Name-based treatments have been used in observational studies and experiments to study the differential effect of identity—commonly race or ethnic minority status. These treatments are typically assumed to signal only a single characteristic. If names unintentionally signal other characteristics, then the treatment can violate information equivalence, and estimated treatment effects cannot be attributed to the desired characteristic alone. Using results from a name perception study paired with an original correspondence audit experiment of U.S. state legislators, we show that names manipulate perceptions of minority status, socioeconomic status (SES), and migrant status. Our audit study shows that low SES status is related to reply rates both across and within each racial category. These results provide evidence that discrimination cannot be easily attributed singularly to the intended treatment of minority status but rather reflect a more multifaceted form of discrimination. More generally, our results provide an example of how name-based treatments manipulate more than the intended characteristic, which means that estimated treatment effects cannot be interpreted as being manipulated solely by the desired characteristic. Future studies with name-based or other informational treatments should account for the potential violation of information equivalence in their research design and interpretation of results.
1 October 2019 in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Research suggests that organizational structure can influence the ability of actors to discriminate. In this research note, we examine whether the structure of state legislatures affects observed discrimination in correspondent audit studies. We find that increased legislative professionalization is associated with reduced discrimination against racial minorities. By analyzing thousands of emails collected in a prior study, we find that legislative professionalization is related to a higher likelihood that staffers respond to email contacts and staffers are less likely to discriminate against racial minorities across multiple measures of discrimination. Our findings emphasize the importance of substantively relevant heterogeneity in audit studies and identify a potential mitigator of discrimination—legislative professionalism. Our results also highlight the importance of staffers in representation and the legislative process.
1 December 2020 in State Politics & Policy Quarterly
The use of deception is common in elite correspondence audit studies. Elite audit studies are a type of field experiment used by researchers to test for discrimination against vulnerable populations seeking to access government resources. These studies have provided invaluable insights, but they have done so at the cost of using deception. They have relied on identity, activity, and motivation deception. In addition, they request unnecessary work. Is there a less deceptive alternative? In this article, I present results from a field experiment with state legislative offices that minimize the use of deception. Consistent with elite correspondence audit studies, I find evidence of discrimination against Hispanics among state legislative offices. In addition, I find that discrimination is mitigated when subjects believe their behavior will be public knowledge. This suggests that discrimination can be mitigated through increased monitoring. This article advances the discussion on how to minimize the use of deception in elite field experimentation and how to mitigate discrimination against vulnerable populations.
An ongoing debate in American politics concerns the extent to which subnational politics has become “nationalized.” We advance this debate by collecting issue‐position data on four distinct policy topics from unprecedented national surveys of public officials at both the local and state levels. We then combine this survey data with precinct‐level presidential vote‐share data that is tabulated to match the boundary of each survey respondent's government jurisdiction. In doing so, we demonstrate that national party sorting of subnational officials is substantively and statistically significant across a range of issues with national salience, that it is consistent across local and state levels of government and it cannot be explained by the party sorting of constituents. These findings have implications both for the scope of nationalization as well as its implications for substantive representation.