Bernd Schlipphak

Bernd Schlipphak

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Bernd Schlipphak

University of Münster, Münster, Germany

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

13Years (2014-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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14 September 2016 in Journal of European Public Policy
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Journal Article
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BSBernd Schlipphak
Bernd Schlipphak
OTOliver Treib
Oliver Treib
This article develops the argument that European Union (EU) intervention to protect its core values is likely to provoke unintended and undesired consequences at the domestic level. EU intervention will typically invite the accused government to play the blame game on Brussels. By criticizing the EU for illegitimately interfering with domestic affairs, the government may frame EU intervention as a threat from the outside and present itself as the only safeguard against this threat. As a consequence, support for those domestic actors that were supposed to be weakened by EU intervention is likely to increase in the aftermath of a European intervention, while EU support might significantly drop. The article illustrates this argument by tracing domestic reactions to EU interventions against Austria between 2000 and 2002 and against Hungary since 2010. In conclusion, the EU should be very cautious with such external interventions, since they may easily strengthen anti-EU and illiberal political forces at the domestic level. To minimize the risk of such undesired consequences, bottom–up mechanisms against democratic backsliding should be installed, which would allow disadvantaged domestic groups to appeal to an independent European democracy watchdog if they feel that democratic rules are being violated in their country.

16 October 2014 in The Review of International Organizations
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Journal Article
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BSBernd Schlipphak
Bernd Schlipphak

11 February 2022 in The Review of International Organizations
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Journal Article
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BSBernd Schlipphak
Bernd Schlipphak
PMPaul Meiners
Paul Meiners
OKOsman Sabri Kiratli
Osman Sabri Kiratli

21 July 2022 in Journal of European Public Policy
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
BSBernd Schlipphak
Bernd Schlipphak
PMPaul Meiners
Paul Meiners
OTOliver Treib
Oliver Treib
CSConstantin Schäfer
Constantin Schäfer
Under what conditions do citizens consider external sanctions against their country to be appropriate? Based on the literature on blame shifting, we argue that citizens should become less likely to support external sanctions if their government defends itself, especially if it seeks to shift the blame to the external actors (blame effect). However, this effect may be moderated by which actor identifies and claims the norm violation (source effect) and by whether citizens trust their government (trust effect). We test our expectations by conducting a survey experiment on EU sanctions against democratic backsliding in six countries (n = 12,000). Our results corroborate the blame and source effects, but disconfirm the trust effect. These findings have important implications for the literatures on blame shifting and external sanctions as well as for how the EU and other International Organizations should design their sanctioning mechanisms.

21 July 2022 in Journal of European Public Policy
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Journal Article
Open access
CSConstantin Schäfer
Constantin Schäfer
OTOliver Treib
Oliver Treib
BSBernd Schlipphak
Bernd Schlipphak
How to reform the EU in times of fundamental conflict over the future of European integration? Although Europe’s future is fiercely debated, we still know little about what kind of EU citizens want and how their reform preferences relate to the emerging transnational cleavage. We argue that there are two kinds of reform trajectories. First, any changes that touch upon the vertical and horizontal balance of power should be highly contested, as people’s EU reform preferences depend on their position in the conflict between Eurosceptics and Europhiles. Second, reforms that do not activate this fundamental conflict, such as reshaping the EU’s input, output, and throughput legitimacy dimensions, should be favored by citizens across the board. Analyzing original data from conjoint survey experiments with 12,000 respondents in six EU member states largely corroborates our arguments. These findings carry important implications for the political debate about reforming the EU.

24 November 2022 in Politics and Governance
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Journal Article
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BSBernd Schlipphak
Bernd Schlipphak
MIMujtaba Isani
Mujtaba Isani
MBMitja D. Back
Mitja D. Back
A plentitude of research has analyzed citizens’ belief in conspiracy theories and its individual‐level correlates. Yet, the effects of (political) context factors on the causes and effects of individual belief in conspiracy theories are still neglected. However, such context should be especially relevant when it comes to the impact of one’s belief in conspiracy theories on one’s political preference. In this article, we argue that the communication of governmental actors exerts a moderating influence on the link leading from a belief in conspiracy theories to political attitudes. In a nutshell, the belief in conspiracy theories should make citizens less likely to distrust their government—and the political system in general—in contexts where these theories are shared or at least publicly represented by governmental actors. Using two original data sets with data from Germany, Poland, and Jordan (Study 1) and data from Germany, Poland, Sweden, and France (Study 2), we test our argument based on an overall sample of about 10,000 cases. Our results indicate that higher degrees of generic conspiracy theories beliefs are associated with higher levels of political distrust across countries. Yet, confirming our argument, such an effect takes place less strongly in those countries in which governmental actors use conspiracy theories as a political communication strategy.