15 November 2017 in Weather, Climate, and Society
The likelihood of floods and other potentially destructive natural phenomena is often expressed as a return period or recurrence interval, such as a 100-yr flood. However, the expression might give users the impression that the event will occur exactly once within the described period, obscuring the intended probabilistic meaning. If so, users may think a flood is less likely when one has just occurred or more likely when it has not, leading to a “flood is due” effect. This hypothesis was tested experimentally in two studies reported here. Participants were given either a return period or a probability expression and asked to rate flood likelihood and concern. Flood recency was also manipulated. The results from both studies support a flood is due effect when the return period expression is used. In the return period condition alone, participants rated floods as more likely and expressed greater concern when no flood had occurred recently. When no likelihood information was conveyed in the control condition, the opposite effect was observed. Participants rated flood likelihood as higher and expressed greater concern when a flood had occurred recently. Participants using the percent chance expression were least affected by flood recency. This adds to the growing body of research suggesting that nonexperts can benefit from probabilistic weather forecasts.
1 December 2016 in BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making
TCThe Writing Group for CERTAIN-CHOICES
The Writing Group for CERTAIN-CHOICES
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Prospect theory suggests that when faced with an uncertain outcome, people display loss aversion by preferring to risk a greater loss rather than incurring certain, lesser cost. Providing probability information improves decision making towards the economically optimal choice in these situations. Clinicians frequently make decisions when the outcome is uncertain, and loss aversion may influence choices. This study explores the extent to which prospect theory, loss aversion, and probability information in a non-clinical domain explains clinical decision making under uncertainty. Four hundred sixty two participants (n = 117 non-medical undergraduates, n = 113 medical students, n = 117 resident trainees, and n = 115 medical/surgical faculty) completed a three-part online task. First, participants completed an iced-road salting task using temperature forecasts with or without explicit probability information. Second, participants chose between less or more risk-averse (“defensive medicine”) decisions in standardized scenarios. Last, participants chose between recommending therapy with certain outcomes or risking additional years gained or lost. In the road salting task, the mean expected value for decisions made by clinicians was better than for non-clinicians(−$1,022 vs -$1,061; <0.001). Probability information improved decision making for all participants, but non-clinicians improved more (mean improvement of $64 versus $33; p = 0.027). Mean defensive decisions decreased across training level (medical students 2.1 ± 0.9, residents 1.6 ± 0.8, faculty1.6 ± 1.1; p-trend < 0.001) and prospect-theory-concordant decisions increased (25.4%, 33.9%, and 40.7%;p-trend = 0.016). There was no relationship identified between road salting choices with defensive medicine and prospect-theory-concordant decisions. All participants made more economically-rational decisions when provided explicit probability information in a non-clinical domain. However, choices in the non-clinical domain were not related to prospect-theory concordant decision making and risk aversion tendencies in the clinical domain. Recognizing this discordance may be important when applying prospect theory to interventions aimed at improving clinical care.