Andrea Downing

Andrea Downing

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Andrea Downing

The Light Collective Eugene Oregon USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

5Years (2022-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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4 January 2023 in Journal of Medical Internet Research
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
SPSmit Patel
Smit Patel
JGJennifer C Goldsack
Jennifer C Goldsack
GCGrace Cordovano
Grace Cordovano
ADAndrea Downing
Andrea Downing
KFKaren K Fields
Karen K Fields
EREdmondo J Robinson
Edmondo J Robinson
Although health care delivery is becoming increasingly digitized, driven by the pursuit of improved access, equity, efficiency, and effectiveness, progress does not appear to be equally distributed across therapeutic areas. Oncology is renowned for leading innovation in research and in care; digital pathology, digital radiology, real-world data, next-generation sequencing, patient-reported outcomes, and precision approaches driven by complex data and biomarkers are hallmarks of the field. However, remote patient monitoring, decentralized approaches to care and research, “hospital at home,” and machine learning techniques have yet to be broadly deployed to improve cancer care. In response, the Digital Medicine Society and Moffitt Cancer Center convened a multistakeholder roundtable discussion to bring together leading experts in cancer care and digital innovation. This viewpoint highlights the findings from these discussions, in which experts agreed that digital innovation is lagging in oncology relative to other therapeutic areas. It reports that this lag is most likely attributed to poor articulation of the challenges in cancer care and research best suited to digital solutions, lack of incentives and support, and missing standardized infrastructure to implement digital innovations. It concludes with suggestions for actions needed to bring the promise of digitization to cancer care to improve lives.

15 August 2022 in Patterns
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
ADAndrea Downing
Andrea Downing
EPEric Perakslis
Eric Perakslis
In this study, we analyzed health-advertising tactics of digital medicine companies (n = 5) to evaluate varying types of cross-site-tracking middleware (n = 32) used to extract health information from users. More specifically, we examine how browsing data can be exchanged between digital medicine companies and Facebook for advertising and lead generation and advertising purposes. Our analysis focused on companies offering services to patient advocates in the cancer community who frequently engage on social media. We co-produced this study with public cancer advocates leading or participating in breast cancer groups on Facebook.

19 February 2026 in Nature Health
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
DKDuaa O. Khair
Duaa O. Khair
AKAditya U. Kale
Aditya U. Kale
RARuth Agbakoba
Ruth Agbakoba
EGEthan Goh
Ethan Goh
BMBilal A. Mateen
Bilal A. Mateen
JAJoseph E. Alderman
Joseph E. Alderman

24 September 2025 in Journal of Participatory Medicine
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
KOKirsten Ostherr
Kirsten Ostherr
WHWaverly Huang
Waverly Huang
APAna Park
Ana Park
TPTom Punnen
Tom Punnen
BTBhavik Tadigotla
Bhavik Tadigotla
ADAndrea Downing
Andrea Downing
The adoption of artificial intelligence (AI) in health care has outpaced education of the clinical workforce on responsible use of AI in patient care. Although many policy statements advocate safe, ethical, and trustworthy AI, guidance on the use of health AI has rarely included patient perspectives. This gap leaves out a valuable source of information and guidance about what responsible AI means to patients. In this viewpoint coauthored by patients, students, and faculty, we discuss a novel approach to integrating patient perspectives in undergraduate premedical education in the United States that aims to foster an inclusive and patient-centered future of AI in health care.

26 June 2026 in JMIR Preprints
Verified
Preprint
Open access
SJSudha Jayaraman
Sudha Jayaraman
AKArooshi Kumar
Arooshi Kumar
EPErin Palm
Erin Palm
MFMelanie Fernando
Melanie Fernando
CSChethan Sarabu
Chethan Sarabu
ASAnil Saldanha
Anil Saldanha
UNSTRUCTURED Deploying agentic AI systems without adequate plans for human supervision raises serious concerns about patient safety, privacy, and equity. To address this gap, a group of experts across industry, academic and clinical informatics interested in AI and safety convened a voice AI taskforce to discuss and develop consensus on the impact of agentic AI in healthcare. Through this collaboration, we developed a consensus framework to determine potential risks and plan mitigation efforts based on potential clinical use cases to aid health care delivery organizations assess, implement and evaluate AI agents to meet their needs. Based on five diverse use case examples, we identified common themes of risk at the level of the agent, data, patient and clinician as well as the mitigation strategies needed to address them. Agent-level risks include robust transcription validation, knowledge-grounded responses, mandatory conversation checklists, demographic bias testing, and red-teamed escalation triggers. At the data level, secure identity verification, high‑quality data, interoperable standards and rigorous governance form the foundation of safety. Patient‑level risks include equitable access, patient suitability and clear escalation paths. Finally, clinician-level risks include alert prioritization, defined liability frameworks, workflow-integrated outputs, and preserved clinical override authority. Robust symptom recognition and a thoughtful precision–recall balance are also essential aspects to consider. These guardrails, supported by multidisciplinary oversight and continuous evaluation, can enable AI agents to contribute to patient care without compromising safety, privacy or equity. This framework aims to address the uncertainties in risks to patient safety that should be considered by healthcare delivery organizations to safely apply these technologies to address healthcare needs.

15 March 2024 in JMIR Preprints
Verified
Preprint
Open access
ADAndrea Downing
Andrea Downing
JHJill Holdren
Jill Holdren
BACKGROUND Tracking technologies are frequently employed to gather and examine data regarding user interactions with websites or mobile applications of regulated health-related entities. These technologies then illegally share user data with third parties that use it to target ads to patients across social media platforms. This collection and sharing constitutes a data leak of massive proportions. Specifically, some pharmacies, medical device companies, and hospitals utilize banned tracking or surveillance technologies on their websites in a way that exposes patients’ prescriptions, medical device information, doctor appointments and contact details to third parties. OBJECTIVE This study aimed to assess the use of prohibited tracking technologies on unauthenticated URL’s within three types of entities: pharmacies, medical companies, and health systems. METHODS We identified the largest-by-revenue medical device companies, pharmacies, and hospitals in the United States, using a scanning tool we developed based on existing open source software to detect the presence or absence of five banned tracking technologies on a sample of them. RESULTS In total, we included 341 URLs associated with three different types of HIPAA covered entities in our scan sample. Medical device company (n= 147) webpages comprised 43.1% of our overall sample. Pharmacy webpages (n=96) comprised 28.2% of our sample, and hospitals/health system URLs (n=98) comprised 28.7% of our sample. 63.9% of the medical device company URLs scanned contained at least one banned surveillance technology. 59.2% of pharmacy URLs scanned had at least one banned surveillance technology installed. 59.8% out of hospital URLs scanned contained at least one banned surveillance tracker. The most common tracker found on medical device company sample was Google Audience (39.5%), followed closely by Facebook Pixel (36.1%) There were a number of device companies, pharmacies, and hospitals scanned that had none of the banned trackers. n=53 URLs or 36.1% did not have any banned trackers identified. 40.8% (44) of pharmacies did not have any trackers. 67.0% of hospital URLs scanned did not have any trackers identified. CONCLUSIONS This study demonstrates the presence of health trackers on many health-related sites despite the laws that prohibit them, and further examines the ways PHI may be shared with social media platforms or third parties via unauthenticated landing pages. Future studies are needed to assess the impact of leaking sensitive data belonging to millions of patients to third party vendors. CLINICALTRIAL n/a