Álvaro Feal

Álvaro Feal

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Álvaro Feal

IMDEA Networks Institute / Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

8Years (2019-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 April 2020 in Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
ÁFÁlvaro Feal
Álvaro Feal
PCPaolo Calciati
Paolo Calciati
NVNarseo Vallina-Rodriguez
Narseo Vallina-Rodriguez
CTCarmela Troncoso
Carmela Troncoso
AGAlessandra Gorla
Alessandra Gorla
Android parental control applications are used by parents to monitor and limit their children’s mobile behaviour (e.g., mobile apps usage, web browsing, calling, and texting). In order to offer this service, parental control apps require privileged access to system resources and access to sensitive data. This may significantly reduce the dangers associated with kids’ online activities, but it raises important privacy concerns. These concerns have so far been overlooked by organizations providing recommendations regarding the use of parental control applications to the public. We conduct the first in-depth study of the Android parental control app’s ecosystem from a privacy and regulatory point of view. We exhaustively study 46 apps from 43 developers which have a combined 20M installs in the Google Play Store. Using a combination of static and dynamic analysis we find that: these apps are on average more permissions-hungry than the top 150 apps in the Google Play Store, and tend to request more dangerous permissions with new releases; 11% of the apps transmit personal data in the clear; 34% of the apps gather and send personal information without appropriate consent; and 72% of the apps share data with third parties (including online advertising and analytics services) without mentioning their presence in their privacy policies. In summary, parental control applications lack transparency and lack compliance with regulatory requirements. This holds even for those applications recommended by European and other national security centers.

1 July 2020 in Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
CHCatherine Han
Catherine Han
IRIrwin Reyes
Irwin Reyes
ÁFÁlvaro Feal
Álvaro Feal
JRJoel Reardon
Joel Reardon
PWPrimal Wijesekera
Primal Wijesekera
SESerge Egelman
Serge Egelman
It is commonly assumed that “free” mobile apps come at the cost of consumer privacy and that paying for apps could offer consumers protection from behavioral advertising and long-term tracking. This work empirically evaluates the validity of this assumption by comparing the privacy practices of free apps and their paid premium versions, while also gauging consumer expectations surrounding free and paid apps. We use both static and dynamic analysis to examine 5,877 pairs of free Android apps and their paid counterparts for differences in data collection practices and privacy policies between pairs. To understand user expectations for paid apps, we conducted a 998-participant online survey and found that consumers expect paid apps to have better security and privacy behaviors. However, there is no clear evidence that paying for an app will actually guarantee protection from extensive data collection in practice. Given that the free version had at least one thirdparty library or dangerous permission, respectively, we discovered that 45% of the paid versions reused all of the same third-party libraries as their free versions, and 74% of the paid versions had all of the dangerous permissions held by the free app. Likewise, our dynamic analysis revealed that 32% of the paid apps exhibit all of the same data collection and transmission behaviors as their free counterparts. Finally, we found that 40% of apps did not have a privacy policy link in the Google Play Store and that only 3.7% of the pairs that did reflected differences between the free and paid versions.

21 October 2019
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
PVPelayo Vallina
Pelayo Vallina
ÁFÁlvaro Feal
Álvaro Feal
JGJulien Gamba
Julien Gamba
NVNarseo Vallina-Rodriguez
Narseo Vallina-Rodriguez
AAAntonio Fernández Anta
Antonio Fernández Anta
Modern privacy regulations, including the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in the European Union, aim to control user tracking activities in websites and mobile applications. These privacy rules typically contain specific provisions and strict requirements for websites that provide sensitive material to end users such as sexual, religious, and health services. However, little is known about the privacy risks that users face when visiting such websites, and about their regulatory compliance. In this paper, we present the first comprehensive and large-scale analysis of 6,843 pornographic websites. We provide an exhaustive behavioral analysis of the use of tracking methods by these websites, and their lack of regulatory compliance, including the absence of age-verification mechanisms and methods to obtain informed user consent. The results indicate that, as in the regular web, tracking is prevalent across pornographic sites: 72% of the websites use third-party cookies and 5% leverage advanced user fingerprinting technologies. Yet, our analysis reveals a third-party tracking ecosystem semi-decoupled from the regular web in which various analytics and advertising services track users across, and outside, pornographic websites. We complete the paper with a regulatory compliance analysis in the context of the EU GDPR, and newer legal requirements to implement verifiable access control mechanisms (e.g., UK's Digital Economy Act). We find that only 16% of the analyzed websites have an accessible privacy policy and only 4% provide a cookie consent banner. The use of verifiable access control mechanisms is limited to prominent pornographic websites.

