The Porter hypothesis postulates that the costs of compliance with environmental standards may be offset by adoption of innovations they trigger. We model this hypothesis using a game of timing of technology adoption. We will show that times of adoption will be earlier if the non-adoption tax is higher. The environmental tax will turn the preemption game with low profits into a game with credible precommitment generating higher profits (pro-Porter). If there is a precommitment game without environmental taxes, the introduction of a tax will lead to lower profits (anti-Porter). An evaluation of the empirical literature indicates that the Porter hypothesis will hold even for profit-maximizing firms under multiple market imperfections such as imperfect competition, X-inefficiency, and agency costs. These are more likely to be present in sectors with large firms. In many case studies that we have evaluated, though, we detected an element of explicit or implicit subsidies for environmentally friendly behaviour, which is in line with Pigovian policies.
Displaced workers experience significant and long‐lasting wage losses. However, the average wage losses hide the tremendous differences among workers. So far, the differences are explained by differences in accumulated on‐the‐job experience, education level, age, and so on, but a large variation among similar workers remain. In this paper we investigate the effect of general and specific human capital on the unemployment duration and wage losses during the first three years following displacement. Information on the specificity of a job or function allows us to quantify the impact on the wage losses. We are able to rank positions in terms of the specificity of accumulated human capital.
Flexible jobs make up a larger share of the Dutch labour market than in almost any other Western country. Recent graduates in the Netherlands are particularly likely to take flexible jobs. In this study we examine why recent graduates enter into temporary contracts and whether flexible jobs offer a poorer match for graduates’ qualifications than permanent jobs. We find that recent graduates that enter into flexible jobs face large wage penalties, a worse job match and less training participation than graduates who take permanent jobs, even after correcting for differences in ability. When the labour market situation for a particular field of education deteriorates, more recent graduates are forced into flexible jobs, threatening their position on the labour market in the long run. Flexible work among recent graduates is unrelated to their willingness to take risks. Only for university graduates is there any indication that flexible jobs may provide a stepping stone to permanent employment.