Zhiping Zhou

Zhiping Zhou

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Zhiping Zhou

School of Management, Hefei University of Technology, Hefei, People’s Republic of China

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

9Years (2018-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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16 August 2022 in International Journal of Production Research
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ZZZhiping Zhou
Zhiping Zhou
JRJing Ren
Jing Ren
XLXinbao Liu
Xinbao Liu
PPPanos M. Pardalos
Panos M. Pardalos
Service-oriented manufacturing has been a prevalent trend in integrating product collaborative development with maintenance service, whereas the final products are frequently trapped into severe quality defects lacking appropriate contracting incentives. This paper establishes a tractable framework investigating the alignment of inspection and warranty strategies to manage product quality throughout the R&D, manufacturing and usage processes. Specifically, the manufacturing effort is motivated by a cost-sharing contract provided by the researcher, who performs quality inspection upon receiving the final product. Subsequent maintenance service is predesignated for warranty period coverage that the cost is partially claimed for compensation from the manufacturer. Under both breakdown and preventive maintenance strategies, we elaborate and compare the optimal incentive intensities solving the equilibrium effort decisions and inspection accuracy. The results suggest that both R&D and manufacturing effort levels under preventive maintenance are slightly higher than that under breakdown maintenance scenario, while inspection accuracy contradicts conversely. The breakdown maintenance strategy is associated with a lower proportion of warranty costs borne by the manufacturer. For a sufficient long warranty period, the researcher is better off to conduct preventive maintenance periodically. Our study contributes to providing explicit implications to manage product development quality with adequate inspection and warranty strategies.

26 December 2020 in International Journal of Production Research
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
LGLei Guan
Lei Guan
JPJun Pei
Jun Pei
XLXinbao Liu
Xinbao Liu
ZZZhiping Zhou
Zhiping Zhou
PPPanos M. Pardalos
Panos M. Pardalos
The daily home-office commute of millions of people in crowded cities strains air quality and increases travel time, which motivates the generation of ridesharing. Ridesharing offers many benefits, such as reducing travel costs, congestion, and pollution. Commuter ridesharing is an important theme of urban transportation. This paper studies a ridesharing problem aiming at enlarging the ridesharing market at a limited cost, which enlighten the decision-making problem in city logistics. We establish a novel multi-objective optimisation model based on cumulative prospect theory (CPT) to address the preferred travel mode of commuters. The commuters’ perceived value influences their choice of travel mode. Meanwhile, the perceived value changes with the commuters’ experience of travel mode choice. We give the NP-hardness proof of the ridesharing scheduling problem and develop a heuristic algorithm to solve it in a small-scale scenario. For large-scale problems, a hybrid VNS-NSGAII algorithm combining variable neighbourhood search (VNS) with NSGAII (Non-dominated Sorting Genetic Algorithm II) is proposed to generate an approximate optimal Pareto front. A series of computational experiments are conducted to demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed algorithm based on the actual traffic data in Beijing, China.

17 June 2022 in Operational Research
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
SLShaojun Lu
Shaojun Lu
MKMin Kong
Min Kong
ZZZhiping Zhou
Zhiping Zhou
XLXinbao Liu
Xinbao Liu
SLSiwen Liu
Siwen Liu

19 August 2020 in International Journal of Production Research
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ZZZhiping Zhou
Zhiping Zhou
JPJun Pei
Jun Pei
XLXinbao Liu
Xinbao Liu
HFHong Fu
Hong Fu
PPPanos M. Pardalos
Panos M. Pardalos
Enterprises in China are extensively involved in collaborative virtual enterprise (VE) supported by the internet of things (IoT). This paper investigates the effects of member enterprises’ resource occupation on performance of the IoT-based VE, and examines how such effects are moderated by decision authority decentralisation. We obtained the research data from a survey administered to 141 small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that participate in IoT-based VEs. Hierarchical regression analysis was adopted to test the proposed hypotheses. Our findings suggest that information and operational resources are positively associated with both business and market performance. Strategic decision authority decentralised to SMEs with superior information or operational resources enhances the overall performance, whereas decentralisation of operational decision authority facilitates the positive effects of operational resource on performance. Our study provides directive guidance for IoT-based VEs to cultivate and acquire specific superior resources, and allocate decision authorities reasonably for effective resource utilisation and collaboration.

1 January 2018 in Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
ZZZhiping Zhou
Zhiping Zhou
XLXinbao Liu
Xinbao Liu
JPJun Pei
Jun Pei
Panos M. PardalosPanos M. Pardalos
Panos M. Pardalos
HCHao Cheng
Hao Cheng
This paper develops a multi-period product pricing and service investment model to discuss the optimal decisions of the participants in a supplier-dominant supply chain under uncertainty. The supply chain consists of a risk-neutral supplier and two risk-averse manufacturers, of which one manufacturer can provide real-time customer service based on the Internet of Things (IoT). In each period of the Stackelberg game, the supplier decides its wholesale price to maximize the profit while the manufacturers make pricing and service investment decisions to maximize their respective utility. Using the backward induction, we first investigate the effects of risk-averse coefficients and price sensitive coefficients on the optimal decisions of the manufacturers. We find that the decisions of one manufacturer are inversely proportional to both risk-averse coefficients and its own price sensitive coefficient, while proportional to the price sensitive coefficient of its rival. Then, we derive the first-best wholesale price of the supplier and analyze how relevant factors affect the results. A numerical example is conducted to verify our conclusions and demonstrate the advantages of the IoT technology in long-term competition. Finally, we summarize the main contributions of this paper and put forward some advices for further study.

1 January 2022 in Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
ZZZhiping Zhou
Zhiping Zhou
YYYao Yin
Yao Yin
MZMi Zhou
Mi Zhou
HCHao Cheng
Hao Cheng
Panos M. PardalosPanos M. Pardalos
Panos M. Pardalos
The shareholder's interest oriented from business operation relies on opportunism regulation of the manager under asymmetry. Effective motivation incentives should be exploited to facilitate the manager's effort devotion enthusiasms. This paper establishes a theoretic model in which the shareholder offers equity-based incentive to a fairness-preferred manager to coordinate their interest conflicts and maximize her expected revenue. The manager exerts unverifiable levels of efforts toward both decision and coordination tasks making the most of his private information about fairness preference. Two interrelated performance measures on different hierarchical levels are considered for contracting purposes. In each situation, we derive the equilibrium effort choices and incentive coefficients of both participants, and investigate how these decisions are affected by fairness preference. Research findings suggest that the incorporation of firm equity dominates pure profit incentive in eliciting high effort levels toward two distinctive managerial tasks. Besides, the equity-based incentive weakens the perceived unfairness and facilitates the participants' expected revenue. Comparative statics and numerical analysis are conducted to demonstrate our results and the effectiveness of the proposed equity-based incentive. Finally, we summarize the contributions of this paper and put forward directions for further study.