14 May 2002 in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
The Nash equilibrium, the main solution concept in analytical game theory, cannot make precise predictions about the outcome of repeated mixed-motive games. Nor can it tell us much about the dynamics by which a population of players moves from one equilibrium to another. These limitations, along with concerns about the cognitive demands of forward-looking rationality, have motivated efforts to explore backward-looking alternatives to analytical game theory. Most of the effort has been invested in evolutionary models of population dynamics. We shift attention to a learning-theoretic alternative. Computational experiments with adaptive agents identify a fundamental solution concept for social dilemmas–−stochastic collusion–−based on a random walk from a self-limiting noncooperative equilibrium into a self-reinforcing cooperative equilibrium. However, we show that this solution is viable only within a narrow range of aspiration levels. Below the lower threshold, agents are pulled into a deficient equilibrium that is a stronger attractor than mutual cooperation. Above the upper threshold, agents are dissatisfied with mutual cooperation. Aspirations that adapt with experience (producing habituation to stimuli) do not gravitate into the window of viability; rather, they are the worst of both worlds. Habituation destabilizes cooperation and stabilizes defection. Results from the two-person problem suggest that applications to multiplex and embedded relationships will yield unexpected insights into the global dynamics of cooperation in social dilemmas.
13 March 2023 in Nature Human Behaviour
Social media has been transforming political communication dynamics for over a decade. Here using nearly a billion tweets, we analyse the change in Twitter’s news media landscape between the 2016 and 2020 US presidential elections. Using political bias and fact-checking tools, we measure the volume of politically biased content and the number of users propagating such information. We then identify influencers—users with the greatest ability to spread news in the Twitter network. We observe that the fraction of fake and extremely biased content declined between 2016 and 2020. However, results show increasing echo chamber behaviours and latent ideological polarization across the two elections at the user and influencer levels.
21 December 2018 in Science
The strength of long-range ties: It seems reasonable that we would have the closest, strongest ties with people in our immediate social network and that the ties between networks would be weaker. However, Park et al. discovered strong ties that spanned extreme network (not geographic) distances in 11 culturally diverse population-scale networks on four continents—encompassing 56 million Twitter users and 58 million mobile phone subscribers. Although they are fairly rare, strong ties between networks could be important for the spreading of ideas or disease. Science , this issue p. 1410
20 November 2023 in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
Science is among humanity’s greatest achievements, yet scientific censorship is rarely studied empirically. We explore the social, psychological, and institutional causes and consequences of scientific censorship (defined as actions aimed at obstructing particular scientific ideas from reaching an audience for reasons other than low scientific quality). Popular narratives suggest that scientific censorship is driven by authoritarian officials with dark motives, such as dogmatism and intolerance. Our analysis suggests that scientific censorship is often driven by scientists, who are primarily motivated by self-protection, benevolence toward peer scholars, and prosocial concerns for the well-being of human social groups. This perspective helps explain both recent findings on scientific censorship and recent changes to scientific institutions, such as the use of harm-based criteria to evaluate research. We discuss unknowns surrounding the consequences of censorship and provide recommendations for improving transparency and accountability in scientific decision-making to enable the exploration of these unknowns. The benefits of censorship may sometimes outweigh costs. However, until costs and benefits are examined empirically, scholars on opposing sides of ongoing debates are left to quarrel based on competing values, assumptions, and intuitions.
6 December 2021 in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
Significance: Our study was motivated by a highly disturbing puzzle. Confronted with a deadly global pandemic that threatened not only massive loss of life but also the collapse of our medical system and economy, why were we unable to put partisan divisions aside and unite in a common cause, similar to the national mobilization in the Great Depression and the Second World War? We used a computational model to search for an answer in the phase transitions of political polarization. The model reveals asymmetric hysteresis trajectories with tipping points that are hard to predict and that make polarization extremely difficult to reverse once the level exceeds a critical value.
14 May 2002 in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
Compared with the U.S., Japan is believed to have a collectivist culture that nurtures high trust. Results from laboratory and survey research, however, show that Americans are more likely to trust strangers than are Japanese. Why would trust be lower in a collectivist culture? We use an agent-based computational model to explore the evolutionary origin of this puzzling empirical finding. Computer simulations suggest that higher social mobility in the U.S. may be the explanation. With low mobility, agents rarely encounter strangers and thus remain highly parochial, trusting only their neighbors and avoiding open-market transactions with outsiders. With moderate mobility, agents learn to read telltale signs of character so that they can take advantage of better opportunities outside the neighborhood. However, if mobility is too great, there is too little trustworthiness to make the effort to discriminate worthwhile. This finding suggests that higher mobility in the U.S. may explain why Americans are more trusting than Japanese, but if mobility becomes too high, the self-reinforcing high-trust equilibrium could collapse.