Misinformation online poses a range of threats, from subverting democratic processes to undermining public health measures. Proposed solutions range from encouraging more selective sharing by individuals to removing false content and accounts that create or promote it. Here we provide a framework to evaluate interventions aimed at reducing viral misinformation online both in isolation and when used in combination. We begin by deriving a generative model of viral misinformation spread, inspired by research on infectious disease. By applying this model to a large corpus (10.5 million tweets) of misinformation events that occurred during the 2020 US election, we reveal that commonly proposed interventions are unlikely to be effective in isolation. However, our framework demonstrates that a combined approach can achieve a substantial reduction in the prevalence of misinformation. Our results highlight a practical path forward as misinformation online continues to threaten vaccination efforts, equity and democratic processes around the globe.
The presence of political misinformation and ideological echo chambers on social media platforms is concerning given the important role that these sites play in the public’s exposure to news and current events. Algorithmic systems employed on these platforms are presumed to play a role in these phenomena, but little is known about their mechanisms and effects. In this work, we conduct an algorithmic audit of Twitter’s Who-To-Follow friend recommendation system, the first empirical audit that investigates the impact of this algorithm in-situ. We create automated Twitter accounts that initially follow left and right affiliated U.S. politicians during the 2022 U.S. midterm elections and then grow their information networks using the platform’s recommender system. We pair the experiment with an observational study of Twitter users who already follow the same politicians. Broadly, we find that while following the recommendation algorithm leads accounts into dense and reciprocal neighborhoods that structurally resemble echo chambers, the recommender also results in less political homogeneity of a user’s network compared to accounts growing their networks through social endorsement. Furthermore, accounts that exclusively followed users recommended by the algorithm had fewer opportunities to encounter content centered on false or misleading election narratives compared to choosing friends based on social endorsement.
As a research tradition, participatory design (PD) tends to focus on power dynamics where researchers hold greater power than participants. This paper uses design fiction to consider what this tendency overlooks by examining settings where participants may exist in multiple power relationships simultaneously implicated by the research, specifically focusing on the contexts of misinformation, disinformation, and online hate (M/D/OH). Drawing from existing literature in M/D/OH, we present a series of imaginary method abstracts that prompt questions for researchers to reflect on as they adapt PD techniques for new, different contexts. We highlight three value tensions—authenticity, reciprocity, and impact—integral to sustaining a concern for responsibility in PD scholarship. We end with reflections and potential considerations for responsibly applying PD and design fiction methods in M/D/OH settings.
Understanding the spread of online rumors is a pressing societal challenge and an active area of research across domains. In the context of the 2022 U.S. midterm elections, one influential social media platform for sharing information — including rumors that may be false, misleading, or unsubstantiated — was Twitter (now renamed X). To increase understanding of the dynamics of online rumors about elections, we present and analyze a dataset of 1.81 million Twitter posts corresponding to 135 distinct rumors which spread online during the midterm election season (September 5 to December 1, 2022). We describe how this data was collected, compiled, and supplemented, and provide a series of exploratory analyses along with comparisons to a previously published dataset on 2020 election rumors. We also conduct a mixed-methods analysis of five distinct rumors about the election in Arizona, a particularly prominent focus of 2022 election rumoring. Finally, we provide a set of potential future directions for how this dataset could be used to facilitate future research into online rumors, misinformation, and disinformation.