Xing Gao

Xing Gao

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Xing Gao

University of Delaware

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

7Years (2020-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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15 November 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
ZZZhenkai Zhang
Zhenkai Zhang
TATyler Allen
Tyler Allen
FYFan Yao
Fan Yao
XGXing Gao
Xing Gao
RGRong Ge
Rong Ge
Recent studies have revealed much detailed information about the translation lookaside buffers (TLBs) of modern CPUs, but we find that many properties of such components in modern GPUs still remain unknown or unclear. To fill this knowledge gap, we develop a new GPU TLB reverse-engineering method and apply it to a variety of consumer- and server-grade GPUs in Turing and Ampere generations. Aside from learning significantly more comprehensive and accurate GPU TLB properties, we discover a design flaw of NVIDIA Multi-Instance GPU (MIG) feature. MIG claims full partitioning of the entire GPU memory system for secure GPU sharing in cloud computing. However, we surprisingly find that MIG does not partition the last-level TLB, which is shared by all the compute units in a GPU. Exploiting this design flaw and learned TLB properties, we are able to construct a covert channel for data exfiltration across MIG-enforced isolation. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attack on MIG. We evaluate the proposed attack on a commercial cloud platform, and we successfully achieve reliable data exfiltration from a victim tenant at a speed of up to 31 kbps with a very high accuracy around 99.8%. Even when the victim is using the GPU for deep neural network training, the transmission can still reach more than 25 kbps with a more than 99.5% accuracy. We propose and implement a mitigation approach that can effectively thwart data exfiltration through this covert channel. Additionally, we present a preliminary study on exploiting the access patterns of the last-level TLB to infer the identity of applications running in other MIG-created GPU instances.

13 May 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
XLXiaofan Li
Xiaofan Li
JYJin Yang
Jin Yang
JCJiaqi Chen
Jiaqi Chen
YTYuzhe Tang
Yuzhe Tang
XGXing Gao
Xing Gao
Upgradeable smart contracts (USCs) have been widely adopted to enable modifying deployed smart contracts. While USCs bring great flexibility to developers, improper usage might introduce new security issues, potentially allowing attackers to hijack USCs and their users. In this paper, we conduct a large-scale measurement study to characterize USCs and their security implications in the wild. We summarize six commonly used USC patterns and develop a tool, USCDetector, to identify USCs without needing source code. Particularly, USCDetector collects various information such as bytecode and transaction information to construct upgrade chains for USCs and disclose potentially vulnerable ones. We evaluate USCDetector using verified smart contracts (i.e., with source code) as ground truth and show that USCDetector can achieve high accuracy with a precision of 96.26%. We then use USCDetector to conduct a large-scale study on Ethereum, covering a total of 60,251,064 smart contracts. USCDetecor constructs 10,218 upgrade chains and discloses multiple real-world USCs with potential security issues.

7 August 2024 in IEEE Security & Privacy
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
MAMustafa Abdallah
Mustafa Abdallah
SBSaurabh Bagchi
Saurabh Bagchi
SBShaunak D. Bopardikar
Shaunak D. Bopardikar
KCKevin Chan
Kevin Chan
XGXing Gao
Xing Gao
Quanyan  ZhuQuanyan Zhu
Quanyan Zhu
Combining insights from distributed system security and game theory could effectively address security challenges. We present foundational concepts from both fields that can be integrated to better secure distributed systems and outline several research challenges for the community to tackle.

2 December 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
XLXiaofan Li
Xiaofan Li
YGYacong Gu
Yacong Gu
CQChu Qiao
Chu Qiao
ZZZhenkai Zhang
Zhenkai Zhang
DLDaiping Liu
Daiping Liu
XGXing Gao
Xing Gao
Mainstream Continuous Integration (CI) platforms have provided the plugin functionality to accelerate the development of CI pipelines. Unfortunately, CI plugins, which are essentially reusable code snippets, also expose new attack surfaces as plugins might be developed by less trusted users. In this paper, we present an in-depth study to understand potential security risks in existing CI plugins. We conduct a comprehensive analysis of plugin implementations on four mainstream CI platforms (GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, CircleCI, and Azure Pipelines), and investigate several weak links in existing plugin distributions and isolation mechanisms. We investigate seven attack vectors that can enable attackers to hijack plugins and distribute malicious code without plugins users being aware, and further exploit hijacked plugins to manipulate the workflow execution. Additionally, we find that plugin dependency (a plugin references other plugins) might further amplify the attack impact of our disclosed attacks. To evaluate the potential impact, we conduct a large-scale measurement on GitHub and GitLab, covering a total of 1,328,912 repositories using the aforementioned CI platforms. Our measurement results show that a large number of repositories and existing plugins, including many widely used ones, are potentially vulnerable to the proposed attacks. We have duly reported the identified vulnerabilities and received positive responses.