4 February 2014 in Annals of Operations Research
30 January 2020 in International Transactions in Operational Research
17 March 2016 in Annals of Operations Research
1 January 2013 in Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
The optimal pricing and remanufacturing decisions problem of a fuzzy closed-loop supply chain is considered in this paper. Particularly, there is one manufacturer who has incorporated a remanufacturing process for used products into her original production system, so that she can manufacture a new product directly from raw materials or from collected used products. The manufacturer then sells the new product to two different competitive retailers, respectively, and the two competitive retailers are in charge of deciding the rates of the remanufactured products in their consumers’ demand quantity. The fuzziness is associated with the customer’s demands, the remanufacturing and manufacturing costs, and the collecting scaling parameters of the two retailers. The purpose of this paper is to explore how the manufacturer and the two retailers make their own decisions about wholesale price, retail prices, and the remanufacturing rates in the expected value model. Using game theory and fuzzy theory, we examine each firm’s strategy and explore the role of the manufacturer and the two retailers over three different game scenarios. We get some insights into the economic behavior of firms, which can serve as the basis for empirical study in the future.
1 January 2017 in Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization
This paper studies pricing and remanufacturing decisions for two substitutable products in a supply chain with two manufacturers and one common retailer. The two manufacturers produce two substitutable products and sell them to the retailer. Specifically, the first manufacturer is a traditional manufacturer who produces the new product directly from raw material, while the second manufacturer has incorporated a remanufacturing process for used product into his original production system, so that he can manufacture a new product directly from raw material, or remanufacture part or whole of a returned unit into a new product. We establish seven game models by considering the chain members' horizontal and vertical competitions, and obtain the corresponding closed-form expressions for equilibrium solution. Then, the equilibrium characteristics with respect to the second manufacturer's remanufacturing decision and all channel members' pricing decisions are explored, the sensitivity analysis of equilibrium solution is conducted for some model parameters, and the maximal profits and equilibrium solutions obtained in different game models are compared by numerical analyses. Based on these results, some interesting and valuable economic and managerial insights are established.
21 March 2018 in Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
Supply disruption may cause strong complaints of customers, which is a cost loss for the firms in the supply chain. Obviously, if realizing that there is the disruption risk, the members in a supply chain will adjust their decisions. For analyzing the influence, we consider a popular supply chain mode with dual channels, where one manufacturer has its direct sales channel and one traditional retailer channel. The manufacturer may suffer a supply disruption so that all ordered products by the retailer or the direct retail channel will be lost, and the members in supply chain will bear the corresponding disruption penalty from the customers. By considering four structures with different market power relations, the closed-form optimal price decisions of the four models are given. We found that the disruption factor improves the sales prices for any member structure as compared to the supply chain without the disruption. And the direct retail prices in the different modes are the same as each other, but the price of the traditional channel is influenced by the market share. And the sorts of the sales prices under different structures are given. We also conduct some extensive numerical analysis and compare the results under different structures. We observe that the expected optimal profits of considering the external penalty are smaller than those of no external penalty, and we give a sort of the optimal expected profits. And we also provide the effects of some parameters on the optimal decisions and the optimal expected profits.