1 January 2010 in Psychological Review
Rational models of cognition typically consider the abstract computational problems posed by the environment, assuming that people are capable of optimally solving those problems. This differs from more traditional formal models of cognition, which focus on the psychological processes responsible for behavior. A basic challenge for rational models is thus explaining how optimal solutions can be approximated by psychological processes. We outline a general strategy for answering this question, namely to explore the psychological plausibility of approximation algorithms developed in computer science and statistics. In particular, we argue that Monte Carlo methods provide a source of rational process models that connect optimal solutions to psychological processes. We support this argument through a detailed example, applying this approach to Anderson's (1990, 1991) rational model of categorization (RMC), which involves a particularly challenging computational problem. Drawing on a connection between the RMC and ideas from nonparametric Bayesian statistics, we propose 2 alternative algorithms for approximate inference in this model. The algorithms we consider include Gibbs sampling, a procedure appropriate when all stimuli are presented simultaneously, and particle filters, which sequentially approximate the posterior distribution with a small number of samples that are updated as new data become available. Applying these algorithms to several existing datasets shows that a particle filter with a single particle provides a good description of human inferences.
1 December 2016 in Trends in Cognitive Sciences
Bayesian explanations have swept through cognitive science over the past two decades, from intuitive physics and causal learning, to perception, motor control and language. Yet people flounder with even the simplest probability questions. What explains this apparent paradox? How can a supposedly Bayesian brain reason so poorly with probabilities? In this paper, we propose a direct and perhaps unexpected answer: that Bayesian brains need not represent or calculate probabilities at all and are, indeed, poorly adapted to do so. Instead, the brain is a Bayesian sampler. Only with infinite samples does a Bayesian sampler conform to the laws of probability; with finite samples it systematically generates classic probabilistic reasoning errors, including the unpacking effect, base-rate neglect, and the conjunction fallacy.
1 January 2013 in Psychological Review
People have strong intuitions about the influence objects exert upon one another when they collide. Because people's judgments appear to deviate from Newtonian mechanics, psychologists have suggested that people depend on a variety of task-specific heuristics. This leaves open the question of how these heuristics could be chosen, and how to integrate them into a unified model that can explain human judgments across a wide range of physical reasoning tasks. We propose an alternative framework, in which people's judgments are based on optimal statistical inference over a Newtonian physical model that incorporates sensory noise and intrinsic uncertainty about the physical properties of the objects being viewed. This noisy Newton framework can be applied to a multitude of judgments, with people's answers determined by the uncertainty they have for physical variables and the constraints of Newtonian mechanics. We investigate a range of effects in mass judgments that have been taken as strong evidence for heuristic use and show that they are well explained by the interplay between Newtonian constraints and sensory uncertainty. We also consider an extended model that handles causality judgments, and obtain good quantitative agreement with human judgments across tasks that involve different judgment types with a single consistent set of parameters.
25 July 2012 in Current Directions in Psychological Science
Probabilistic models of cognition characterize the abstract computational problems underlying inductive inferences and identify their ideal solutions. This approach differs from traditional methods of investigating human cognition, which focus on identifying the cognitive or neural processes that underlie behavior and therefore concern alternative levels of analysis. To evaluate the theoretical implications of probabilistic models and increase their predictive power, we must understand the relationships between theories at these different levels of analysis. One strategy for bridging levels of analysis is to explore cognitive processes that have a direct link to probabilistic inference. Recent research employing this strategy has focused on the possibility that the Monte Carlo principle—which concerns sampling from probability distributions in order to perform computations—provides a way to link probabilistic models of cognition to more concrete cognitive and neural processes.
1 August 2010 in Psychonomic Bulletin & Review