Pablo Moriano

Pablo Moriano

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Pablo Moriano

Computer Science and Mathematics Division, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

16Years (2011-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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22 January 2024 in PLOS ONE
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
MVMiki E Verma
Miki E Verma
RBRobert A Bridges
Robert A Bridges
MIMichael D Iannacone
Michael D Iannacone
SHSamuel C Hollifield
Samuel C Hollifield
PMPablo Moriano
Pablo Moriano
FCFrank L Combs
Frank L Combs
Although ubiquitous in modern vehicles, Controller Area Networks (CANs) lack basic security properties and are easily exploitable. A rapidly growing field of CAN security research has emerged that seeks to detect intrusions or anomalies on CANs. Producing vehicular CAN data with a variety of intrusions is a difficult task for most researchers as it requires expensive assets and deep expertise. To illuminate this task, we introduce the first comprehensive guide to the existing open CAN intrusion detection system (IDS) datasets. We categorize attacks on CANs including fabrication (adding frames, e.g., flooding or targeting and ID), suspension (removing an ID’s frames), and masquerade attacks (spoofed frames sent in lieu of suspended ones). We provide a quality analysis of each dataset; an enumeration of each datasets’ attacks, benefits, and drawbacks; categorization as real vs. simulated CAN data and real vs. simulated attacks; whether the data is raw CAN data or signal-translated; number of vehicles/CANs; quantity in terms of time; and finally a suggested use case of each dataset. State-of-the-art public CAN IDS datasets are limited to real fabrication (simple message injection) attacks and simulated attacks often in synthetic data, lacking fidelity. In general, the physical effects of attacks on the vehicle are not verified in the available datasets. Only one dataset provides signal-translated data but is missing a corresponding “raw” binary version. This issue pigeon-holes CAN IDS research into testing on limited and often inappropriate data (usually with attacks that are too easily detectable to truly test the method). The scarcity of appropriate data has stymied comparability and reproducibility of results for researchers. As our primary contribution, we present the Real ORNL Automotive Dynamometer (ROAD) CAN IDS dataset, consisting of over 3.5 hours of one vehicle’s CAN data. ROAD contains ambient data recorded during a diverse set of activities, and attacks of increasing stealth with multiple variants and instances of real (i.e. non-simulated) fuzzing, fabrication, unique advanced attacks, and simulated masquerade attacks. To facilitate a benchmark for CAN IDS methods that require signal-translated inputs, we also provide the signal time series format for many of the CAN captures. Our contributions aim to facilitate appropriate benchmarking and needed comparability in the CAN IDS research field.

8 August 2023 in IEEE Internet of Things Journal
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Journal Article
Open access
HSHasan Shahriar
Hasan Shahriar
YXYang Xiao
Yang Xiao
PMPablo Moriano
Pablo Moriano
WLWenjing Lou
Wenjing Lou
YHY. Thomas Hou
Y. Thomas Hou
Modern vehicles rely on a fleet of electronic control units (ECUs) connected through controller area network (CAN) buses for critical vehicular control. With the expansion of advanced connectivity features in automobiles and the elevated risks of internal system exposure, the CAN bus is increasingly prone to intrusions and injection attacks. As ordinary injection attacks disrupt the typical timing properties of the CAN data stream, rule-based intrusion detection systems (IDS) can easily detect them. However, advanced attackers can inject false data to the signal/semantic level, while looking innocuous by the pattern/frequency of the CAN messages. The rule-based IDS, as well as the anomaly-based IDS, are built merely on the sequence of CAN messages IDs or just the binary payload data and are less effective in detecting such attacks. Therefore, to detect such intelligent attacks, we propose CANShield, a deep learning-based signal-level intrusion detection framework for the CAN bus. CANShield consists of three modules: a data preprocessing module that handles the high-dimensional CAN data stream at the signal level and parses them into time series suitable for a deep learning model; a data analyzer module consisting of multiple deep autoencoder (AE) networks, each analyzing the time-series data from a different temporal scale and granularity, and finally an attack detection module that uses an ensemble method to make the final decision. Evaluation results on two high-fidelity signal-based CAN attack datasets show the high accuracy and responsiveness of CANShield in detecting advanced intrusion attacks.

