Weijuan Zhang

Weijuan Zhang

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Weijuan Zhang

Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

4Years (2023-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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24 April 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
HQHaoxiang Qin
Haoxiang Qin
ZSZhenyu Song
Zhenyu Song
WZWeijuan Zhang
Weijuan Zhang
SHSicong Huang
Sicong Huang
WYWentao Yao
Wentao Yao
HDHaichao Du
Haichao Du
AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) assumes the hypervisor (HV) is untrusted and introduces hardware memory encryption support for virtual machines (VMs). Previous studies have proposed various attacks against encrypted VMs by exploiting SEV security flaws such as unencrypted VMCB and lack of memory integrity. Most of these flaws have been solved by the subsequent releases of SEV with Encrypted State (SEV-ES) and SEV with Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP). However, the latest SEV-SNP cannot stop the malicious HV tampering with critical flags in the nested page table (NPT). So SEV-SNP is still vulnerable to the nested page fault (NPF) controlled channel attack, which is a commonly shared step of most attacks against SEV. Existing works on SEV also cannot defend against NPF controlled channel. In this paper, we first analyze the root cause of NPF controlled channel. Then we propose a software-based approach to protect encrypted VMs from NPF controlled channel. We introduce a virtualization security module (VSM) as a software TCB to deprivilege the HV by modifing the HV to access critical resources indirectly through interfaces managed by VSM. To prevent the untrusted HV from compromising the VSM-based protection, we extend the nested kernel architecture to the virtualization layer to provide isolation for VSM at the same privilege level. A prototype of this approach is implemented based on KVM. The experiments show that the approach can protect encrypted VMs from NPF controlled channel with 1.21% average runtime overhead and 1.47% average I/O overhead.

27 May 2025 in Proceedings of the ACM on Measurement and Analysis of Computing Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
ZZZhicong Zhang
Zhicong Zhang
QZQihang Zhou
Qihang Zhou
SXShaowen Xu
Shaowen Xu
NJNan Jiang
Nan Jiang
WZWeijuan Zhang
Weijuan Zhang
XJXiaoqi Jia
Xiaoqi Jia
Container technology, characterized by its convenience in deployment and exceptional performance, has emerged as a dominant force in the realm of cloud computing. However, the shared kernel among different containers and the common practice of running multiple applications within a single container pose threats to user data from malicious co-resident containers or other malicious programs within the same container. To address this problem, we introduce a novel container architecture design - UniContainer. UniContainer partitions original containers, allowing each component to run within an independent customized Unikernel, thereby enhancing isolation both between containers and within containers. We implement a prototype of UniContainer based on Unikraft, enabling automated analysis of target container system call logs and configuration of optimal Unikraft images, while preserving the convenience of container technology deployment. Through experimental evaluation, we validate the effectiveness and performance of UniContainer, maximizing the outstanding performance benefits of container technology.

16 June 2025 in ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
ZZZhicong Zhang
Zhicong Zhang
QZQihang Zhou
Qihang Zhou
SXShaowen Xu
Shaowen Xu
NJNan Jiang
Nan Jiang
WZWeijuan Zhang
Weijuan Zhang
XJXiaoqi Jia
Xiaoqi Jia
Container technology, characterized by its convenience in deployment and exceptional performance, has emerged as a dominant force in the realm of cloud computing. However, the shared kernel among different containers and the common practice of running multiple applications within a single container pose threats to user data from malicious co-resident containers or other malicious programs within the same container. To address this problem, we introduce a novel container architecture design - UniContainer. UniContainer partitions original containers, allowing each component to run within an independent customized Unikernel, thereby enhancing isolation both between containers and within containers. We implement a prototype of UniContainer based on Unikraft, enabling automated analysis of target container system call logs and configuration of optimal Unikraft images, while preserving the convenience of container technology deployment. Through experimental evaluation, we validate the effectiveness and performance of UniContainer, maximizing the outstanding performance benefits of container technology.