26 April 2021 in IEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
AFAlvaro Feal
Alvaro Feal
PVPelayo Vallina
Pelayo Vallina
JGJulien Gamba
Julien Gamba
SPSergio Pastrana
Sergio Pastrana
ANAntonio Nappa
Antonio Nappa
JTJuan Tapiador
Juan Tapiador
Blocklists constitute a widely-used Internet security mechanism to filter undesired network traffic based on IP/domain reputation and behavior. Many blocklists are distributed in open source form by threat intelligence providers who aggregate and process input from their own sensors, but also from third-party feeds or providers. Despite their wide adoption, many open-source blocklist providers lack clear documentation about their structure, curation process, contents, dynamics, and inter-relationships with other providers. In this paper, we perform a transparency and content analysis of 2,093 free and open source blocklists with the aim of exploring those questions. To that end, we perform a longitudinal 6-month crawling campaign yielding more than 13.5M unique records. This allows us to shed light on their nature, dynamics, inter-provider relationships, and transparency. Specifically, we discuss how the lack of consensus on distribution formats, blocklist labeling taxonomy, content focus, and temporal dynamics creates a complex ecosystem that complicates their combined crawling, aggregation and use. We also provide observations regarding their generally low overlap as well as acute differences in terms of liveness (i.e., how frequently records get indexed and removed from the list) and the lack of documentation about their data collection processes, nature and intended purpose. We conclude the paper with recommendations in terms of transparency, accountability, and standardization.

12 January 2023 in IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
KHKaspar Hageman
Kaspar Hageman
ÁFÁlvaro Feal
Álvaro Feal
JGJulien Gamba
Julien Gamba
AGAniketh Girish
Aniketh Girish
JBJakob Bleier
Jakob Bleier
NVNarseo Vallina-Rodriguez
Narseo Vallina-Rodriguez
The ability to identify the author responsible for a given software object is critical for many research studies and for enhancing software transparency and accountability. However, as opposed to other application markets like Apple's iOS App Store, attribution in the Android ecosystem is known to be hard. Prior research has leveraged market metadata and signing certificates to identify software authors without questioning the validity and accuracy of these attribution signals. However, Android application (app) authors can, either intentionally or by mistake, hide their true identity due to: (1) the lack of policy enforcement by markets to ensure the accuracy and correctness of the information disclosed by developers in their market profiles during the app release process, and (2) the use of self-signed certificates for signing apps instead of certificates issued by trusted CAs. In this paper, we perform the first empirical analysis of the availability, volatility and overall aptness of publicly available market and app metadata for author attribution in Android markets. To that end, we analyze a dataset of over 2.5 million market entries and apps extracted from five Android markets for over two years. Our results show that widely used attribution signals are often missing from market profiles and that they change over time. We also invalidate the general belief about the validity of signing certificates for author attribution. For instance, we find that apps from different authors share signing certificates due to the proliferation of app building frameworks and software factories. Finally, we introduce the concept of an attribution graph and we apply it to evaluate the validity of existing attribution signals on the Google Play Store. Our results confirm that the lack of control over publicly available signals can confuse automatic attribution processes.

30 June 2023 in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
JGJulien Gamba
Julien Gamba
ÁFÁlvaro Feal
Álvaro Feal
EBEduardo Blazquez
Eduardo Blazquez
VBVinuri Bandara
Vinuri Bandara
ARAbbas Razaghpanah
Abbas Razaghpanah
NVNarseo Vallina-Rodriguez
Narseo Vallina-Rodriguez
Android implements a permission system to regulate apps' access to system resources and sensitive user data. One salient feature of this system is its extensibility: apps can define their own custom permissions to expose features and data to other apps. However, little is known about how widespread the usage of custom permissions is, and what is the impact that these permissions can have on users' privacy and security. In this paper, we empirically study the usage of custom permissions at large scale, using a dataset of 2.2M pre-installed and app-store-downloaded apps. We find the usage of custom permissions to be widespread, and seemingly growing over time. Despite this prevalence, we find that custom permissions are virtually invisible to end users, and their purpose mostly undocumented. This lack of transparency can lead to serious security and privacy problems: we show that custom permissions can facilitate access to permission-protected system resources to apps that lack those permissions without user awareness. To detect this practice, we design and implement two static analysis tools, and highlight multiple concerning cases spotted in the wild. We conclude this study with a discussion of potential solutions to mitigate the privacy and security risks of custom permissions.