23 June 2025 in Artificial Intelligence Review
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Journal Article
Open access
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PMPablo Moriano
Pablo Moriano
SHSteven C. Hespeler
Steven C. Hespeler
MLMingyan Li
Mingyan Li
MMMaria Mahbub
Maria Mahbub
Modern cyberattacks in cyber-physical systems (CPS) rapidly evolve and cannot be deterred effectively with most current methods, which focus on characterizing past threats. Adaptive anomaly detection (AAD) is among the most promising techniques to detect evolving cyberattacks, with an emphasis on fast data processing and model adaptation. AAD has been researched extensively; however, to the best of our knowledge, our work is the first systematic literature review (SLR) on current research in this field. We present a comprehensive SLR, gathering 397 relevant papers and systematically analyzing 65 of them (47 research and 18 survey papers) on AAD in CPS from 2013 to November 2023. We introduce a novel taxonomy considering attack types, CPS application, learning paradigm, data management, and algorithms. Our findings show that most studies addressed either model adaptation or data processing, but rarely both simultaneously. This indicates a research gap in fully adaptive solutions. We also categorize algorithms, datasets, and attack characteristics, and summarize strengths and weaknesses across the literature. Our review provides a structured and accessible reference for researchers and practitioners, offering insights into key trends and highlighting limitations in current approaches. Finally, we outline several future research directions, including the need for integrated real-time processing and adaptive learning, explainability, and uncertainty quantification in AAD for CPS.

12 June 2017 in Information & Computer Security
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PRPrashanth Rajivan
Prashanth Rajivan
PMPablo Moriano
Pablo Moriano
TKTimothy Kelley
Timothy Kelley
LCL. Jean Camp
L. Jean Camp
Purpose: The purpose of this study is to identify factors that determine computer and security expertise in end users. They can be significant determinants of human behaviour and interactions in the security and privacy context. Standardized, externally valid instruments for measuring end-user security expertise are non-existent. Design/methodology/approach: A questionnaire encompassing skills and knowledge-based questions was developed to identify critical factors that constitute expertise in end users. Exploratory factor analysis was applied on the results from 898 participants from a wide range of populations. Cluster analysis was applied to characterize the relationship between computer and security expertise. Ordered logistic regression models were applied to measure efficacy of the proposed security and computing factors in predicting user comprehension of security concepts: phishing and certificates. Findings: There are levels to peoples’ computer and security expertise that could be reasonably measured and operationalized. Four factors that constitute computer security-related skills and knowledge are, namely, basic computer skills, advanced computer skills, security knowledge and advanced security skills, and these are identified as determinants of computer expertise. Practical implications: Findings from this work can be used to guide the design of security interfaces such that it caters to people with different expertise levels and does not force users to exercise more cognitive processes than required. Originality/value: This work identified four factors that constitute security expertise in end users. Findings from this work were integrated to propose a framework called Security SRK for guiding further research on security expertise. This work posits that security expertise instrument for end user should measure three cognitive dimensions: security skills, rules and knowledge.

1 April 2021 in Computer Networks
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PMPablo Moriano
Pablo Moriano
RHRaquel Hill
Raquel Hill
LCL. Jean Camp
L. Jean Camp

13 March 2019 in Scientific Reports
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Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
PMPablo Moriano
Pablo Moriano
JFJorge Finke
Jorge Finke
YAYong-Yeol Ahn
Yong-Yeol Ahn
We propose a method for detecting large events based on the structure of temporal communication networks. Our method is motivated by findings that viral information spreading has distinct diffusion patterns with respect to community structure. Namely, we hypothesize that global events trigger viral information cascades that easily cross community boundaries and can thus be detected by monitoring intra- and inter-community communications. By comparing the amount of communication within and across communities, we show that it is possible to detect events, even when they do not trigger a significantly larger communication volume. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our method using two examples—the email communication network of Enron and the Twitter communication network during the Boston Marathon bombing.