Olivier Massol

Olivier Massol

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Olivier Massol

Industrial Engineering Research Department, CentraleSupélec, Université Paris-Saclay, 9 ter rue Joliot-Curie, 92190, Gif-sur-Yvette, France; Department of Economics, City St George's, University of London, Northampton Square, London, EC1V 0HB, UK

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

17Years (2010-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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29 December 2024 in Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PBPaul Bardon
Paul Bardon
OMOlivier Massol
Olivier Massol

1 July 2010 in Energy Economics
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
OMOlivier Massol
Olivier Massol
STStéphane Tchung-Ming
Stéphane Tchung-Ming

1 April 2018 in Energy Policy
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
OMOlivier Massol
Olivier Massol
STStéphane Tchung-Ming
Stéphane Tchung-Ming
ABAlbert Banal-Estañol
Albert Banal-Estañol

11 May 2024 in Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
MSMarzia Sesini
Marzia Sesini
ACAnna Cretì
Anna Cretì
OMOlivier Massol
Olivier Massol

1 November 2015 in European Journal of Operational Research
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
OMOlivier Massol
Olivier Massol
STStéphane Tchung-Ming
Stéphane Tchung-Ming
ABAlbert Banal-Estañol
Albert Banal-Estañol
International audienceThis paper examines the conditions for a widespread adoption of Carbon Capture transport and Storage (CCS) by a group of emitters that can be connected to a common CO2 pipeline. It details a modeling framework aimed at assessing the critical value in the charge for the CO2 emissions required for each of the emitters to decide to implement capture capabilities. This model can be used to analyze how the tariff structure imposed on the CO2 pipeline operator modifies the overall cost of CO2 abatement via CCS. This framework is applied to the case of a real European CO2 pipeline project. We find that the obligation to use cross-subsidy-free pipeline tariffs has a minor impact on the minimum CO2 price required to adopt the CCS. In contrast, the obligation to charge non-discriminatory prices can either impede the adoption of CCS or significantly raise that price. Besides which, we compared two alternative regulatory frameworks for CO2 pipelines: a common European organization as opposed to a collection of national regulations. The results indicate that the institutional scope of that regulation has a limited impact on the adoption of CCS compared to the detailed design of the tariff structure imposed on pipeline operators