Model extraction attack typically refers to extracting non-public information from a black-box machine learning model. Its unauthorized nature poses significant threat to intellectual property rights of the model owners. By using the well-designed queries and the predictions returned from the victim model, the adversary is able to train a clone model from scratch to obtain similar functionality as victim model. Recently, some methods have been proposed to perform model extraction attacks without using any in-distribution data (Data-free setting). Although these methods have been shown to achieve high clone accuracy, their query budgets are typically around 10 million or even exceed 20 million in some datasets, which lead to a high cost of model stealing and can be easily defended by limiting the number of queries. To illustrate the severe threats induced by model extraction attacks with limited query budget in realistic scenarios, we propose QUDA – a novel QUey-limited DAta-free model extraction attack that incorporates GAN pre-trained by public unrelated dataset to provide weak image prior and the technique of deep reinforcement learning to make query generation strategy more efficient. Compared with the state-of-the-art data-free model extraction method, QUDA achieves better results under query-limited condition (0.1M query budget) in FMNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets, and even outperforms the baseline method in most cases when QUDA uses only 10% query budget of its. QUDA issued a warning that solely relying on the limited numbers of queries or the confidentiality of training data is not reliable to protect model’s security and privacy. Potential countermeasures, such as detection-based defense approach, are also provided.
Machine learning models are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. In this paper, we consider the scenario where a model is distributed to multiple buyers, among which a malicious buyer attempts to attack another buyer. The malicious buyer probes its copy of the model to search for adversarial samples and then presents the found samples to the victim’s copy of the model in order to replicate the attack. We point out that by distributing different copies of the model to different buyers, we can mitigate the attack such that adversarial samples found on one copy would not work on another copy. We observed that training a model with different randomness indeed mitigates such replication to a certain degree. However, there is no guarantee and retraining is computationally expensive. A number of works extended the retraining method to enhance the differences among models. However, a very limited number of models can be produced using such methods and the computational cost becomes even higher. Therefore, we propose a flexible parameter rewriting method that directly modifies the model’s parameters. This method does not require additional training and is able to generate a large number of copies in a more controllable manner, where each copy induces different adversarial regions. Experimentation studies show that rewriting can significantly mitigate the attacks while retaining high classification accuracy. For instance, on GTSRB dataset with respect to Hop Skip Jump attack, using attractor-based rewriter can reduce the success rate of replicating the attack to 0.5% while independently training copies with different randomness can reduce the success rate to 6.5%. From this study, we believe that there are many further directions worth exploring.