1 January 2016 in Journal of Experimental Child Psychology
Children between 5 and 8 years of age freely intervened on a three-variable causal system, with their task being to discover whether it was a common cause structure or one of two causal chains. From 6 or 7 years of age, children were able to use information from their interventions to correctly disambiguate the structure of a causal chain. We used a Bayesian model to examine children's interventions on the system; this showed that with development children became more efficient in producing the interventions needed to disambiguate the causal structure and that the quality of interventions, as measured by their informativeness, improved developmentally. The latter measure was a significant predictor of children's correct inferences about the causal structure. A second experiment showed that levels of performance were not reduced in a task where children did not select and carry out interventions themselves, indicating no advantage for self-directed learning. However, children's performance was not related to intervention quality in these circumstances, suggesting that children learn in a different way when they carry out interventions themselves.
1 September 2012 in Acta Psychologica
Causal counterfactuals e.g., 'if the ignition key had been turned then the car would have started' and causal conditionals e.g., 'if the ignition key was turned then the car started' are understood by thinking about multiple possibilities of different sorts, as shown in six experiments using converging evidence from three different types of measures. Experiments 1a and 1b showed that conditionals that comprise enabling causes, e.g., 'if the ignition key was turned then the car started' primed people to read quickly conjunctions referring to the possibility of the enabler occurring without the outcome, e.g., 'the ignition key was turned and the car did not start'. Experiments 2a and 2b showed that people paraphrased causal conditionals by using causal or temporal connectives (because, when), whereas they paraphrased causal counterfactuals by using subjunctive constructions (had…would have). Experiments 3a and 3b showed that people made different inferences from counterfactuals presented with enabling conditions compared to none. The implications of the results for alternative theories of conditionals are discussed.
25 September 2015 in British Journal of Psychology
1 April 2019 in Patient Education and Counseling
This review aims to increase understanding of health decision-making by children and adolescents with chronic illnesses and offer suggestions for improving shared decision-making with healthcare professionals. Using cross-disciplinary publication databases, we surveyed literature on children's and adolescents' health decision-making from psychology, health sciences, and neuroscience. Several factors influencing health decision-making were identified. Considering neurobiological aspects, children lack functionality in the frontal lobe resulting in lesser cognitive control and higher risk-taking compared to adults. Additionally, adolescents' generally higher arousal of socioemotional systems demonstrates neurological underpinnings for reward-seeking behaviours. Psychological investigations of children's health decision-making indicate important age-dependent differences in risk-taking, locus of control, affect and cognitive biases. Furthermore, social influences, particularly from peers, have a large, often negative, effect on individual decision-making due to desire for peer acceptance. Acknowledging these factors is necessary for optimising the process of shared decision-making to support minors with chronic illnesses during healthcare consultations. Doctors and other healthcare professionals may need to counteract some adolescents' risk-taking behaviours which are often spurred by peer pressure. This can be achieved by highlighting the patient's control over health outcomes, emphasising short-term benefits and long-term consequences of risky behaviours, and recommending peer support networks.
1 July 2011 in Acta Psychologica
One view of causation is deterministic: A causes B means that whenever A occurs, B occurs. An alternative view is that causation is probabilistic: the assertion means that given A, the probability of B is greater than some criterion, such as the probability of B given not-A. Evidence about the induction of causal relations cannot readily decide between these alternative accounts, and so we examined how people refute causal assertions. In four experiments most participants judged that a single counterexample of A and not-B refuted assertions of the form, A causes B. And, as a deterministic theory based on mental models predicted, participants were more likely to request multiple refutations for assertions of the form, A enables B. Similarly, refutations of the form not-A and B were more frequent for enabling than causal assertions. Causation in daily life seems to be a deterministic concept.
3 November 2011 in Cognitive Science