a cloud FPGA. Just as a pentimento of a painting can be exposed by infrared imaging, FPGA pentimentos can be exposed by signal timing sensors. The data constituting an FPGA pentimento is imprinted on the device through bias temperature instability effects on the underlying transistors. Measuring this degradation using a time-to-digital converter allows an attacker to (1) extract proprietary details or keys from an encrypted FPGA design image available on the AWS marketplace and (2) recover information from a previous user of a cloud-FPGA. These threat models are validated on AWS F1, with successful AES key recovery under one model.

13 October 2025
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
GHGregor Haas
Gregor Haas
MCMicheal Chung
Micheal Chung
DKDavid Kohlbrenner
David Kohlbrenner