Online media offer unprecedented access to digital public spheres, largely enhancing users’ opportunities for participation and providing new means for strengthening democratic discourse. At the same time, the last decades have demonstrated that online discourses are often characterised by so-called ‘dark participation’ the spreading of lies and incivility. Using ‘problematic behaviour theory’ as framework and focusing on incivility as a specific form of dark participation, this article investigates the role of users’ personal characteristics, media use, and online experiences in relation to offensive and hateful online behaviour. Using a random-quota survey of the German population, we explored how dark personality traits, political attitudes and emotions, the frequency and spaces of online-media use, and users’ experiences with both civil and uncivil online discourses predicted participants own uncivil behaviour, such as posting, sharing, or liking uncivil content. We found that 46% of the participants who had witnessed incivility in the last three months also engaged in uncivil participation. A hierarchical logistic regression analysis showed that incivility was associated with manipulative personality traits as measured by the dark triad, right-wing populist voting intentions, and frequent social-media use. Experiences with both civil comments and hate speech predicted higher levels of uncivil participation. The strongest predictor was participants’ personal experiences with online victimisation. Overall, the results confirmed that dark participation in the sense of uncivil engagement results from the interplay of personality traits, an online environment that allows for deviant engagement, and, most importantly, participants’ experiences in said environment.
Participatory formats in online journalism offer increased options for user comments to reach a mass audience, also enabling the spreading of incivility. As a result, journalists feel the need to moderate offensive user comments in order to prevent the derailment of discussion threads. However, little is known about the principles on which forum moderation is based. The current study aims to fill this void by examining 673,361 user comments (including all incoming and rejected comments) of the largest newspaper forum in Germany (Spiegel Online) in terms of the moderation decision, the topic addressed, and the use of insulting language using automated content analysis. The analyses revealed that the deletion of user comments is a frequently used moderation strategy. Overall, more than one-third of comments studied were rejected. Further, users mostly engaged with political topics. The usage of swear words was not a reason to block a comment, except when offenses were used in connection with politically sensitive topics. We discuss the results in light of the necessity for journalists to establish consistent and transparent moderation strategies.
Comments in designated sections of newspaper websites and on social media platforms are the most prominent form of user participation in journalism, offering the opportunity to connect to the audience. Yet, rising levels of dark participation in the form of hate speech, disinformation, and strategic attempts to influence public opinion, provide new challenges for media organizations and require moderators to ensure a minimum of discursive quality. Newsrooms employ a variety of moderation strategies. Based on computer assisted telephone interviews with German journalists working for online newspapers (N = 274), we identified explanatory factors for the implementation of discursive-interactive and authoritative-interactive moderation practices. The results suggest that left-leaning media tend to engage more in authoritative-interactive as well as discursive-interactive moderation than right-leaning media. If media organizations establish a participative communicative setting, moderators engage more with the audience although the prevalence of dark participation is higher.
Consuming conspiracy theories erodes trust in democratic institutions, while conspiracy beliefs demotivate democratic participation, posing a potential threat to democracy. The proliferation of social media, especially the emergence of numerous alternative platforms with minimal moderation, has greatly facilitated the dissemination and consumption of conspiracy theories. Nevertheless, there remains a dearth of knowledge concerning the origin and evolution of specific conspiracy theories across different platforms. This study aims to address this gap through a large-scale, cross-platform examination of the genesis of new conspiracy theories surrounding the death of Jeffrey Epstein. Through a (semi-) automated content analysis conducted on a distinctive dataset comprising N = 8,020,314 Epstein-related posts posted on both established platforms ( Twitter, Reddit) and alternative platforms ( Gab and 4Chan), we demonstrate that conspiracy theories emerge early and influence public discourse well in advance of reports from established media sources. Our data shows that users of the studied platforms immediately turn to conspirational explanations, exhibiting skepticism towards the official representation of events. Especially on alternative platforms, this skepticism swiftly transformed into unwarranted conspiracy theorizing, partly bolstered by references to alternative news media sources. The present study shows how conspirational explanations thrive in low information environments and how alternative media plays a role in turning rational skepticism into unwarranted conspiracy theories.
The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic was accompanied by a massive flood of “fake news”, conspiracy theories, and distorted information more generally. Alternative news media have been accused of contributing to this pollution the information sphere. In this article, we argue that audiences with a counter-hegemonic, ideologically biased worldview are particularly likely to use alternative counter-news, because these outlets validate their worldview ― and worldview validation being a relevant psychological need in times of crises. We suggest that by turning to alternative counter-news, audiences increase their exposure to fake news and end up being less well informed about important events. Results of a random-quota survey in Germany (N = 967) confirmed that those with higher levels of conspiracy mentality and lower media trust were more likely to use alternative counter-news. Alternative counter-news users recalled more fake news than non-users and alternative counter-news use partially mediated the relationship between counter-hegemonic attitudes and fake news recall. Thus, although not all content in alternative counter-news is fake news, these outlets do attract a specific counter-hegemonic audience and they do contribute to the “pollution” of the information ecosystem.